From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"\\\"Radim Krčmář\\\"" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 22/26] KVM: SVM: Pin guest memory when SEV is active
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2017 16:00:21 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170914140021.omgcxnjdcyet3lua@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170724200303.12197-23-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 03:02:59PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> The SEV memory encryption engine uses a tweak such that two identical
> plaintexts at different location will have a different ciphertexts.
plaintexts or plaintext pages? also, s/a //
> So swapping or moving ciphertexts of two pages will not result in
> plaintexts being swapped. Relocating (or migrating) a physical backing
s/a //
> pages for SEV guest will require some additional steps. The current SEV
"for a SEV guest"
> key management spec does not provide commands to swap or migrate (move)
> ciphertexts. For now, we pin the guest memory registered through
> KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REGISTER_RAM ioctl.
>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 113 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 114 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 150177e..a91aadf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -747,6 +747,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
> unsigned int handle; /* firmware handle */
> unsigned int asid; /* asid for this guest */
> int sev_fd; /* SEV device fd */
> + struct list_head ram_list; /* list of registered ram */
regions_list I guess.
> };
>
> struct kvm_arch {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index 75dcaa9..cdb1cf3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -333,8 +333,19 @@ static int sev_asid_new(void);
> static void sev_asid_free(int asid);
> static void sev_deactivate_handle(struct kvm *kvm, int *error);
> static void sev_decommission_handle(struct kvm *kvm, int *error);
> +static void sev_unpin_memory(struct page **pages, unsigned long npages);
Unneeded.
> +
> #define __sme_page_pa(x) __sme_set(page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT)
>
> +struct kvm_sev_pin_ram {
sev_pinned_region
> + struct list_head list;
> + unsigned long npages;
> + struct page **pages;
> + struct kvm_memory_encrypt_ram userspace;
That member would need a comment what it is.
> +};
> +
> +static void __mem_encrypt_unregister_ram(struct kvm_sev_pin_ram *ram);
Move code so that you don't need that one.
> +
> static bool svm_sev_enabled(void)
> {
> return !!max_sev_asid;
> @@ -385,6 +396,11 @@ static inline void sev_set_fd(struct kvm *kvm, int fd)
> to_sev_info(kvm)->sev_fd = fd;
> }
>
> +static inline struct list_head *sev_get_ram_list(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + return &to_sev_info(kvm)->ram_list;
> +}
> +
> static inline void mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
> {
> vmcb->control.clean = 0;
> @@ -1566,10 +1582,24 @@ static void sev_firmware_uninit(void)
> static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
> {
> int state, error;
> + struct list_head *pos, *q;
> + struct kvm_sev_pin_ram *ram;
> + struct list_head *head = sev_get_ram_list(kvm);
Please sort function local variables declaration in a reverse christmas
tree order:
<type> longest_variable_name;
<type> shorter_var_name;
<type> even_shorter;
<type> i;
>
> if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> return;
>
> + /*
> + * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory region
> + * then lets unpin all the registered memory.
> + */
> + if (!list_empty(head)) {
> + list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
> + ram = list_entry(pos, struct kvm_sev_pin_ram, list);
> + __mem_encrypt_unregister_ram(ram);
You don't need the local "ram" varible here:
__mem_encrypt_unregister_ram(list_entry(pos, struct kvm_sev_pin_ram, list));
> + }
> + }
> +
> /* release the firmware resources for this guest */
> if (sev_get_handle(kvm)) {
> sev_deactivate_handle(kvm, &error);
> @@ -5640,6 +5670,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> sev_set_active(kvm);
> sev_set_asid(kvm, asid);
> sev_set_fd(kvm, argp->sev_fd);
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(sev_get_ram_list(kvm));
> ret = 0;
> e_err:
> fdput(f);
> @@ -6437,6 +6468,86 @@ static int svm_memory_encryption_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
> return r;
> }
>
> +static int mem_encrypt_register_ram(struct kvm *kvm,
> + struct kvm_memory_encrypt_ram *ram)
> +{
Please call that arg "regions" or so. "ram" is strange. In the other
functions too.
> + struct list_head *head = sev_get_ram_list(kvm);
> + struct kvm_sev_pin_ram *pin_ram;
> +
> + if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> + return -ENOTTY;
> +
> + pin_ram = kzalloc(sizeof(*pin_ram), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!pin_ram)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + pin_ram->pages = sev_pin_memory(ram->address, ram->size,
> + &pin_ram->npages, 1);
Let it stick out.
> + if (!pin_ram->pages)
> + goto e_free;
> +
> + /*
> + * Guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
"The guest"
> + * for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are flushed to ensure
> + * that guest data gets written into memory with correct C-bit.
> + */
> + sev_clflush_pages(pin_ram->pages, pin_ram->npages);
> +
> + pin_ram->userspace.address = ram->address;
> + pin_ram->userspace.size = ram->size;
> + list_add_tail(&pin_ram->list, head);
> + return 0;
<---- newline here.
> +e_free:
> + kfree(pin_ram);
> + return 1;
> +}
> +
> +static struct kvm_sev_pin_ram *sev_find_pinned_ram(struct kvm *kvm,
> + struct kvm_memory_encrypt_ram *ram)
So this function signature is almost impossible to read: you have "kvm"
"sev" "pin" "ram" and those long structure names.
Now look how something like this:
static struct regions_list *
sev_find_pinned_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct enc_range *range)
tells you exactly what the function does.
> +{
> + struct list_head *head = sev_get_ram_list(kvm);
> + struct kvm_sev_pin_ram *i;
> +
> + list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) {
> + if (i->userspace.address == ram->address &&
> + i->userspace.size == ram->size)
if (i->usr.addr == reg->addr &&
i->usr.size == reg->size)
reads much better to me.
> + return i;
> + }
> +
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static void __mem_encrypt_unregister_ram(struct kvm_sev_pin_ram *ram)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Guest may have changed the memory encryption attribute from
"The guest"
> + * C=0 -> C=1. Lets make sure caches are flushed to ensure in data
Both comments talk about the 0 -> 1 case for the C-bit. What about the
reverse: 1->0? Do we not flush there or we don't have cases where a
guest doesn't decrypt its memory?
> + * gets written into memory with correct C-bit.
> + */
> + sev_clflush_pages(ram->pages, ram->npages);
> +
> + sev_unpin_memory(ram->pages, ram->npages);
> + list_del(&ram->list);
> + kfree(ram);
> +}
> +
> +static int mem_encrypt_unregister_ram(struct kvm *kvm,
> + struct kvm_memory_encrypt_ram *ram)
> +{
> + struct kvm_sev_pin_ram *pinned_ram;
> +
> + if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> + return -ENOTTY;
> +
> + pinned_ram = sev_find_pinned_ram(kvm, ram);
> + if (!pinned_ram)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + __mem_encrypt_unregister_ram(pinned_ram);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
> .cpu_has_kvm_support = has_svm,
> .disabled_by_bios = is_disabled,
> @@ -6551,6 +6662,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
> .setup_mce = svm_setup_mce,
>
> .memory_encryption_op = svm_memory_encryption_op,
> + .memory_encryption_register_ram = mem_encrypt_register_ram,
> + .memory_encryption_unregister_ram = mem_encrypt_unregister_ram,
Names are too long. mem_encrypt_reg_memory or so I guess. In general,
choose a prefix and stick with it. mem_enc, mem_encrypt, mem_crypt...
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-14 14:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-24 20:02 [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 00/26] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 01/26] Documentation/virtual/kvm: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Brijesh Singh
2017-09-05 17:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-05 21:39 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-05 22:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-06 16:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-06 20:54 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 02/26] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) device support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 8:29 ` Kamil Konieczny
2017-07-25 15:00 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-06 17:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-06 20:38 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-06 20:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-06 21:26 ` Gary R Hook
2017-09-07 10:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-07 14:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-07 22:19 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-07 23:15 ` Gary R Hook
2017-09-08 8:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-08 8:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-08 13:54 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-08 16:06 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 03/26] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 14:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-12 15:32 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 16:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 14:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 15:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 04/26] KVM: SVM: Prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 19:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 05/26] KVM: SVM: Reserve ASID range " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-12 20:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 06/26] KVM: SVM: Prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 07/26] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 08/26] KVM: X86: Extend CPUID range to include new leaf Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 09/26] KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 10/26] KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REGISTER/UNREGISTER_RAM ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 20:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-12 20:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-12 21:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 11/26] KVM: X86: Extend struct kvm_arch to include SEV information Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 13:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 15:14 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 15:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 12/26] KVM: Define SEV key management command id Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 13:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 13/26] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_INIT command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 16:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 16:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 14/26] KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use assosiated ASID when SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 15:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 15/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 17:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 18:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 18:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 18:58 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 21:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 16/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 17:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-13 19:45 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-13 21:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 17/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 10:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 18/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 10:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 19/26] KVM: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 10:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-14 11:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 20/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 11:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 21/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 13:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:02 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 22/26] KVM: SVM: Pin guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 14:00 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2017-07-24 20:03 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 23/26] KVM: X86: Add memory encryption enabled ops Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 14:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:03 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 24/26] KVM: SVM: Clear C-bit from the page fault address Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:03 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 25/26] KVM: SVM: Do not install #UD intercept when SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 14:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 20:03 ` [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 26/26] KVM: X86: Restart the guest when insn_len is zero and " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-14 15:40 ` Borislav Petkov
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