From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Unify KVM kernel-space and user-space code into a single
	project
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 17:17:11 +0100
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Cc: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>,
	"Zhang, Yanmin" <yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com>,
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	Sheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>,
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	Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
	Jes Sorensen <Jes.Sorensen@redhat.com>,
	Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>, ziteng.huang@intel.com,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
	Fr?d?ric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>,
	Gregory Haskins <ghaskins@novell.com>
To: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
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On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 05:52:54PM +0200, Avi Kivity wrote:
> On 03/24/2010 05:50 PM, Joerg Roedel wrote:
>> If we go the /proc/<pid>/kvm way then the directory should probably
>> inherit the label from /proc/<pid>/?
>
> That's a security policy.  The security people like their policies  
> outside the kernel.
>
> For example, they may want a label that allows a trace context to read  
> the data, and also qemu itself for introspection.

Hm, I am not a security expert. But is this not only one entity more for
sVirt to handle? I would leave that decision to the sVirt developers.
Does attaching the same label as for the VM resources mean that root
could not access it anymore?

	Joerg