From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
Subject: Re: [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 21:16:15 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180123201615.GA6957@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1516566497.9814.78.camel@infradead.org>
On Sun 2018-01-21 20:28:17, David Woodhouse wrote:
> On Sun, 2018-01-21 at 11:34 -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > All of this is pure garbage.
> >
> > Is Intel really planning on making this shit architectural? Has
> > anybody talked to them and told them they are f*cking insane?
> >
> > Please, any Intel engineers here - talk to your managers.
>
> If the alternative was a two-decade product recall and giving everyone
> free CPUs, I'm not sure it was entirely insane.
>
> Certainly it's a nasty hack, but hey — the world was on fire and in the
> end we didn't have to just turn the datacentres off and go back to goat
> farming, so it's not all bad.
Well, someone at Intel put world on fire. And then was selling faulty
CPUs for half a year while world was on fire; they knew they are
faulty yet they sold them anyway.
Then Intel talks about how great they are and how security is
important for them.... Intentionaly confusing between Meltdown and
Spectre so they can mask how badly they screwed. And without apologies.
> As a hack for existing CPUs, it's just about tolerable — as long as it
> can die entirely by the next generation.
>
> So the part is I think is odd is the IBRS_ALL feature, where a future
> CPU will advertise "I am able to be not broken" and then you have to
> set the IBRS bit once at boot time to *ask* it not to be broken. That
> part is weird, because it ought to have been treated like the RDCL_NO
> bit — just "you don't have to worry any more, it got better".
And now Intel wants to cheat at benchmarks, to put companies that do
right thing at disadvantage and thinks that that's okay because world
was on fire?
At this point, I believe that yes, product recall would be
appropriate. If Intel is not willing to do it on their own, well,
perhaps courts can force them. Ouch and I wound not mind some jail time
for whoever is responsible for selling known-faulty CPUs to the public.
Oh, and still no word about the real fixes. World is not only Linux,
you see? https://pavelmachek.livejournal.com/140949.html?nojs=1
Best regards,
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-23 20:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 152+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-20 19:22 [RFC 00/10] Speculation Control feature support KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 01/10] x86/speculation: Add basic support for IBPB KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 02/10] x86/kvm: Add IBPB support KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 20:18 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-22 18:56 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-22 19:31 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 03/10] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 04/10] x86/mm: Only flush indirect branches when switching into non dumpable process KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 21:06 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-22 18:29 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-21 11:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-21 12:04 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 14:07 ` H.J. Lu
2018-01-22 10:19 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-22 10:23 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 16:21 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-21 16:25 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-21 22:20 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-29 6:35 ` Jon Masters
2018-01-29 14:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 05/10] x86/speculation: Add basic IBRS support infrastructure KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-21 14:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-21 14:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-22 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-22 12:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-22 13:30 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22 13:36 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-21 15:25 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 20:58 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 8:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-24 9:02 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-24 15:09 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-24 15:18 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 9:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-24 10:49 ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2018-01-24 12:30 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 12:14 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 12:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-24 12:58 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-29 20:14 ` [RFC,05/10] " Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-29 20:17 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-29 20:42 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-29 20:44 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-29 21:02 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-29 21:37 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-29 21:50 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-29 22:12 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-30 1:22 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-29 22:25 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-30 1:37 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-29 21:37 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-29 21:44 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-29 22:10 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-30 1:12 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-30 0:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-30 1:03 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-30 3:13 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-31 15:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-31 15:07 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-30 1:32 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-30 3:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-30 12:04 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-30 13:54 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-30 8:22 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-30 11:35 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-30 11:56 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-30 12:11 ` Christian Borntraeger
2018-01-30 14:46 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2018-01-30 14:52 ` Christian Borntraeger
2018-01-30 14:56 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2018-01-30 15:33 ` Christian Borntraeger
2018-01-30 20:46 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-31 10:05 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2018-01-31 10:15 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-31 11:04 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-31 11:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-31 12:30 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-31 13:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-31 14:04 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-31 14:44 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-31 16:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-31 11:07 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2018-01-31 15:00 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-31 15:11 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-31 10:03 ` [RFC 05/10] " Christophe de Dinechin
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 06/10] x86/speculation: Add inlines to control Indirect Branch Speculation KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 07/10] x86: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 08/10] x86/idle: Control Indirect Branch Speculation in idle KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 19:23 ` [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-21 19:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-23 16:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-23 16:20 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-23 22:49 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-23 23:14 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 23:22 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-24 0:47 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-24 1:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-24 1:22 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 1:59 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-24 3:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CA+55aFxUEPHc7JRQG3zmxEsfmfJOiJa1QqFBKCBNb5Tt5vfiSg@mail.gmail.com>
2018-01-21 20:28 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 21:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-21 22:00 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 22:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-22 16:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 7:29 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 7:53 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 9:27 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 9:37 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 15:01 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-23 9:30 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 10:15 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 10:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 10:44 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 10:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-04 18:43 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-04 20:22 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-06 9:14 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 20:16 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2018-01-20 19:23 ` [RFC 10/10] x86/enter: Use IBRS on syscall and interrupts KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-21 13:50 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-21 14:40 ` KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-21 17:22 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-21 14:02 ` [RFC 00/10] Speculation Control feature support Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-22 21:27 ` David Woodhouse
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-01-23 11:13 [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation Liran Alon
2018-01-25 22:20 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-26 2:11 Liran Alon
2018-01-26 2:23 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-26 9:11 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 17:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-26 17:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 17:29 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 17:31 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 17:59 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-26 18:11 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 18:12 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-26 18:26 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 18:28 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-26 18:43 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 18:44 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-26 18:53 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 19:02 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-26 19:11 ` Hansen, Dave
2018-01-27 13:42 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-27 15:55 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-26 19:11 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 8:46 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 2:50 Liran Alon
2018-01-26 2:55 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
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