From: "Mihai Donțu" <mdontu@bitdefender.com>
To: "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Jim Mattson" <jmattson@google.com>,
"kvm list" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Alex Williamson" <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 00/10] Intel EPT-Based Sub-page Write Protection Support.
Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2017 17:13:18 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1508335998.3230.118.camel@bitdefender.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <96efaece-306c-cde3-06d6-553505612136@redhat.com>
On Wed, 2017-10-18 at 11:35 +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 16/10/2017 02:08, Yi Zhang wrote:
> > > And the introspection facility by Mihai uses a completely
> > > different API for the introspector, based on sockets rather than ioctls.
> > > So I'm not sure this is the right API at all.
> >
> > Currently, We only block the write access, As far as I know an example,
> > we now using it in a security daemon:
>
> Understood. However, I think QEMU is the wrong place to set this up.
>
> If the kernel wants to protect _itself_, it should use a hypercall. If
> an introspector appliance wants to protect the guest kernel, it should
> use the socket that connects it to the hypervisor.
We have been looking at using SPP for VMI for quite some time. If a
guest kernel will be able to control it (can it do so with EPT?) then
it would be useful a simple switch that disables this ability, as an
introspector wouldn't want the guest is trying to protect to interfere
with it.
Also, if Intel doesn't have a specific use case for it that requires
separate access to SPP control, then maybe we can fold it into the VMI
API we are working on?
Thanks,
> > Consider It has a server which launching in the host user-space, and a
> > client launching in the guest kernel. Yes, they are communicate with
> > sockets. The guest kernel wanna protect a special area to prevent all
> > the process including the kernel itself modify this area. the client
> > could send the guest physical address via the security socket to server
> > side, and server would update these protection into KVM. Thus, all the
> > write access in a guest specific area will be blocked.
> >
> > Now the implementation only on the second half(maybe third ^_^) of this
> > example: 'How kvm set the write-protect into a specific GFN?'
> >
> > Maybe a user space tools which use ioctl let kvm mmu update the
> > write-protection is a better choice.
--
Mihai Donțu
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-18 14:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-13 23:11 [PATCH RFC 00/10] Intel EPT-Based Sub-page Write Protection Support Zhang Yi
2017-10-13 16:57 ` Jim Mattson
2017-10-13 21:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-16 0:08 ` Yi Zhang
2017-10-18 9:35 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-18 14:07 ` Yi Zhang
2017-10-19 11:57 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-20 8:51 ` Yi Zhang
2017-10-18 14:13 ` Mihai Donțu [this message]
2017-10-20 8:47 ` Yi Zhang
2017-10-20 17:06 ` Mihai Donțu
2017-10-24 7:52 ` Yi Zhang
2017-10-16 0:01 ` Yi Zhang
2017-10-13 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 01/10] KVM: VMX: Added EPT Subpage Protection Documentation Zhang Yi
2017-10-13 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 02/10] x86/cpufeature: Add intel Sub-Page Protection to CPU features Zhang Yi
2017-10-13 23:13 ` [PATCH RFC 03/10] KVM: VMX: Added VMX SPP feature flags and VM-Execution Controls Zhang Yi
2017-10-13 23:13 ` [PATCH RFC 04/10] KVM: VMX: Introduce the SPPTP and SPP page table Zhang Yi
2017-10-13 23:14 ` [PATCH RFC 05/10] KVM: VMX: Introduce SPP-Induced vm exit and it's handle Zhang Yi
2017-10-13 23:14 ` [PATCH RFC 06/10] KVM: VMX: Added handle of SPP write protection fault Zhang Yi
2017-10-13 23:14 ` [PATCH RFC 07/10] KVM: VMX: Introduce ioctls to set/get Sub-Page Write Protection Zhang Yi
2017-10-13 23:14 ` [PATCH RFC 08/10] KVM: VMX: Update the EPT leaf entry indicated with the SPP enable bit Zhang Yi
2017-10-13 23:14 ` [PATCH RFC 09/10] KVM: VMX: Added setup spp page structure Zhang Yi
2017-10-13 23:16 ` [PATCH RFC 10/10] KVM: VMX: implement setup SPP page structure in spp miss Zhang Yi
2017-10-18 7:09 ` [PATCH RFC 00/10] Intel EPT-Based Sub-page Write Protection Support Christoph Hellwig
2017-10-18 14:02 ` Yi Zhang
2017-11-04 0:12 ` Yi Zhang
2017-11-04 16:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-11-10 15:39 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-11-13 10:37 ` Yi Zhang
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