From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [Part1 PATCH v7 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 09:30:49 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171020143059.3291-8-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171020143059.3291-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
EFI data is encrypted when the kernel is run under SEV. Update the
page table references to be sure the EFI memory areas are accessed
encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
---
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 12e83888e5b9..5469c9319f43 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
@@ -369,7 +370,11 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
* as trim_bios_range() will reserve the first page and isolate it away
* from memory allocators anyway.
*/
- if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, _PAGE_RW)) {
+ pf = _PAGE_RW;
+ if (sev_active())
+ pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
+
+ if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, pf)) {
pr_err("Failed to create 1:1 mapping for the first page!\n");
return 1;
}
@@ -412,6 +417,9 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
+ if (sev_active())
+ flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
+
pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, va, md->num_pages, flags))
pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
@@ -538,6 +546,9 @@ static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *m
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
+ if (sev_active())
+ pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
+
return efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
}
@@ -589,6 +600,9 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
+ if (sev_active())
+ pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
+
efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
}
}
--
2.9.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-20 14:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-20 14:30 [Part1 PATCH v7 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) description Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 11/17] x86/mm: Add DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 18:39 ` Alan Cox
2017-10-21 11:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 15/17] percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 16/17] X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-20 14:30 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-11-15 23:57 ` [Part1 PATCH v7 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Steve Rutherford
2017-11-16 10:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-16 14:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-11-21 23:18 ` Steve Rutherford
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