From: Sheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>
To: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Sheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: Enable snooping control for supported hardware
Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2009 16:43:02 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1240476182-26254-1-git-send-email-sheng@linux.intel.com> (raw)
Memory aliases with different memory type is a problem for guest. For the guest
without assigned device, the memory type of guest memory would always been the
same as host(WB); but for the assigned device, some part of memory may be used
as DMA and then set to uncacheable memory type(UC/WC), which would be a conflict of
host memory type then be a potential issue.
Snooping control can guarantee the cache correctness of accessing the DMA engine
of VT-d.
Signed-off-by: Sheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
virt/kvm/iommu.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 3fc4623..d2da40f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -397,6 +397,8 @@ struct kvm_arch{
struct list_head assigned_dev_head;
struct list_head oos_global_pages;
struct iommu_domain *iommu_domain;
+#define KVM_IOMMU_CACHE_COHERENCY 0x1
+ int iommu_flags;
struct kvm_pic *vpic;
struct kvm_ioapic *vioapic;
struct kvm_pit *vpit;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index 409d08e..1e63a87 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -1713,10 +1713,27 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *shadow_pte,
if (largepage)
spte |= PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;
if (mt_mask) {
+ /* For VT-d and EPT combination
+ * 1. MMIO: always map as UC
+ * 2. EPT without VT-d: always map as WB and set IGMT=1 to
+ * keep consistent with host MTRR
+ * 3. EPT with VT-d:
+ * a. VT-d with snooping control feature: keep consistent
+ * with host MTRR can guarantee the correctness
+ * b. VT-d without snooping control feature: can't
+ * guarantee the result, try to trust guest.
+ */
if (!kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn)) {
- mt_mask = get_memory_type(vcpu, gfn) <<
- kvm_x86_ops->get_mt_mask_shift();
- mt_mask |= VMX_EPT_IGMT_BIT;
+ if (vcpu->kvm->arch.iommu_domain &&
+ !(vcpu->kvm->arch.iommu_flags &
+ KVM_IOMMU_CACHE_COHERENCY)) {
+ mt_mask = get_memory_type(vcpu, gfn) <<
+ kvm_x86_ops->get_mt_mask_shift();
+ } else {
+ mt_mask = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK <<
+ kvm_x86_ops->get_mt_mask_shift();
+ mt_mask |= VMX_EPT_IGMT_BIT;
+ }
} else
mt_mask = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE <<
kvm_x86_ops->get_mt_mask_shift();
diff --git a/virt/kvm/iommu.c b/virt/kvm/iommu.c
index 4c40375..1514758 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/iommu.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/iommu.c
@@ -39,11 +39,16 @@ int kvm_iommu_map_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
pfn_t pfn;
int i, r = 0;
struct iommu_domain *domain = kvm->arch.iommu_domain;
+ int flags;
/* check if iommu exists and in use */
if (!domain)
return 0;
+ flags = IOMMU_READ | IOMMU_WRITE;
+ if (kvm->arch.iommu_flags & KVM_IOMMU_CACHE_COHERENCY)
+ flags |= IOMMU_CACHE;
+
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
/* check if already mapped */
if (iommu_iova_to_phys(domain, gfn_to_gpa(gfn)))
@@ -53,8 +58,7 @@ int kvm_iommu_map_pages(struct kvm *kvm,
r = iommu_map_range(domain,
gfn_to_gpa(gfn),
pfn_to_hpa(pfn),
- PAGE_SIZE,
- IOMMU_READ | IOMMU_WRITE);
+ PAGE_SIZE, flags);
if (r) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm_iommu_map_address:"
"iommu failed to map pfn=%lx\n", pfn);
@@ -88,7 +92,7 @@ int kvm_assign_device(struct kvm *kvm,
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL;
struct iommu_domain *domain = kvm->arch.iommu_domain;
- int r;
+ int r, last_flags;
/* check if iommu exists and in use */
if (!domain)
@@ -107,12 +111,29 @@ int kvm_assign_device(struct kvm *kvm,
return r;
}
+ last_flags = kvm->arch.iommu_flags;
+ if (iommu_domain_has_cap(kvm->arch.iommu_domain,
+ IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY))
+ kvm->arch.iommu_flags |= KVM_IOMMU_CACHE_COHERENCY;
+
+ /* Check if need to update IOMMU page table for guest memory */
+ if ((last_flags ^ kvm->arch.iommu_flags) ==
+ KVM_IOMMU_CACHE_COHERENCY) {
+ kvm_iommu_unmap_memslots(kvm);
+ r = kvm_iommu_map_memslots(kvm);
+ if (r)
+ goto out_unmap;
+ }
+
printk(KERN_DEBUG "assign device: host bdf = %x:%x:%x\n",
assigned_dev->host_busnr,
PCI_SLOT(assigned_dev->host_devfn),
PCI_FUNC(assigned_dev->host_devfn));
return 0;
+out_unmap:
+ kvm_iommu_unmap_memslots(kvm);
+ return r;
}
int kvm_deassign_device(struct kvm *kvm,
--
1.5.4.5
next reply other threads:[~2009-04-23 8:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-04-23 8:43 Sheng Yang [this message]
2009-04-24 22:37 ` [PATCH] KVM: Enable snooping control for supported hardware Marcelo Tosatti
2009-04-26 11:12 ` Sheng Yang
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