From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: expose the host's ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR to userspace Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 15:56:28 +0100 Message-ID: <20180307145628.GA12299@flask> References: <1519433546-33879-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com> <20180226221300.GK22024@char.us.oracle.com> <20180301213205.GB29001@flask> <20180302214212.GB13606@flask> <9cad32c8-fdb6-95db-2cd3-a0e3297b1811@redhat.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, David Woodhouse , KarimAllah Ahmed To: Paolo Bonzini Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <9cad32c8-fdb6-95db-2cd3-a0e3297b1811@redhat.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: kvm.vger.kernel.org 2018-03-07 12:53+0100, Paolo Bonzini: > On 02/03/2018 22:42, Radim Krčmář wrote: > > Ok, sounds good. I've deferred it to rc5 as I think we'll want to use > > this to replace the auto setting: I would not bet that it is going to > > be safe to expose future bits, so having the userspace always sanitize > > the capabilities would be safer (and more in line with what we do with > > other MSRs). i.e. this patch would also > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > > index 051dab74e4e9..86ea4a83af1f 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > > @@ -5740,9 +5740,6 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) > > ++vmx->nmsrs; > > } > > > > - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) > > - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, vmx->arch_capabilities); > > - > > vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl); > > > > /* 22.2.1, 20.8.1 */ > > I don't know. There are good reasons for both behaviors, and especially > the following two for _not_ removing the rdmsr: > > 1) so far you could just pass the result of KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID to > KVM_SET_CPUID2, and expect the result to be "as close as possible to the > host"; > > 2) having different behavior for VMX and ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSRs would be > confusing. Right, we can't just stop setting them by default ... (I am in favor of forcing the userspace to configure everything and I'd accept this exception as a mistake of the past.) > I think I'm leaning more towards the following direction: whitelist > ARCH_CAPABILITIES, like we do for the AMD LFENCE MSR already, and > default the AMD LFENCE MSR to the host value. The whitelisting is a good idea and I'm ok with just that, thanks. The MSR_F10H_DECFG default is questionable -- MSR_F10H_DECFG is an architectural MSR, so we'd be changing the guest under the sight of existing userspaces. A potential security risk if they migrate the guest to a CPU that doesn't serialize LFENCE. ARCH_CAPABILITIES are at least hidden by a new CPUID bit. The feature MSR defaults are going to be a mess anyway: we have MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV that is tightly coupled with CPUID. Not a good candidate for passing by default and currently also has a default value.