From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 65ACA322768 for ; Mon, 27 Jul 2026 18:38:15 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1785177496; cv=none; b=I1nDBPRIoiWdymsCCIAKTsscuxnQDRVYzJ3GfA952w+Edkji99SVaKMvma9ooRVx5g4otWtCgEoUlXp0msNJISjwWzVzGVDgXnFyy1vQ0FbUctq4THuvOJF+YzbtSTJKhrzezEIP+zhr/kqh61GoRbuW5A4iaSyAeq33QtHiHYY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1785177496; c=relaxed/simple; bh=PdZllb6ssTIv3SNYvzJGSUIncFVQyLT+B//sJQo8PlU=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=tVFHAW6bj7cT7XCrIhtntxs/FWueUcST9Zy/Kx6+SLejXWcOsYTrWo0JOelvwAurdslJDvHn0doWdb4gzxx2SnE2aKRM7KOq2C1P6tdmz/yxStDpWFBsEzqlwMpIrIFDFhapDkNf/kU8p94bT1Rv0rb4bHSXo+apH9EgKS35K90= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=SemluGRR; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="SemluGRR" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0F1EE1F000E9; Mon, 27 Jul 2026 18:38:14 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1785177495; bh=2L7ta0XwEjtUh+QhjYdkiujXxQzy2Zgj/fuK5g3++k0=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=SemluGRR2I1KeYresdQHtSDeVjJBjcUA9v6SyjM8yYvTvguRJVbpNTFlXMBN6XSUm g7se6ebdM2hCj1piZ6ptGkFOqzzc0nvI47y4OcfeGlTIyPAbbAQbKqPRmsoE62/UKY UbZTIue7XkYNWWfT3jZ6VdTQTUuL3pgABHLlkDEuCpBeLVix92/OXapLGEIRg+d8jz KROxxVH5FKZ+rVVPXNr22J8pIHYF17SoZNiYvh0l1q2nAMwauiLVIYnkgh5zW8/ojM 7H+uKCOO8GtV9C5XPUEoRtTO7EI28db9Jv6QJBrYIpDAwdGQsppEuB3ry/3p8lfE1i cfX8YRN/Ewi/A== Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 14:38:13 -0400 From: Sasha Levin To: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina , ksummit@lists.linux.dev Subject: Re: [MAINTAINERS SUMMIT] Scaling our security process Message-ID: References: <241384q7-s5n1-0267-64ps-13r514r4o123@xreary.bet> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: ksummit@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: On Mon, Jul 27, 2026 at 10:08:48AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote: >On Mon, 27 Jul 2026 at 07:37, Jiri Kosina wrote: >> >> Well, linux-distros@ is still there, and is used to coordinate security >> fixes in exactly this way consistently for vast majority of all the >> relevant projects, pretty much except for the kernel. With my distro hat >> on, I'd add "unfortunately". > >I refuse to have anything to do with linux-distros. > >They have a hard mandatory disclosure policy, which I think is >completely unacceptable. It means that if you send actual exploits to >the channel those exploits will be made public too. There is >absolutely no value in that, and it seems completely crazy to me. > >Yet exploit code - or at least a PoC - are hugely useful to >developers. So you do want to have people who figure out some security >issue - or any other bug, for that matter - to include such code, but >that does not mean that it should be made public. Does this asymmetry in effort between the fix and the reproducer/exploit code really exists these days? Point your favorite LLM at a commit that fixes an issue and ask it to reproduce the problem. You'll likely end up with working exploit code fairly quickly. >The *fix* obviously should be public, and the commit message needs to >explain the bug. And the threat of mandatory disclosure for any >unfixed bug is a good way to keep people honest. But disclosing >exploits after-the-fact as if everybody will have immediately >upgraded? Asinine. ... which is why I think that our current security process, and security@k.o, effectively does something similar to linux-distros@: 1. We end up bringing more attention to a particular issue once the fix is merged. 2. We make the issue public before users had a chance to upgrade. 3. Any "script kiddie" is then able to generate a working exploit from the commit that fixes the issue. Even without security@k.o, things like the syzkaller dashboard and the vulns.git CVE repo are effectively a massive public library of vulnerabilities. -- Thanks, Sasha