From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, pgonda@google.com,
seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2024 08:29:31 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <15e82ca3-9166-cdb4-7d66-e1c6600919d7@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0477b378-aa35-4a68-9ff6-308aada2e790@amd.com>
On 12/9/24 23:02, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote:
> On 12/9/2024 9:27 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>> On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 02:30:36PM +0530, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
>>> Secure TSC enabled guests should not write to MSR_IA32_TSC(10H) register as
>>> the subsequent TSC value reads are undefined.
>>
>> What does that mean exactly?
>
> That is the warning from the APM: 15.36.18 Secure TSC
>
> "Guests that run with Secure TSC enabled are not expected to perform writes to
> the TSC MSR (10h). If such a write occurs, subsequent TSC values read are
> undefined."
>
> What I make out of it is: if a write is performed to the TSC MSR, subsequent
> reads of TSC is not reliable/trusted.
>
> That was the reason to ignore such writes in the #VC handler.
>
>>
>> I'd prefer if we issued a WARN_ONCE() there on the write to catch any
>> offenders.
>
> Do you also want to terminate the offending guest?
>
> ES_UNSUPPORTED return will do that.
>
>>
>> *NO ONE* should be writing the TSC MSR but that's a different story.
>>
>> IOW, something like this ontop of yours?
>>
>> ---
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
>> index c22cb2ea4b99..050170eb28e6 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
>> @@ -1443,9 +1443,15 @@ static enum es_result __vc_handle_msr_tsc(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
>> {
>> u64 tsc;
>>
>> - if (write)
>> - return ES_OK;
>> + if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
>> + goto read_tsc;
>
> This is changing the behavior for SEV-ES and SNP guests(non SECURE_TSC), TSC MSR
> reads are converted to RDTSC. This is a good optimization. But just wanted to
> bring up the subtle impact.
Right, I think it should still flow through the GHCB MSR request for
non-Secure TSC guests.
>
>> +
>> + if (write) {
>> + WARN_ONCE(1, "TSC MSR writes are verboten!\n");
>> + return ES_UNSUPPORTED;
>
> Sure, we can add a WARN_ONCE().
You'll want to test this... IIRC, I'm not sure if a WARN_ONCE() will be
properly printed when issued within the #VC handler (since it will
generate a nested #VC).
Thanks,
Tom
>
>> + }
>>
>> +read_tsc:
>> tsc = rdtsc_ordered();
>> regs->ax = lower_32_bits(tsc);
>> regs->dx = upper_32_bits(tsc);
>> @@ -1462,11 +1468,14 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
>> /* Is it a WRMSR? */
>> write = ctxt->insn.opcode.bytes[1] == 0x30;
>>
>> - if (regs->cx == MSR_SVSM_CAA)
>> + switch(regs->cx) {
>
> Yes, I was thinking about a switch, as there will be more such instances when we
> enable newer features.
>
>> + case MSR_SVSM_CAA:
>> return __vc_handle_msr_caa(regs, write);
>> -
>> - if (regs->cx == MSR_IA32_TSC && (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
>> + case MSR_IA32_TSC:
>> return __vc_handle_msr_tsc(regs, write);
>> + default:
>> + break;
>> + }
>>
>> ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
>> if (write) {
>>
>
> Regards,
> Nikunj
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-12-10 14:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-03 9:00 [PATCH v15 00/13] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03 14:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 14:35 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 14:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 14:52 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-04 9:30 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-04 10:00 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-04 20:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-05 6:23 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-06 20:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-07 0:27 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-12-09 15:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-09 6:16 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-09 15:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 6:38 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-04 19:06 ` Francesco Lavra
2025-01-06 4:14 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 02/13] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-04 20:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-05 6:25 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-05 11:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-06 4:19 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-16 16:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-17 6:12 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-04 20:26 ` Francesco Lavra
2025-01-06 4:34 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-09 15:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 5:02 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-10 11:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 16:44 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2024-12-10 16:59 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-11 19:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:01 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-11 22:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 05/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 11:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 06/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 12:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 17:13 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 17:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-12 4:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-17 10:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-18 5:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-24 11:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-01 8:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-01 16:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 5:03 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 9:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 9:30 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 14:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-02 14:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 17:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 07/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-11 20:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-12 5:07 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 08/13] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-17 11:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-18 5:21 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 09/13] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-16 16:31 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-17 6:27 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-17 7:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-17 7:57 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-30 11:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-01 8:56 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-01 16:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 5:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 9:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 10:01 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 10:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 13:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-03 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 13:59 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-04 10:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 10/13] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-30 11:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 5:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 9:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 10:09 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-03 12:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 14:03 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 11/13] tsc: Switch to native sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 12/13] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-16 16:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-30 17:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-01 9:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-01 16:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 5:34 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 9:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 10:06 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 13/13] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
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