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From: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
To: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, gleb@kernel.org, linux@arm.linux.org.uk,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/6] KVM: VMX: Add PML support in VMX
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2015 16:18:34 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150203151833.GD19731@potion.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1422413668-3509-7-git-send-email-kai.huang@linux.intel.com>

2015-01-28 10:54+0800, Kai Huang:
> This patch adds PML support in VMX. A new module parameter 'enable_pml' is added

(+module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool, S_IRUGO);)

> to allow user to enable/disable it manually.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h b/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h
> index 587149b..a139977 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/trace.h
> @@ -846,6 +846,24 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_track_tsc,
> +TRACE_EVENT(kvm_pml_full,
> +	TP_PROTO(unsigned int vcpu_id),
> +	TP_ARGS(vcpu_id),
> +
> +	TP_STRUCT__entry(
> +		__field(	unsigned int,	vcpu_id			)
> +	),
> +
> +	TP_fast_assign(
> +		__entry->vcpu_id		= vcpu_id;
> +	),
> +
> +	TP_printk("vcpu %d: PML full", __entry->vcpu_id)
> +);
> +
>  #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */

You have it protected by CONFIG_X86_64, but use it unconditionally.

(Also, we can get all this information from kvm_exit tracepoint;
 I'd just drop it.)

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index c987374..de5ce82 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -516,6 +519,10 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
> +	/* Support for PML */
> +#define PML_ENTITY_NUM		512

(Readers of this struct likely aren't interested in this number, so it
 would be nicer to define it outside.  I thought it is here to hint the
 amount of allocated pages, but PML_ENTITY_NUM / 512 isn't obvious.)

> +	struct page *pml_pg;
> @@ -4355,6 +4368,9 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>  	   a current VMCS12
>  	*/
>  	exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
> +	/* PML is enabled/disabled in creating/destorying vcpu */
> +	exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;

What is the harm of enabling it here?

(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES seems similar and does it.)

> +
>  	return exec_control;
>  }
> @@ -6971,6 +7001,31 @@ static bool vmx_test_pir(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
> +static int handle_pml_full(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +	unsigned long exit_qualification;
> +
> +	trace_kvm_pml_full(vcpu->vcpu_id);
> +
> +	exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * PML buffer FULL happened while executing iret from NMI,
> +	 * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
> +	 */
> +	if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
> +			cpu_has_virtual_nmis() &&
> +			(exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
> +		vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
> +				GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);

Relevant part of the specification is pasted from 27.2.2 (Information
for VM Exits Due to Vectored Events), which makes me think that this bit
is mirrored to IDT-vectoring information field ...

Isn't vmx_recover_nmi_blocking() enough?

(I see the same code in handle_ept_violation(), but wasn't that needed
 just because of a hardware error?)

> +
> +	/*
> +	 * PML buffer already flushed at beginning of VMEXIT. Nothing to do
> +	 * here.., and there's no userspace involvement needed for PML.
> +	 */
> +	return 1;
> +}
> @@ -7325,6 +7381,89 @@ static void vmx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *info1, u64 *info2)
> +static int vmx_enable_pml(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> +{
> +	struct page *pml_pg;
> +	u32 exec_control;
> +
> +	pml_pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
> +	if (!pml_pg)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	vmx->pml_pg = pml_pg;

(It's safe to use vmx->pml_pg directly.)

> +
> +	vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->pml_pg));
> +	vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
> +
> +	exec_control = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
> +	exec_control |= SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
> +	vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +static void vmx_flush_pml_buffer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> +{
> +	struct kvm *kvm = vmx->vcpu.kvm;
> +	u64 *pml_buf;
> +	u16 pml_idx;
> +
> +	pml_idx = vmcs_read16(GUEST_PML_INDEX);
> +
> +	/* Do nothing if PML buffer is empty */
> +	if (pml_idx == (PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1))
> +		return;
> +
> +	/* PML index always points to next available PML buffer entity */
> +	if (pml_idx >= PML_ENTITY_NUM)
> +		pml_idx = 0;
> +	else
> +		pml_idx++;

If the pml_idx is >= PML_ENTITY_NUM and < 0xffff, the log is empty,
so it would be better to use just 'pml_idx++' and unsigned modulo.

(Could also 'assert(pml_idx < PML_ENTITY_NUM)' then.)

> +
> +	pml_buf = page_address(vmx->pml_pg);
> +	for (; pml_idx < PML_ENTITY_NUM; pml_idx++) {
> +		u64 gpa;
> +
> +		gpa = pml_buf[pml_idx];
> +		WARN_ON(gpa & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
> +		mark_page_dirty(kvm, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> +	}
> +
> +	/* reset PML index */
> +	vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
> +}
> @@ -9492,6 +9655,31 @@ static void vmx_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
> +static void vmx_slot_enable_log_dirty(struct kvm *kvm,
> +				     struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> +{
> +	kvm_mmu_slot_leaf_clear_dirty(kvm, slot);

(New slot contains dirty pages?)

> +	kvm_mmu_slot_largepage_remove_write_access(kvm, slot);
> +}

Thanks.

  reply	other threads:[~2015-02-03 15:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-01-28  2:54 [PATCH 0/6] KVM: VMX: Page Modification Logging (PML) support Kai Huang
2015-01-28  2:54 ` [PATCH 1/6] KVM: Rename kvm_arch_mmu_write_protect_pt_masked to be more generic for log dirty Kai Huang
2015-01-28  2:54 ` [PATCH 2/6] KVM: MMU: Add mmu help functions to support PML Kai Huang
2015-02-03 17:34   ` Radim Krčmář
2015-02-05  5:59     ` Kai Huang
2015-02-05 14:51       ` Radim Krčmář
2015-01-28  2:54 ` [PATCH 3/6] KVM: MMU: Explicitly set D-bit for writable spte Kai Huang
2015-01-28  2:54 ` [PATCH 4/6] KVM: x86: Change parameter of kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access Kai Huang
2015-02-03 16:28   ` Radim Krčmář
2015-01-28  2:54 ` [PATCH 5/6] KVM: x86: Add new dirty logging kvm_x86_ops for PML Kai Huang
2015-02-03 15:53   ` Radim Krčmář
2015-02-05  6:29     ` Kai Huang
2015-02-05 14:52       ` Radim Krčmář
2015-01-28  2:54 ` [PATCH 6/6] KVM: VMX: Add PML support in VMX Kai Huang
2015-02-03 15:18   ` Radim Krčmář [this message]
2015-02-03 15:39     ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-03 16:02       ` Radim Krčmář
2015-02-05  6:23     ` Kai Huang
2015-02-05 15:04       ` Radim Krčmář
2015-02-06  0:22         ` Kai Huang
2015-02-06  0:28         ` Kai Huang
2015-02-06 16:00       ` Paolo Bonzini

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