From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
To: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
kai.huang@intel.com, reinette.chatre@intel.com,
tony.lindgren@linux.intel.com, binbin.wu@linux.intel.com,
dmatlack@google.com, isaku.yamahata@intel.com,
nik.borisov@suse.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
yan.y.zhao@intel.com, chao.gao@intel.com,
weijiang.yang@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 02/12] KVM: x86: Allow the use of kvm_load_host_xsave_state() with guest_state_protected
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2025 18:50:17 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <01e85b96-db63-4de2-9f49-322919e054ec@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250129095902.16391-3-adrian.hunter@intel.com>
On 1/29/2025 5:58 PM, Adrian Hunter wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>
> Allow the use of kvm_load_host_xsave_state() with
> vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected == true. This will allow TDX to reuse
> kvm_load_host_xsave_state() instead of creating its own version.
>
> For consistency, amend kvm_load_guest_xsave_state() also.
>
> Ensure that guest state that kvm_load_host_xsave_state() depends upon,
> such as MSR_IA32_XSS, cannot be changed by user space, if
> guest_state_protected.
>
> [Adrian: wrote commit message]
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z2GiQS_RmYeHU09L@google.com
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
> ---
> TD vcpu enter/exit v2:
> - New patch
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 7 +++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
> 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 7640a84e554a..b4bcfe15ad5e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -4253,7 +4253,9 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> svm_set_dr6(svm, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW);
>
> clgi();
> - kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
> +
> + if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> + kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
>
> kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
>
> @@ -4282,7 +4284,8 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NMI))
> kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_NMI);
>
> - kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
> + if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> + kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
> stgi();
>
> /* Any pending NMI will happen here */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index bbb6b7f40b3a..5cf9f023fd4b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -1169,11 +1169,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lmsw);
>
> void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> - if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> - return;
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected);
>
> if (kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)) {
> -
> if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != kvm_host.xcr0)
> xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, vcpu->arch.xcr0);
>
> @@ -1192,13 +1190,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_load_guest_xsave_state);
>
> void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> - if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> - return;
> -
> if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
> ((vcpu->arch.xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU) ||
> kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE))) {
> - vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();
> + if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> + vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();
this needs justification.
> if (vcpu->arch.pkru != vcpu->arch.host_pkru)
> wrpkru(vcpu->arch.host_pkru);
> }
> @@ -3916,6 +3912,10 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
> return 1;
> +
> + if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> + return 1;
> +
this and below change need to be a separate patch. So that we can
discuss independently.
I see no reason to make MSR_IA32_XSS special than other MSRs. When
guest_state_protected, most of the MSRs that aren't emulated by KVM are
inaccessible by KVM.
> /*
> * KVM supports exposing PT to the guest, but does not support
> * IA32_XSS[bit 8]. Guests have to use RDMSR/WRMSR rather than
> @@ -4375,6 +4375,10 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
> return 1;
> +
> + if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> + return 1;
> +
> msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.ia32_xss;
> break;
> case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL:
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-20 10:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-29 9:58 [PATCH V2 00/12] KVM: TDX: TD vcpu enter/exit Adrian Hunter
2025-01-29 9:58 ` [PATCH V2 01/12] x86/virt/tdx: Make tdh_vp_enter() noinstr Adrian Hunter
2025-02-16 18:26 ` Paolo Bonzini
2025-02-27 14:13 ` Adrian Hunter
2025-01-29 9:58 ` [PATCH V2 02/12] KVM: x86: Allow the use of kvm_load_host_xsave_state() with guest_state_protected Adrian Hunter
2025-02-20 10:50 ` Xiaoyao Li [this message]
2025-02-24 11:38 ` Adrian Hunter
2025-02-25 5:56 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-02-27 14:14 ` Adrian Hunter
2025-03-06 18:04 ` Paolo Bonzini
2025-03-06 20:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-06 22:34 ` Paolo Bonzini
2025-03-07 23:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-10 19:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2025-01-29 9:58 ` [PATCH V2 03/12] KVM: TDX: Set arch.has_protected_state to true Adrian Hunter
2025-02-20 12:35 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-02-27 14:17 ` Adrian Hunter
2025-01-29 9:58 ` [PATCH V2 04/12] KVM: VMX: Move common fields of struct vcpu_{vmx,tdx} to a struct Adrian Hunter
2025-01-29 9:58 ` [PATCH V2 05/12] KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path Adrian Hunter
2025-02-20 13:16 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-02-24 12:27 ` Adrian Hunter
2025-02-25 6:15 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-02-27 18:37 ` Adrian Hunter
2025-03-06 18:19 ` Paolo Bonzini
2025-03-06 19:13 ` Adrian Hunter
2025-01-29 9:58 ` [PATCH V2 06/12] KVM: TDX: vcpu_run: save/restore host state(host kernel gs) Adrian Hunter
2025-01-29 9:58 ` [PATCH V2 07/12] KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD Adrian Hunter
2025-02-25 6:43 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-02-27 14:29 ` Adrian Hunter
2025-02-28 1:58 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-01-29 9:58 ` [PATCH V2 08/12] KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o wrmsr Adrian Hunter
2025-02-25 7:00 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-01-29 9:58 ` [PATCH V2 09/12] KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs Adrian Hunter
2025-02-25 7:01 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-02-27 14:19 ` Adrian Hunter
2025-01-29 9:58 ` [PATCH V2 10/12] KVM: TDX: Disable support for TSX and WAITPKG Adrian Hunter
2025-01-29 9:59 ` [PATCH V2 11/12] KVM: TDX: Save and restore IA32_DEBUGCTL Adrian Hunter
2025-01-29 9:59 ` [PATCH V2 12/12] KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched behavior Adrian Hunter
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