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From: Gabriele Monaco <gmonaco@redhat.com>
To: "igor.stoppa@gmail.com" <igor.stoppa@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>,
	 Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
		ksummit@lists.linux.dev, istoppa@nvidia.com,
	Kate Stewart	 <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Gabriele Paoloni <gpaoloni@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [TECH TOPIC] Improving kernel security & integrity by generalizing ad-hoc safety mechanisms
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2026 12:10:53 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a8e733d2c5dfa78fbe45a7d82e502788f4c4cdba.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAH2bzCRvGGi_WS4j-5jeWU2uFrFWy_s9ZtMrcT5r+QY+=UdP4w@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, 2026-09-09 at 19:07 +0300, igor.stoppa@gmail.com wrote:
> On Wed, 9 Sept 2026 at 18:22, Gabriele Monaco <gmonaco@redhat.com> wrote:
> 
> > In general I feel anything that tries to validate the kernel from the kernel
> > itself will have this kind of problems. It cannot really be isolated from
> > what it tries to verify.
> 
> Well, that is where I beg to differ. We have implemented such a mechanism.
> But I've been repeatedly told that I should provide first the code,
> which right now woulnd't really help much, because it is far from being in a
> reviewable shape.
> So I won't get back there.
> 
> You can look at the references from the root mail in this thread,
> or we can move the conversation to a different place, if you want to
> discuss more about it.

Right, I didn't think I had access to the entire conversation but it's all on
lore.

Now I remember, you discussed this at last year's LPC.
RV is indeed not quite a fit for this.

I'll be trying to follow your presentation this year. Also a BoF on this sounds
interesting to get the ball rolling.

Thanks,
Gabriele


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-09-10 10:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-07 16:53 [TECH TOPIC] Improving kernel security & integrity by generalizing ad-hoc safety mechanisms igor.stoppa
2026-09-07 19:46 ` Greg KH
2026-09-07 21:42   ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-08  3:51     ` Theodore Tso
2026-09-08 10:14       ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-08 13:55         ` Theodore Tso
2026-09-08 14:32           ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-08 19:29             ` Steven Rostedt
2026-09-08 21:13               ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-08 23:14                 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-09-08 23:48                   ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-09  7:44                     ` Gabriele Monaco
2026-09-09  9:40                       ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-09 15:22                         ` Gabriele Monaco
2026-09-09 16:07                           ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-09 16:14                             ` Steven Rostedt
2026-09-09 16:24                               ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-09 16:32                                 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-09-10 10:10                             ` Gabriele Monaco [this message]
2026-09-30  2:57                         ` Chuck Wolber
2026-09-30  1:58                       ` Chuck Wolber
2026-09-08  5:05     ` Greg KH
2026-09-08 11:26       ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-08 11:54         ` Greg KH
2026-09-08 12:25           ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-08 12:39             ` Greg KH
2026-09-08 12:52               ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-08 13:11             ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-09-08 13:52               ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-08 14:44                 ` Theodore Tso
2026-09-08 15:32                   ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-08 12:41         ` James Bottomley
2026-09-08 13:03           ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-08 15:40             ` Steven Rostedt
2026-09-08 16:09               ` igor.stoppa
2026-09-08 17:35                 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-09-09  1:31                   ` Theodore Tso

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