From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 21/28] sev/i386: add debug encrypt and decrypt commands Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 18:24:10 +0000 Message-ID: <20180307182409.GI3089@work-vm> References: <20180307165038.88640-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> <20180307165038.88640-22-brijesh.singh@amd.com> <20180307172703.GH3089@work-vm> <6b8bf293-4a3c-5832-8617-a2b957f97a83@amd.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: Peter Maydell , kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Stefan Hajnoczi , qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Alexander Graf , "Edgar E. Iglesias" , Markus Armbruster , Bruce Rogers , Christian Borntraeger , Marcel Apfelbaum , Borislav Petkov , Thomas Lendacky , Eduardo Habkost , Richard Henderson , Alistair Francis , Cornelia Huck , Richard Henderson , Peter Crosthwaite , Paolo Bonzini To: Brijesh Singh Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <6b8bf293-4a3c-5832-8617-a2b957f97a83@amd.com> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+gceq-qemu-devel2=m.gmane.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" List-Id: kvm.vger.kernel.org * Brijesh Singh (brijesh.singh@amd.com) wrote: > > > On 03/07/2018 11:27 AM, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > > [...] > > > > +{ > > > + SEVState *s = (SEVState *)handle; > > > + > > > + /* If policy does not allow debug then no need to register ops */ > > > + if (s->policy & SEV_POLICY_NODBG) { > > > + return; > > > + } > > > > So what happens if someone tries to use a gdb or monitor command when > > policy didn't allow debug? Does it end up with an obvious error > > somehow? > > > > In those cases caller will get encrypted bytes, leading to unintelligible > data. It can sometime translate into obvious errors e.g caller tries to > walk guest pagtable and it gets garbage and will have trouble dumping the > pgtables etc. Many times qemu calls ldphys_* functions to access the data it > may get tricky to report the errors. So would it make sense to have something like: sev_mem_cant_read(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, uint32_t len, MemTxAttrs attrs) { error_report("SEV Guest policy does not allow debug access"); return -EPERM; } void sev_set_debug_ops(void *handle, MemoryRegion *mr) { SEVState *s = (SEVState *)handle; /* If policy does not allow debug then no need to register ops */ if (s->policy & SEV_POLICY_NODBG) { sev_ops.read = sev_mem_cant_read; sev_ops.write = sev_mem_cant_write; } else { sev_ops.read = sev_mem_read; sev_ops.write = sev_mem_write; } Dave > > -Brijesh -- Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK