From: "Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
To: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, kvm <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
Radim Krcmar <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>,
Anthony Liguori <aliguori@amazon.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/8] kvm: vmx: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU
Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2018 09:29:55 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515835795.22302.517.camel@amazon.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALMp9eS4Y7+n+S49eC4n-0LazrmREpUATnELjEn2gRZQPeQirg@mail.gmail.com>
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On Fri, 2018-01-12 at 09:03 -0800, Jim Mattson wrote:
> The point behind the IPBP in vmx_vcpu_load is to prevent one VCPU from
> steering the speculative execution of the next. If the VMCS address is
> recycled, vmx_vcpu_load doesn't realize that the VCPUs are different,
> and so it won't issue the IPBP.
I don't understand the sequence of events that could lead to this.
If the VMCS is freed, surely per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) has to be
cleared? If the VMCS is freed while it's still *active* on a CPU,
that's a bug, surely? And if that CPU is later offlined and clears the
VMCS, it's going to scribble on freed (and potentially re-used) memory.
So vmx_cpu_load() *will* realise that it's different, won't it?
>> + if (have_spec_ctrl)
>> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
Also, I think the same condition applies to the conditional branches
over the IBPB-frobbing, as it does to setting IBRS. You can eschew the
'else lfence' only if you put in a comment showing that you've proved
it's safe. Many of the other bits like this are being done with
alternatives, which avoids that concern completely.
But really, I don't like this series much. Don't say "let's do this
until upstream supports...". Just fix it up properly, and add the
generic X86_FEATURE_IBPB bit and use it. We have *too* many separate
tiny patch sets, and we need to be getting our act together and putting
it all in one.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-13 9:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-09 12:03 [PATCH v2 0/8] KVM: x86: expose CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre variant 2") mitigations to guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 1/8] KVM: x86: add SPEC_CTRL and IBPB_SUPPORT accessors Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-15 9:42 ` David Hildenbrand
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 2/8] x86/msr: add definitions for indirect branch predictor MSRs Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 3/8] kvm: vmx: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to the guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-13 10:16 ` Longpeng (Mike)
2018-01-15 9:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-15 9:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
[not found] ` <1515839272.22302.520.camel@amazon.co.uk>
2018-01-15 9:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 4/8] kvm: vmx: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-12 1:49 ` Wanpeng Li
2018-01-12 17:03 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-13 9:29 ` Woodhouse, David [this message]
2018-01-15 9:21 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 5/8] KVM: SVM: fix comment Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-15 9:53 ` David Hildenbrand
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 14:22 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-09 16:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 16:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-11 10:45 ` Wanpeng Li
2018-01-10 20:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-11 10:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 7/8] x86/svm: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 14:23 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 8/8] KVM: x86: add SPEC_CTRL and IBPB_SUPPORT to MSR and CPUID lists Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-13 1:25 ` Eric Wheeler
2018-01-13 8:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-16 0:40 ` Eric Wheeler
2018-01-16 7:39 ` R: " Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 9/8] KVM: x86: limit MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL access based on CPUID availability Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-16 0:55 ` Eric Wheeler
2018-01-16 12:59 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-30 13:21 ` [9/8] " Mihai Carabas
2018-01-30 16:33 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-30 16:43 ` Mihai Carabas
2018-01-30 16:57 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-30 17:14 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-30 17:38 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-30 17:45 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-30 23:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-30 23:47 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-31 1:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-05 11:10 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-05 11:15 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-05 12:10 ` Ingo Molnar
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