From: Adalbert Lazar <alazar@bitdefender.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
alazar@bitdefender.com, mdontu@bitdefender.com
Subject: [RFC PATCH 07/19] kvm: x86: Add kvm_arch_msr_intercept()
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 16:43:36 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170616134348.17725-8-alazar@bitdefender.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616134348.17725-1-alazar@bitdefender.com>
From: Mihai Dontu <mdontu@bitdefender.com>
This function is used by the introspection subsytem to enable/disable
MSR register interception.
The patch adds back the __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr() function
removed with 40d8338d095e6117112f4d303e5d6cf776069e38
(KVM: VMX: remove functions that enable msr intercepts).
Signed-off-by: Mihai Dontu <mdontu@bitdefender.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 7 ++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 +++++
4 files changed, 67 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 695605eb1dfb..ff94a3512347 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1048,6 +1048,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
void (*cancel_hv_timer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*setup_mce)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+ void (*msr_intercept)(unsigned int msr, bool enable);
};
struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
@@ -1429,4 +1430,5 @@ static inline int kvm_cpu_get_apicid(int mps_cpu)
#endif
}
+void kvm_arch_msr_intercept(unsigned int msr, bool enable);
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_HOST_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index ba9891ac5c56..7f1b00b74199 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -5262,6 +5262,11 @@ static void svm_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->arch.mcg_cap &= 0x1ff;
}
+static void svm_msr_intercept(unsigned int msr, bool enable)
+{
+ set_msr_interception(msrpm, msr, enable, enable);
+}
+
static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
.cpu_has_kvm_support = has_svm,
.disabled_by_bios = is_disabled,
@@ -5374,6 +5379,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
.deliver_posted_interrupt = svm_deliver_avic_intr,
.update_pi_irte = svm_update_pi_irte,
.setup_mce = svm_setup_mce,
+
+ .msr_intercept = svm_msr_intercept,
};
static int __init svm_init(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index ca5d2b93385c..7a594cfcb2ea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -11457,6 +11457,56 @@ static void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
~FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE;
}
+static void __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+ u32 msr, int type)
+{
+ int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+ if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals
+ * have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round.
+ * We can control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff.
+ */
+ if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
+ if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+ /* read-low */
+ __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000 / f);
+
+ if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+ /* write-low */
+ __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
+
+ } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
+ msr &= 0x1fff;
+ if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+ /* read-high */
+ __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400 / f);
+
+ if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+ /* write-high */
+ __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
+
+ }
+}
+
+static void vmx_msr_intercept(unsigned int msr, bool enabled)
+{
+ if (enabled) {
+ __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, msr,
+ MSR_TYPE_W);
+ __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, msr,
+ MSR_TYPE_W);
+ } else {
+ __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, msr,
+ MSR_TYPE_W);
+ __vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode, msr,
+ MSR_TYPE_W);
+ }
+}
+
static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
.cpu_has_kvm_support = cpu_has_kvm_support,
.disabled_by_bios = vmx_disabled_by_bios,
@@ -11584,6 +11634,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
#endif
.setup_mce = vmx_setup_mce,
+
+ .msr_intercept = vmx_msr_intercept,
};
static int __init vmx_init(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 1a7493982310..9a47f640a7b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -8734,6 +8734,12 @@ bool kvm_vector_hashing_enabled(void)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vector_hashing_enabled);
+void kvm_arch_msr_intercept(unsigned int msr, bool enable)
+{
+ kvm_x86_ops->msr_intercept(msr, enable);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_msr_intercept);
+
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_exit);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_fast_mmio);
EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_inj_virq);
--
2.12.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-16 13:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-16 13:43 [RFC PATCH 00/19] Guest introspection Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 01/19] kvm: x86: mmu: Add kvm_mmu_get_spte() and kvm_mmu_set_spte() Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 02/19] kvm: x86: Add kvm_arch_vcpu_set_regs() Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 03/19] mm: Add vm_replace_page() Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 04/19] kvm: Add kvm_enum() Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 05/19] kvm: Add uuid member in struct kvm + support for KVM_CAP_VM_UUID Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 06/19] kvm: Add kvm_vm_shutdown() Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` Adalbert Lazar [this message]
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 08/19] kvm: Add the introspection subsystem Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-21 11:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-06-21 12:36 ` Mihai Donțu
2017-06-21 12:57 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 09/19] kvm: Hook in kvmi on VM on/off events Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 10/19] kvm: vmx: Hook in kvmi_page_fault() Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 11/19] kvm: x86: Hook in kvmi_breakpoint_event() Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-21 11:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-06-21 12:37 ` Mihai Donțu
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 12/19] kvm: x86: Hook in kvmi_trap_event() Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 13/19] kvm: x86: Hook in kvmi_cr_event() Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 14/19] kvm: x86: Hook in kvmi_xsetbv_event() Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 15/19] kvm: x86: Hook in kvmi_msr_event() Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 16/19] kvm: x86: Change the emulation context Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 17/19] kvm: x86: Hook in kvmi_vmcall_event() Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 18/19] kvm: x86: Set the new spte flags before entering the guest Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 13:43 ` [RFC PATCH 19/19] kvm: x86: Handle KVM_REQ_INTROSPECTION Adalbert Lazar
2017-06-16 14:45 ` [RFC PATCH 00/19] Guest introspection Jan Kiszka
2017-06-16 15:18 ` Mihai Donțu
2017-06-16 15:34 ` Jan Kiszka
2017-06-16 15:59 ` Mihai Donțu
2017-06-19 9:39 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2017-06-20 14:58 ` alazar
2017-06-20 15:03 ` Jan Kiszka
2017-06-21 11:04 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2017-06-21 13:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-06-27 16:12 ` Mihai Donțu
2017-06-27 16:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-06-16 17:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-06-16 17:27 ` Jan Kiszka
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