From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Sean Christopherson Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] x86/kvm: Avoid dynamic allocation of pvclock data when SEV is active Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 08:54:52 -0700 Message-ID: <20180906155452.GC1522@linux.intel.com> References: <1536234182-2809-1-git-send-email-brijesh.singh@amd.com> <1536234182-2809-6-git-send-email-brijesh.singh@amd.com> <20180906122423.GA11144@zn.tnic> <20180906135041.GB32336@linux.intel.com> <20180906144342.GB11144@zn.tnic> <20180906145639.GA1522@linux.intel.com> <20180906151938.GD11144@zn.tnic> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: Brijesh Singh , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Tom Lendacky , Thomas Gleixner , "H. Peter Anvin" , Paolo Bonzini , Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= To: Borislav Petkov Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20180906151938.GD11144@zn.tnic> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: kvm.vger.kernel.org On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 05:19:38PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 07:56:40AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > Wouldn't that result in @hv_clock_boot being incorrectly freed in the > > !SEV case? > > Ok, maybe I'm missing something but why do we need 4K per CPU? Why can't > we map all those pages which contain the clock variable, decrypted in > all guests' page tables? > > Basically > > (NR_CPUS * sizeof(struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info)) / 4096 > > pages. > > For the !SEV case then nothing changes. The 4k per CPU refers to the dynamic allocation in Brijesh's original patch. Currently, @hv_clock_boot is a single 4k page to limit the amount of unused memory when 'nr_cpu_ids < NR_CPUS'. In the SEV case, dynamically allocating for 'cpu > HVC_BOOT_ARRAY_SIZE' one at a time means that each CPU allocates a full 4k page to store a single 32-byte variable. My thought was that we could simply define a second array for the SEV case to statically allocate for NR_CPUS since __decrypted has a big chunk of memory that would be ununsed anyways[1]. And since the second array is only used for SEV it can be freed if !SEV. If we free the array explicitly then we don't need a second section or attribute. My comments about __decrypted_exclusive were that if we did want to go with a second section/attribute, e.g. to have a generic solution that can be used for other stuff, then we'd have more corner cases to deal with. I agree that simpler is better, i.e. I'd vote for explicitly freeing the second array. Apologies for not making that clear from the get-go. [1] An alternative solution would be to batch the dynamic allocations, but that would probably require locking and be more complex.