From: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
To: avi@redhat.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 07/10] [SVM] inject NMI after IRET from a previous NMI, not before.
Date: Mon, 11 May 2009 13:35:52 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1242038155-8759-7-git-send-email-gleb@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1242038155-8759-1-git-send-email-gleb@redhat.com>
If NMI is received during handling of another NMI it should be injected
immediately after IRET from previous NMI handler, but SVM intercept IRET
before instruction execution so we can't inject pending NMI at this
point and there is not way to request exit when NMI window opens. This
patch fix SVM code to open NMI window after IRET by single stepping over
IRET instruction.
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 93fd6e5..09fbde6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
unsigned int time_offset;
struct page *time_page;
+ bool singlestep; /* guest is single stepped by KVM */
bool nmi_pending;
bool nmi_injected;
@@ -771,6 +772,7 @@ enum {
#define HF_HIF_MASK (1 << 1)
#define HF_VINTR_MASK (1 << 2)
#define HF_NMI_MASK (1 << 3)
+#define HF_IRET_MASK (1 << 4)
/*
* Hardware virtualization extension instructions may fault if a
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 0b1b8b8..c0eb3f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -945,15 +945,16 @@ static void svm_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
}
-static int svm_guest_debug(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_guest_debug *dbg)
+static void update_db_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- int old_debug = vcpu->guest_debug;
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
- vcpu->guest_debug = dbg->control;
-
svm->vmcb->control.intercept_exceptions &=
~((1 << DB_VECTOR) | (1 << BP_VECTOR));
+
+ if (vcpu->arch.singlestep)
+ svm->vmcb->control.intercept_exceptions |= (1 << DB_VECTOR);
+
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE) {
if (vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
@@ -964,6 +965,16 @@ static int svm_guest_debug(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_guest_debug *dbg)
1 << BP_VECTOR;
} else
vcpu->guest_debug = 0;
+}
+
+static int svm_guest_debug(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_guest_debug *dbg)
+{
+ int old_debug = vcpu->guest_debug;
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ vcpu->guest_debug = dbg->control;
+
+ update_db_intercept(vcpu);
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)
svm->vmcb->save.dr7 = dbg->arch.debugreg[7];
@@ -1113,14 +1124,30 @@ static int pf_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
static int db_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
{
if (!(svm->vcpu.guest_debug &
- (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))) {
+ (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) &&
+ !svm->vcpu.arch.singlestep) {
kvm_queue_exception(&svm->vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
- kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
- kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = svm->vmcb->save.cs.base + svm->vmcb->save.rip;
- kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
- return 0;
+
+ if (svm->vcpu.arch.singlestep) {
+ svm->vcpu.arch.singlestep = false;
+ if (!(svm->vcpu.guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP))
+ svm->vmcb->save.rflags &=
+ ~(X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
+ update_db_intercept(&svm->vcpu);
+ }
+
+ if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug &
+ (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)){
+ kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
+ kvm_run->debug.arch.pc =
+ svm->vmcb->save.cs.base + svm->vmcb->save.rip;
+ kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
}
static int bp_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
@@ -1867,7 +1894,7 @@ static int iret_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
{
++svm->vcpu.stat.nmi_window_exits;
svm->vmcb->control.intercept &= ~(1UL << INTERCEPT_IRET);
- svm->vcpu.arch.hflags &= ~HF_NMI_MASK;
+ svm->vcpu.arch.hflags |= HF_IRET_MASK;
return 1;
}
@@ -2343,8 +2370,16 @@ static void enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
- if (svm->vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK)
- enable_irq_window(vcpu);
+ if ((svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & (HF_NMI_MASK | HF_IRET_MASK))
+ == HF_NMI_MASK)
+ return; /* IRET will cause a vm exit */
+
+ /* Something prevents NMI from been injected. Single step over
+ possible problem (IRET or exception injection or interrupt
+ shadow) */
+ vcpu->arch.singlestep = true;
+ svm->vmcb->save.rflags |= (X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
+ update_db_intercept(vcpu);
}
static int svm_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr)
@@ -2387,6 +2422,9 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
int type;
u32 exitintinfo = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info;
+ if (svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & HF_IRET_MASK)
+ svm->vcpu.arch.hflags &= ~(HF_NMI_MASK | HF_IRET_MASK);
+
svm->vcpu.arch.nmi_injected = false;
kvm_clear_exception_queue(&svm->vcpu);
kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(&svm->vcpu);
--
1.6.2.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-05-11 10:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-05-11 10:35 [PATCH 01/10] Unprotect a page if #PF happens during NMI injection Gleb Natapov
2009-05-11 10:35 ` [PATCH 02/10] Do not allow interrupt injection from userspace if there is a pending event Gleb Natapov
2009-05-11 10:35 ` [PATCH 03/10] Remove irq_pending bitmap Gleb Natapov
2009-05-11 10:35 ` [PATCH 04/10] [SVM] skip_emulated_instruction() decode an instruction if size is not known Gleb Natapov
2009-05-11 10:35 ` [PATCH 05/10] [VMX] Do not re-execute INTn instruction Gleb Natapov
2009-05-11 10:35 ` [PATCH 06/10] IRQ/NMI window should always be requested Gleb Natapov
2009-05-11 10:35 ` Gleb Natapov [this message]
2009-05-11 10:35 ` [PATCH 08/10] Do not migrate pending software interrupts Gleb Natapov
2009-05-11 10:35 ` [PATCH 09/10] Disable CR8 intercept if tpr patching is active Gleb Natapov
2009-05-11 10:35 ` [PATCH 10/10] Move "exit due to NMI" handling into vmx_complete_interrupts() Gleb Natapov
2009-05-13 12:07 ` [PATCH 01/10] Unprotect a page if #PF happens during NMI injection Avi Kivity
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