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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	 Tianrui Zhao <zhaotianrui@loongson.cn>,
	Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>,
	 Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>,
	Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>,
	 Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	 Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>, Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	 Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,  kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, loongarch@lists.linux.dev,
	 kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	 linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org,
	 Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>,
	Yongwei Ma <yongwei.ma@intel.com>,
	 Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>,
	Xiong Zhang <xiong.y.zhang@linux.intel.com>,
	 Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>,
	Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 09/44] perf/x86: Switch LVTPC to/from mediated PMI vector on guest load/put context
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2025 13:31:26 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aR43LoV1ti5-2WRD@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aKNF7jc4qr9ab-Es@google.com>

On Mon, Aug 18, 2025, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 18, 2025, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Fri, Aug 15, 2025 at 08:55:25AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > On Fri, Aug 15, 2025, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Aug 15, 2025, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > So if we're confident that switching the host LVTPC outside of
> > > perf_{load,put}_guest_context() is functionally safe, I'm a-ok with it.
> > 
> > Let me see. So the hardware sets Masked when it raises the interrupt.
> > 
> > The interrupt handler clears it from software -- depending on uarch in 3
> > different places:
> >  1) right at the start of the PMI
> >  2) in the middle, right before enabling the PMU (writing global control)
> >  3) at the end of the PMI
> > 
> > the various changelogs adding that code mention spurious PMIs and
> > malformed PEBS records.
> > 
> > So the fun all happens when the guest is doing PMI and gets a VM-exit
> > while still Masked.
> > 
> > At that point, we can come in and completely rewrite the PMU state,
> > reroute the PMI and enable things again. Then later, we 'restore' the
> > PMU state, re-set LVTPC masked to the guest interrupt and 'resume'.
> > 
> > What could possibly go wrong :/ Kan, I'm assuming, but not knowing, that
> > writing all the PMU MSRs is somehow serializing state sufficient to not
> > cause the above mentioned fails? Specifically, clearing PEBS_ENABLE
> > should inhibit those malformed PEBS records or something? What if the
> > host also has PEBS and we don't actually clear the bit?
> > 
> > The current order ensures we rewrite LVTPC when global control is unset;
> > I think we want to keep that.
> 
> Yes, for sure.
> 
> > While staring at this, I note that perf_load_guest_context() will clear
> > global ctrl, clear all the counter programming, and re-enable an empty
> > pmu. Now, an empty PMU should result in global control being zero --
> > there is nothing run after all.
> > 
> > But then kvm_mediated_pmu_load() writes an explicit 0 again. Perhaps
> > replace this with asserting it is 0 instead?
> 
> Yeah, I like that idea, a lot.  This?
> 
> 	perf_load_guest_context();
> 
> 	/*
> 	 * Sanity check that "loading" guest context disabled all counters, as
> 	 * modifying the LVTPC while host perf is active will cause explosions,
> 	 * as will loading event selectors and PMCs with guest values.
> 	 *
> 	 * VMX will enable/disable counters at VM-Enter/VM-Exit by atomically
> 	 * loading PERF_GLOBAL_CONTROL.  SVM effectively performs the switch by
> 	 * configuring all events to be GUEST_ONLY.
> 	 */
> 	WARN_ON_ONCE(rdmsrq(kvm_pmu_ops.PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL));

This doesn't actually work, because perf_load_guest_context() doesn't guarantee
PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL is '0', it only guarantees all events are disabled.  E.g. if
there are no perf events, perf_load_guest_context() is one big nop (I think).

And while it might seem reasonable to expect PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL to be '0' if
there are no perf events, that doesn't hold true today.  E.g. amd_pmu_reload_virt()
unconditionally sets all supported MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_CTL bits.

I'm sure we could massage perf to really truly ensure PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL is '0',
but I don't see any value in explicitly doing that in perf_load_guest_context()
(versus simply doing it in KVM), and I would rather not play whack-a-mole in perf
as part of this series.

So unless someone really, really wants to lean on perf to clear PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
I'll go with this:

	/*
	 * Explicitly clear PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, as "loading" the guest's context
	 * disables all individual counters (if any were enabled), but doesn't
	 * globally disable the entire PMU.  Loading event selectors and PMCs
	 * with guest values while PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL is non-zero will generate
	 * unexpected events and PMIs.
	 *
	 * VMX will enable/disable counters at VM-Enter/VM-Exit by atomically
	 * loading PERF_GLOBAL_CONTROL.  SVM effectively performs the switch by
	 * configuring all events to be GUEST_ONLY.  Clear PERF_GLOBAL_CONTROL
	 * even for SVM to minimize the damage if a perf event is left enabled,
	 * and to ensure a consistent starting state.
	 */
	wrmsrq(kvm_pmu_ops.PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0);

-- 
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-11-19 21:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-06 19:56 [PATCH v5 00/44] KVM: x86: Add support for mediated vPMUs Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 01/44] perf: Skip pmu_ctx based on event_type Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 02/44] perf: Add generic exclude_guest support Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 03/44] perf: Move security_perf_event_free() call to __free_event() Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 04/44] perf: Add APIs to create/release mediated guest vPMUs Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 05/44] perf: Clean up perf ctx time Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 06/44] perf: Add a EVENT_GUEST flag Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 07/44] perf: Add APIs to load/put guest mediated PMU context Sean Christopherson
2025-08-08  7:30   ` Mi, Dapeng
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 08/44] perf: core/x86: Register a new vector for handling mediated guest PMIs Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 09/44] perf/x86: Switch LVTPC to/from mediated PMI vector on guest load/put context Sean Christopherson
2025-08-15 11:39   ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-15 15:41     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-15 15:55       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-18 14:32         ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-18 15:25           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-18 16:12             ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-18 20:07               ` Liang, Kan
2025-11-19 21:31             ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-08-15 13:04   ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-15 15:51     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 10/44] perf/x86/core: Do not set bit width for unavailable counters Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 11/44] perf/x86/core: Plumb mediated PMU capability from x86_pmu to x86_pmu_cap Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 12/44] perf/x86/intel: Support PERF_PMU_CAP_MEDIATED_VPMU Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 13/44] perf/x86/amd: Support PERF_PMU_CAP_MEDIATED_VPMU for AMD host Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 14/44] KVM: VMX: Setup canonical VMCS config prior to kvm_x86_vendor_init() Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 15/44] KVM: SVM: Check pmu->version, not enable_pmu, when getting PMC MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-08-13  9:58   ` Sandipan Das
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 16/44] KVM: Add a simplified wrapper for registering perf callbacks Sean Christopherson
2025-08-22 10:32   ` Anup Patel
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 17/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Snapshot host (i.e. perf's) reported PMU capabilities Sean Christopherson
2025-08-13  9:56   ` Sandipan Das
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 18/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Start stubbing in mediated PMU support Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 19/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Implement Intel mediated PMU requirements and constraints Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 20/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Implement AMD mediated PMU requirements Sean Christopherson
2025-08-13  9:49   ` Sandipan Das
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 21/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Register PMI handler for mediated vPMU Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 22/44] KVM: x86: Rename vmx_vmentry/vmexit_ctrl() helpers Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 23/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Move PMU_CAP_{FW_WRITES,LBR_FMT} into msr-index.h header Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 24/44] KVM: x86: Rework KVM_REQ_MSR_FILTER_CHANGED into a generic RECALC_INTERCEPTS Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 25/44] KVM: x86: Use KVM_REQ_RECALC_INTERCEPTS to react to CPUID updates Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 26/44] KVM: VMX: Add helpers to toggle/change a bit in VMCS execution controls Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 27/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Disable RDPMC interception for compatible mediated vPMU Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 28/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Load/save GLOBAL_CTRL via entry/exit fields for mediated PMU Sean Christopherson
2025-11-25  1:48   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-25  5:02     ` Mi, Dapeng
2025-11-25 17:08       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-26  0:23         ` Mi, Dapeng
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 29/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Use BIT_ULL() instead of open coded equivalents Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 30/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Move initialization of valid PMCs bitmask to common x86 Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 31/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Restrict GLOBAL_{CTRL,STATUS}, fixed PMCs, and PEBS to PMU v2+ Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 32/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Disable interception of select PMU MSRs for mediated vPMUs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-26  7:12   ` Sandipan Das
2025-10-01 18:14     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-03  5:03       ` Sandipan Das
2025-10-09  2:19       ` Mi, Dapeng
2025-10-15 18:48         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-16  0:04           ` Mi, Dapeng
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 33/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Bypass perf checks when emulating mediated PMU counter accesses Sean Christopherson
2025-08-13 10:01   ` Sandipan Das
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 34/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Introduce eventsel_hw to prepare for pmu event filtering Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 35/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Reprogram mediated PMU event selectors on event filter updates Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 36/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Always stuff GuestOnly=1,HostOnly=0 for mediated PMCs on AMD Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:56 ` [PATCH v5 37/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Load/put mediated PMU context when entering/exiting guest Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:57 ` [PATCH v5 38/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Disallow emulation in the fastpath if mediated PMCs are active Sean Christopherson
2025-08-13  9:53   ` Sandipan Das
2025-08-06 19:57 ` [PATCH v5 39/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Handle emulated instruction for mediated vPMU Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:57 ` [PATCH v5 40/44] KVM: nVMX: Add macros to simplify nested MSR interception setting Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:57 ` [PATCH v5 41/44] KVM: nVMX: Disable PMU MSR interception as appropriate while running L2 Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:57 ` [PATCH v5 42/44] KVM: nSVM: " Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:57 ` [PATCH v5 43/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Expose enable_mediated_pmu parameter to user space Sean Christopherson
2025-08-06 19:57 ` [PATCH v5 44/44] KVM: x86/pmu: Elide WRMSRs when loading guest PMCs if values already match Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14  6:19   ` Manali Shukla
2025-08-08  8:28 ` [PATCH v5 00/44] KVM: x86: Add support for mediated vPMUs Mi, Dapeng
2025-08-08  8:35   ` Mi, Dapeng
2025-08-13  9:45 ` Sandipan Das
2025-08-22  8:12 ` Hao, Xudong
2025-09-19  0:10 ` Sean Christopherson

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