From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
To: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Cc: chrisw <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
"Hao, Xudong" <xudong.hao@intel.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: KVM Test report, kernel a685b38... qemu 671d89d...
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2011 08:06:58 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1297868818.14733.188.camel@x201> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1297868471.14733.186.camel@x201>
On Wed, 2011-02-16 at 08:01 -0700, Alex Williamson wrote:
> On Wed, 2011-02-16 at 11:10 +0200, Avi Kivity wrote:
> > On 02/16/2011 11:05 AM, Hao, Xudong wrote:
> > > Hi, all,
> > > This is KVM test result against kvm.git a685b38e272587e644fedd37269ddb82df21c052, and qemu-kvm.git 671d89d6411655bb4f8058ce6eb86bb0bb8ec978.
> > >
> > > Currently qemu-kvm can build successfully on RHEL5, and Qcow image create failure issue also got fixed, our nightly testing resumed. One VT-d device assignment issue opened on latest KVM.
> > >
> > > New issue:
> > > 1. [VT-d] VT-d device passthrough fail to guest
> > > https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=29232
> > >
>
> Extremely reproducible. Looks like it's a result of this kernel change:
>
> commit 47970b1b2aa64464bc0a9543e86361a622ae7c03
> Author: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
> Date: Thu Feb 10 15:58:56 2011 -0800
>
> pci: use security_capable() when checking capablities during config space re
>
> Eric Paris noted that commit de139a3 ("pci: check caps from sysfs file
> open to read device dependent config space") caused the capability check
> to bypass security modules and potentially auditing. Rectify this by
> calling security_capable() when checking the open file's capabilities
> for config space reads.
>
> Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
>
> Chris, why isn't this working for us? Thanks,
Ah, I see now that this has already been fixed. The above commit was
reverted in f00eaeea7a42b5ea327e9ce8839cb0b53d3bdb4e and a corrected
version applied in a628e7b87e100befac9702aa0c3b9848a7685e49. So it
should be fixed on the next kvm.git merge. Thanks,
Alex
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-02-16 15:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-02-16 9:05 KVM Test report, kernel a685b38... qemu 671d89d Hao, Xudong
2011-02-16 9:10 ` Avi Kivity
2011-02-16 15:01 ` Alex Williamson
2011-02-16 15:06 ` Alex Williamson [this message]
2011-02-16 15:16 ` Chris Wright
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