From: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@gmail.com>
To: Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@gmail.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
rkrcmar@redhat.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
ovich00@gmail.com, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
nigel.edwards@hpe.com,
Boris Lukashev <blukashev@sempervictus.com>,
Hossam Hassan <7ossam9063@gmail.com>,
Ahmed Lotfy <A7med.lotfey@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V5 0/5] KVM: X86: Introducing ROE Protection Kernel Hardening
Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2018 20:01:42 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1b3eb10e-c492-dc77-cbe6-3a3e692326d7@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181026151223.16810-1-ahmedsoliman0x666@gmail.com>
Hi,
On 26/10/2018 16:12, Ahmed Abd El Mawgood wrote:
> This is the 5th version which is 4th version with minor fixes. ROE is a
> hypercall that enables host operating system to restrict guest's access to its
> own memory. This will provide a hardening mechanism that can be used to stop
> rootkits from manipulating kernel static data structures and code. Once a memory
> region is protected the guest kernel can't even request undoing the protection.
This is very interesting, because it seems a very good match to the work
I'm doing, for supporting the creation of more targets for protection:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/10/23/3
In my case the protection would extend also to write-rate type of data.
There is an open problem of identifying legitimate write-rare
operations, however it should be possible to provide at least a certain
degree of confidence.
--
igor
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-29 18:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-26 15:12 [PATCH V5 0/5] KVM: X86: Introducing ROE Protection Kernel Hardening Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-10-26 15:12 ` [PATCH V5 1/5] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-10-29 16:42 ` gRe: [PATCH V5 1/5] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation^[ Sean Christopherson
2018-10-31 16:02 ` gRe: [PATCH V5 1/5] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation Ahmed Soliman
2018-10-26 15:12 ` [PATCH V5 2/5] KVM: X86: Adding arbitrary data pointer in kvm memslot iterator functions Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-10-26 15:12 ` [PATCH V5 3/5] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-10-26 15:12 ` [PATCH V5 4/5] KVM: X86: Adding support for byte granular memory ROE Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-10-26 15:12 ` [PATCH V5 5/5] KVM: Small Refactoring to kvm_free_memslot Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-10-29 16:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-10-29 6:46 ` [PATCH V5 0/5] KVM: X86: Introducing ROE Protection Kernel Hardening Ingo Molnar
2018-10-30 16:49 ` Ahmed Soliman
2018-10-29 18:01 ` Igor Stoppa [this message]
2018-10-31 23:21 ` Ahmed Soliman
2018-11-01 15:56 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-10-30 17:31 ` Christian Borntraeger
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