From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Borislav Petkov Subject: Re: [Part1 PATCH v4 16/17] X86/KVM: Unencrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 09:39:31 +0200 Message-ID: <20170920073930.GB26073@nazgul.tnic> References: <20170916123418.37807-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> <20170916123418.37807-17-brijesh.singh@amd.com> <20170919110611.GN4733@nazgul.tnic> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H . Peter Anvin" , Andy Lutomirski , Paolo Bonzini , Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= To: Brijesh Singh , Tom Lendacky Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: kvm.vger.kernel.org On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 09:00:39AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote: > Yes, we can revisit it later to optimize it. Yeah, it will become pretty fugly if we need to do more decrypted pages sharing between hv and guest. And if they have to be perCPU, it becomes nastier. So we definitely should think about having a proper design for this page-sized sharing. For example, if you do a single shared page and then you copy the actual data between host and guest, the former becomes a bounce buffer of sorts which adds that additional copying penalty. Yuck. So we really should think about this more... -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg) --