From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7A662CD98CE for ; Mon, 8 Jun 2026 14:43:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To: Message-ID:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=R1Aehx98K165uPEhNJ3qZzw7AYU3rjA8/BlTWhZ8Ij8=; b=NKQigSFp8cumbQ HXPZBgxAB12qglSvNhw5m76SQVnYkmea07phF0Ub7za4/JvLJk0odjwgN4/QUf4ub61bvLkZdpLc4 EaE1pZqI3bT7YcHMV/a/+HXeeeP1+3GOwR4XyYiBZnsZIqo0WrS95di7F5nxUsDcojqpFomhjh0Jq K15NUPUn8HB4/pcTEMN9RQ6Eqtri9DWbDwf7Q/Y3lGe7CE17ptpktDrjUYpWt4SNh/PpaU6qOL2Ob z9Sndo1LHGkBsUvpN7dj5acp1rY8QnIl/8ym0V4LEuSQektqvkaColLF/3+nD54TDIWTuFpawcIIo 8Mrsk37zkAm/vWUi4EqA==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.99.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1wWbCN-00000003q6g-2iD3; Mon, 08 Jun 2026 14:43:31 +0000 Received: from desiato.infradead.org ([2001:8b0:10b:1:d65d:64ff:fe57:4e05]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.99.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1wWbCF-00000003pn8-0D5U for kvm-riscv@bombadil.infradead.org; Mon, 08 Jun 2026 14:43:23 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=desiato.20200630; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version :References:In-Reply-To:Message-ID:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Sender:Reply-To: Content-Type:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=MSoaCsHNhwggXAiuLoUjgOgIfe8z45X0C6H0JSFUY58=; b=g7jTs6OlAn00WtrH6x1VWHqMk7 MFRUj5n1ajEYtnpRCx5g4mo/QVbSs+pKSPBBHKErokkzHUA32OBnYeaB996U1N/UhMcFmXEriYI4Z +2FBrANZhfuqenZV+IshCiKJIqvqcPDgtZc1vm8j1EJr3kx7VH1MwVCh65FoKPBdnCvHrms8Mjg+n UvWteqZUCge57IcbbUv8tkxOrxNB/qrrhA2aVVsb3wtVilt5/goWvYerYIjXbSLX64xlgyQwUuUNm gurEjUYV9Oiv6y6O4pb0eWds0vAYwXIBNeE+F1bOMvk/HIOgDYGxS7UpyYmxpRGBJabLXLuIUm8P4 wipFNkTQ==; Received: from mail.8bytes.org ([85.214.250.239]) by desiato.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.99.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1wWbCB-0000000198t-2yMs for kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org; Mon, 08 Jun 2026 14:43:21 +0000 Received: from io.home.8bytes.org (p4ffe1d30.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [79.254.29.48]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mail.8bytes.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 84F122028CF; Mon, 8 Jun 2026 16:43:14 +0200 (CEST) From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=B6rg=20R=C3=B6del?= To: Paolo Bonzini , Sean Christopherson Cc: Tom Lendacky , ashish.kalra@amd.com, michael.roth@amd.com, nsaenz@amazon.com, anelkz@amazon.de, James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, Melody Wang , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, loongarch@lists.linux.dev, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org, coconut-svsm@lists.linux.dev, joerg.roedel@amd.com Subject: [PATCH 44/60] kvm: x86: Move cpu_caps to struct kvm_vcpu_arch_common Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 16:42:36 +0200 Message-ID: <20260608144252.351443-45-joro@8bytes.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260608144252.351443-1-joro@8bytes.org> References: <20260608144252.351443-1-joro@8bytes.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.9.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20260608_154320_046353_DCEA2C7F X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 19.03 ) X-BeenThere: kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "kvm-riscv" Errors-To: kvm-riscv-bounces+kvm-riscv=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Joerg Roedel Now that CPUID state is shared across all planes, cpu_caps can be shared as well. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 33 +++++++++++++++++---------------- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 18 +++++++++--------- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 17 +++++++++-------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 3a64bdae6e23..b0d040528f9d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -800,6 +800,23 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch_common { struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entries; bool cpuid_dynamic_bits_dirty; bool is_amd_compatible; + + /* + * cpu_caps holds the effective guest capabilities, i.e. the features + * the vCPU is allowed to use. Typically, but not always, features can + * be used by the guest if and only if both KVM and userspace want to + * expose the feature to the guest. + * + * A common exception is for virtualization holes, i.e. when KVM can't + * prevent the guest from using a feature, in which case the vCPU "has" + * the feature regardless of what KVM or userspace desires. + * + * Note, features that don't require KVM involvement in any way are + * NOT enforced/sanitized by KVM, i.e. are taken verbatim from the + * guest CPUID provided by userspace. + */ + u32 cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS]; + }; int kvm_arch_vcpu_common_init(struct kvm_vcpu_common *common); @@ -925,22 +942,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch { int halt_request; /* real mode on Intel only */ - /* - * cpu_caps holds the effective guest capabilities, i.e. the features - * the vCPU is allowed to use. Typically, but not always, features can - * be used by the guest if and only if both KVM and userspace want to - * expose the feature to the guest. - * - * A common exception is for virtualization holes, i.e. when KVM can't - * prevent the guest from using a feature, in which case the vCPU "has" - * the feature regardless of what KVM or userspace desires. - * - * Note, features that don't require KVM involvement in any way are - * NOT enforced/sanitized by KVM, i.e. are taken verbatim from the - * guest CPUID provided by userspace. - */ - u32 cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS]; - u64 reserved_gpa_bits; int maxphyaddr; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 6d948d63306c..27e2f7e25038 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_update_feature_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool has_feature) { cpuid_entry_change(entry, x86_feature, has_feature); - guest_cpu_cap_change(vcpu, x86_feature, has_feature); + guest_cpu_cap_change(vcpu->common, x86_feature, has_feature); } static void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) bool allow_gbpages; int i; - memset(vcpu->arch.cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.cpu_caps)); + memset(common->arch.cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(common->arch.cpu_caps)); BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(reverse_cpuid) != NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS); /* @@ -408,9 +408,9 @@ void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * in guest CPUID. Note, this includes features that are * supported by KVM but aren't advertised to userspace! */ - vcpu->arch.cpu_caps[i] = kvm_cpu_caps[i] | - cpuid_get_reg_unsafe(&emulated, cpuid.reg); - vcpu->arch.cpu_caps[i] &= cpuid_get_reg_unsafe(entry, cpuid.reg); + common->arch.cpu_caps[i] = kvm_cpu_caps[i] | + cpuid_get_reg_unsafe(&emulated, cpuid.reg); + common->arch.cpu_caps[i] &= cpuid_get_reg_unsafe(entry, cpuid.reg); } kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu); @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) */ allow_gbpages = tdp_enabled ? boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES) : guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES); - guest_cpu_cap_change(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES, allow_gbpages); + guest_cpu_cap_change(common, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES, allow_gbpages); best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 1); if (best && apic) { @@ -536,8 +536,8 @@ static int kvm_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e2, swap(common->arch.cpuid_entries, e2); swap(common->arch.cpuid_nent, nent); - memcpy(vcpu_caps, vcpu->arch.cpu_caps, sizeof(vcpu_caps)); - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(vcpu_caps) != sizeof(vcpu->arch.cpu_caps)); + memcpy(vcpu_caps, common->arch.cpu_caps, sizeof(vcpu_caps)); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(vcpu_caps) != sizeof(common->arch.cpu_caps)); /* * KVM does not correctly handle changing guest CPUID after KVM_RUN or @@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ static int kvm_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e2, return 0; err: - memcpy(vcpu->arch.cpu_caps, vcpu_caps, sizeof(vcpu_caps)); + memcpy(common->arch.cpu_caps, vcpu_caps, sizeof(vcpu_caps)); swap(common->arch.cpuid_entries, e2); swap(common->arch.cpuid_nent, nent); return r; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index 143ea8531611..75abf447eabf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -239,36 +239,37 @@ static __always_inline bool guest_pv_has(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, return vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.features & (1u << kvm_feature); } -static __always_inline void guest_cpu_cap_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, +static __always_inline void guest_cpu_cap_set(struct kvm_vcpu_common *common, unsigned int x86_feature) { unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature); - vcpu->arch.cpu_caps[x86_leaf] |= __feature_bit(x86_feature); + common->arch.cpu_caps[x86_leaf] |= __feature_bit(x86_feature); } -static __always_inline void guest_cpu_cap_clear(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, +static __always_inline void guest_cpu_cap_clear(struct kvm_vcpu_common *common, unsigned int x86_feature) { unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature); - vcpu->arch.cpu_caps[x86_leaf] &= ~__feature_bit(x86_feature); + common->arch.cpu_caps[x86_leaf] &= ~__feature_bit(x86_feature); } -static __always_inline void guest_cpu_cap_change(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, +static __always_inline void guest_cpu_cap_change(struct kvm_vcpu_common *common, unsigned int x86_feature, bool guest_has_cap) { if (guest_has_cap) - guest_cpu_cap_set(vcpu, x86_feature); + guest_cpu_cap_set(common, x86_feature); else - guest_cpu_cap_clear(vcpu, x86_feature); + guest_cpu_cap_clear(common, x86_feature); } static __always_inline bool guest_cpu_cap_has(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int x86_feature) { unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature); + struct kvm_vcpu_common *common = vcpu->common; /* * Except for MWAIT, querying dynamic feature bits is disallowed, so @@ -278,7 +279,7 @@ static __always_inline bool guest_cpu_cap_has(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE || x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_OSPKE); - return vcpu->arch.cpu_caps[x86_leaf] & __feature_bit(x86_feature); + return common->arch.cpu_caps[x86_leaf] & __feature_bit(x86_feature); } static inline bool kvm_vcpu_is_legal_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 612db7ad8b2a..0b57dde29e40 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -4706,7 +4706,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * XSS on VM-Enter/VM-Exit. Failure to do so would effectively give * the guest read/write access to the host's XSS. */ - guest_cpu_cap_change(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES, + guest_cpu_cap_change(vcpu->common, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES, boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) && guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE)); @@ -4716,7 +4716,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * SVM on Intel is bonkers and extremely unlikely to work). */ if (guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible(vcpu)) - guest_cpu_cap_clear(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD); + guest_cpu_cap_clear(vcpu->common, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD); if (is_sev_guest(vcpu)) sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(svm); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 62e180651143..d10aa5f60cad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -7994,7 +7994,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * set if and only if XSAVE is supported. */ if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE)) - guest_cpu_cap_clear(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES); + guest_cpu_cap_clear(vcpu->common, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES); vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx); -- 2.53.0 -- kvm-riscv mailing list kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kvm-riscv