From: Atish Patra <atish.patra@linux.dev>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] crypto: ccp: Fix possible deadlock in SEV init failure path
Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 17:53:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1dd5c998-ad2a-47dd-9875-c8fd5db6d374@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260529005119.8CFF11F000E9@smtp.kernel.org>
On 5/28/26 5:51 PM, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
>
> Pre-existing issues:
> - [Critical] Host kernel panics due to RMP violation when reading `sev_init_ex_buffer` in `sev_write_init_ex_file()`.
> - [High] Memory allocated for `sev_init_ex_buffer` is leaked and leaves the device in a broken state if initialization fails in `__sev_platform_init_handle_init_ex_path()`.
> - [High] Uninitialized kernel memory is allocated and provided to the SEV firmware and disk if the NV initialization file does not exist.
> --
>
> commit 405e31473bcf0fe9d84a37db761b7cf915973108
> Author: Atish Patra <atishp@meta.com>
>
> crypto: ccp: Fix possible deadlock in SEV init failure path
>
> This commit modifies __sev_platform_init_handle_init_ex_path() to pass
> locked=true to rmp_mark_pages_firmware(). This prevents a potential
> deadlock on the sev_cmd_mutex when an rmpupdate fails and attempts to
> reclaim pages during cleanup.
>
>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>> index d1e9e0ac63b60..3d4793e8e34b2 100644
>> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>> @@ -1557,7 +1557,7 @@ static int __sev_platform_init_handle_init_ex_path(struct sev_device *sev)
>> unsigned long npages;
>>
>> npages = 1UL << get_order(NV_LENGTH);
> [Severity: High]
> This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but is there a risk of leaking
> uninitialized kernel memory to the SEV firmware and disk?
>
> Earlier in this function, the NV buffer is allocated without zeroing the
> memory:
>
> page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, get_order(NV_LENGTH));
> ...
> sev_init_ex_buffer = page_address(page);
> rc = sev_read_init_ex_file();
>
> If the NV initialization file does not exist, sev_read_init_ex_file()
> handles the -ENOENT error and returns 0 without reading any data, leaving
> the 32KB buffer filled with uninitialized kernel memory. This buffer is
> then provided to the SEV firmware.
>
> Later, when state changes occur, sev_write_init_ex_file() writes this memory
> back to the host filesystem.
>
> Should alloc_pages() be called with __GFP_ZERO to prevent this?
Valid findings. The sev_init_ex_buffer should be set to NULL and pages
should be freed in case of failure in sev_read_init_ex_file.
>> - if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(sev_init_ex_buffer), npages, false)) {
>> + if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(__pa(sev_init_ex_buffer), npages, true)) {
>> dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV: INIT_EX NV memory page state change failed.\n");
>> return -ENOMEM;
> [Severity: High]
> This is a pre-existing issue, but is it possible this error path leaves the
> device in a broken state?
>
> If the page state transition fails, the function returns an error without
> freeing the buffer or resetting sev_init_ex_buffer to NULL. Because it is a
> static global, subsequent initialization attempts will return 0 immediately:
>
> if (sev_init_ex_buffer)
> return 0;
>
> This bypasses the file reading and the required firmware page state
> transition, passing an improperly initialized, host-owned buffer to the
> firmware during the INIT_EX command.
>
> Could this permanently break SEV initialization until the system reboots?
I will add the fix as well for this along with the above one.
> [Severity: Critical]
> This is also a pre-existing issue, but will reading from sev_init_ex_buffer
> trigger a host kernel panic?
>
> Once the sev_init_ex_buffer pages are transitioned to a firmware-owned state
> (RMP private) by rmp_mark_pages_firmware(), they are no longer accessible to
> the host.
>
> Later, sev_write_init_ex_file() is called to save the NV memory back to disk
> and invokes kernel_write() using sev_init_ex_buffer as the buffer.
>
> Since there is no code to reclaim the pages back to a host-accessible state
> before this VFS write operation, won't the host CPU's attempt to read from
> sev_init_ex_buffer trigger a Page Fault with the RMP bit set?
As per my understanding that is not correct. A host cpu write to
firmware-owner state would result in RMP #PF but read would not raise a
fault. I confirmed that with loading ccp with init_ex_path and kvm_amd
as well.
>> }
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-30 0:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-28 23:11 [PATCH 0/2] KVM: Miscallenous SEV/SNP fixes Atish Patra
2026-05-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 1/2] KVM: SEV: Do not allow SEV-SNP VMs from intra-host migration Atish Patra
2026-05-28 23:51 ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-29 20:41 ` Atish Patra
2026-05-29 22:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-30 1:08 ` Atish Patra
2026-05-28 23:11 ` [PATCH 2/2] crypto: ccp: Fix possible deadlock in SEV init failure path Atish Patra
2026-05-29 0:51 ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-30 0:53 ` Atish Patra [this message]
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