* [PATCH] vfio/pci: Fix potential Spectre v1
@ 2018-07-17 17:39 Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-07-18 20:33 ` Alex Williamson
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva @ 2018-07-17 17:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alex Williamson; +Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, Gustavo A. R. Silva
info.index can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c:734 vfio_pci_ioctl()
warn: potential spectre issue 'vdev->region'
Fix this by sanitizing info.index before indirectly using it to index
vdev->region
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
index b423a30..125b58e 100644
--- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
+++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/vfio.h>
#include <linux/vgaarb.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "vfio_pci_private.h"
@@ -727,6 +728,9 @@ static long vfio_pci_ioctl(void *device_data,
if (info.index >=
VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS + vdev->num_regions)
return -EINVAL;
+ info.index = array_index_nospec(info.index,
+ VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS +
+ vdev->num_regions);
i = info.index - VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS;
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] vfio/pci: Fix potential Spectre v1
2018-07-17 17:39 [PATCH] vfio/pci: Fix potential Spectre v1 Gustavo A. R. Silva
@ 2018-07-18 20:33 ` Alex Williamson
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Alex Williamson @ 2018-07-18 20:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gustavo A. R. Silva; +Cc: kvm, linux-kernel
On Tue, 17 Jul 2018 12:39:00 -0500
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com> wrote:
> info.index can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
> to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c:734 vfio_pci_ioctl()
> warn: potential spectre issue 'vdev->region'
>
> Fix this by sanitizing info.index before indirectly using it to index
> vdev->region
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
> ---
> drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 4 ++++
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
Applied to vfio for-linus branch for v4.18. Thanks!
Alex
> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
> index b423a30..125b58e 100644
> --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
> +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <linux/vfio.h>
> #include <linux/vgaarb.h>
> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
>
> #include "vfio_pci_private.h"
>
> @@ -727,6 +728,9 @@ static long vfio_pci_ioctl(void *device_data,
> if (info.index >=
> VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS + vdev->num_regions)
> return -EINVAL;
> + info.index = array_index_nospec(info.index,
> + VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS +
> + vdev->num_regions);
>
> i = info.index - VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS;
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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