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From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
To: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>,
	kvm list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Ashok Ra
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 4/5] KVM: VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 23:26:50 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180201042650.GD21751@char.us.oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e28c13c4-4a04-8a41-2a5c-16509e1bad0e@amazon.com>

> >From 9c19a8ac3f021efba6f70ad7e28f7ad06bb97e43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 19:58:10 +0000
> Subject: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
> 
> [ Based on a patch from Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> ]
> 
> Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for
> guests that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not
> be using a retpoline+IBPB based approach.
> 
> To avoid the overhead of atomically saving and restoring the
> MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests that do not actually use the MSR, only
> add_atomic_switch_msr when a non-zero is written to it.
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

That part of the comment does not seem to be in sync with the code.

> 
> No attempt is made to handle STIBP here, intentionally. Filtering STIBP
> may be added in a future patch, which may require trapping all writes
> if we don't want to pass it through directly to the guest.
> 
> [dwmw2: Clean up CPUID bits, save/restore manually, handle reset]
> 
> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> ---
> v6:
> - got rid of save_spec_ctrl_on_exit
> - introduce spec_ctrl_intercepted
> - introduce spec_ctrl_used
> v5:
> - Also check for X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL for the msr reads/writes
> v4:
> - Add IBRS to kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features
> - Handling nested guests
> v3:
> - Save/restore manually
> - Fix CPUID handling
> - Fix a copy & paste error in the name of SPEC_CTRL MSR in
>   disable_intercept.
> - support !cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()
> v2:
> - remove 'host_spec_ctrl' in favor of only a comment (dwmw@).
> - special case writing '0' in SPEC_CTRL to avoid confusing live-migration
>   when the instance never used the MSR (dwmw@).
> - depend on X86_FEATURE_IBRS instead of X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (dwmw@).
> - add MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL to the list of MSRs to save (dropped it by accident).
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c |  9 +++--
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c   | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c   |  2 +-
>  3 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> index 1909635..13f5d42 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> @@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
>  
>  	/* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */
>  	const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features =
> -		F(IBPB);
> +		F(IBPB) | F(IBRS);
>  
>  	/* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */
>  	const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features =
> @@ -394,7 +394,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
>  
>  	/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
>  	const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
> -		F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
> +		F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) |
> +		F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
>  
>  	/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
>  	get_cpu();
> @@ -630,9 +631,11 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
>  			g_phys_as = phys_as;
>  		entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
>  		entry->edx = 0;
> -		/* IBPB isn't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */
> +		/* IBRS and IBPB aren't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */
>  		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
>  			entry->ebx |= F(IBPB);
> +		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
> +			entry->ebx |= F(IBRS);
>  		entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features;
>  		cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX);
>  		break;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index 6a9f4ec..bfc80ff 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -594,6 +594,14 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
>  #endif
>  
>  	u64 		      arch_capabilities;
> +	u64 		      spec_ctrl;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * This indicates that:
> +	 * 1) guest_cpuid_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) == true &&
> +	 * 2) The guest has actually initiated a write against the MSR.
> +	 */
> +	bool spec_ctrl_used;
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * This indicates that:
> @@ -946,6 +954,8 @@ static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
>  static bool nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
>  					    u16 error_code);
>  static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +static void __always_inline vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
> +							  u32 msr, int type);
>  
>  static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
>  static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
> @@ -1917,6 +1927,22 @@ static void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
>  }
>  
> +/* Is SPEC_CTRL intercepted for the currently running vCPU? */
> +static bool spec_ctrl_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +	unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
> +	int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
> +
> +	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
> +		return true;
> +
> +	msr_bitmap = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ?
> +			to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap :
> +			to_vmx(vcpu)->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
> +
> +	return !!test_bit(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
> +}
> +
>  static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
>  		unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit)
>  {
> @@ -3246,6 +3272,14 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>  	case MSR_IA32_TSC:
>  		msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu);
>  		break;
> +	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
> +		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> +		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
> +		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
> +			return 1;
> +
> +		msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
> +		break;
>  	case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
>  		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>  		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
> @@ -3359,6 +3393,34 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>  	case MSR_IA32_TSC:
>  		kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
>  		break;
> +	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
> +		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> +		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
> +		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
> +			return 1;
> +
> +		vmx->spec_ctrl_used = true;
> +
> +		/* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
> +		if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP))
> +			return 1;
> +
> +		vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
> +		 * it through. This means we don't have to take the perf

.. But only if it is a nested guest (as you have && is_guest_mode).

Do you want to update the comment a bit?

> +		 * hit of saving it on vmexit for the common case of guests
> +		 * that don't use it.
> +		 */
> +		if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap() && data &&
> +		    spec_ctrl_intercepted(vcpu) &&
> +		    is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ <=== here
> +			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(
> +					vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap,
> +					MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
> +					MSR_TYPE_RW);
> +		break;
>  	case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
>  		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>  		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) &&

  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-01  4:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-31 19:37 [PATCH v5 0/5] KVM: Expose speculation control feature to guests KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-31 19:37 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] KVM: x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-31 20:22   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-31 19:37 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] KVM: x86: Add IBPB support KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-31 19:45   ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-31 19:53     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-31 19:55       ` Jim Mattson
2018-02-01  0:27         ` KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-31 20:28   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-31 20:36     ` KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-02-01  4:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2018-02-01 17:00   ` Raj, Ashok
2018-01-31 19:37 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] KVM: VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-31 19:37 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] KVM: VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-31 19:53   ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-31 20:00     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-31 20:01     ` KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-31 20:18       ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-31 20:21         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-31 21:18           ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-31 22:05             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-31 20:34         ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-31 20:54           ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-31 21:00             ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-31 21:05               ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-31 21:17                 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-31 21:42                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-31 21:53                   ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-31 21:59                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-31 21:59                     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-31 22:06                       ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-31 22:10                         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-31 22:21                           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-31 22:53                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-01 14:09                       ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-31 22:52         ` KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-02-01  0:24           ` KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-02-01  4:26             ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [this message]
2018-02-01 13:25               ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-01 17:37                 ` KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-02-01 17:46                   ` KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-02-01 14:19               ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-02-01 14:28                 ` KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-31 22:56   ` Raj, Ashok
2018-01-31 19:37 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] KVM: SVM: " KarimAllah Ahmed

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