From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] x86/kvm: Avoid dynamic allocation of pvclock data when SEV is active
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 12:47:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180906194710.GA16605@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c219ec47-1a1f-5d19-0b5b-0cebb706ca6c@amd.com>
On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 02:24:32PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>
>
> On 09/06/2018 01:47 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> >On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 01:37:50PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>On 09/06/2018 09:18 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> >>....
> >>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>So are we going to be defining a decrypted section for every piece of
> >>>>>machinery now?
> >>>>>
> >>>>>That's a bit too much in my book.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>Why can't you simply free everything in .data..decrypted on !SVE guests?
> >>>>
> >>>>That would prevent adding __decrypted to existing declarations, e.g.
> >>>>hv_clock_boot, which would be ugly in its own right. A more generic
> >>>>solution would be to add something like __decrypted_exclusive to mark
> >>>>data that is used if and only if SEV is active, and then free the
> >>>>SEV-only data when SEV is disabled.
> >>>
> >>>Oh, and we'd need to make sure __decrypted_exclusive is freed when
> >>>!CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT, and preferably !sev_active() since the big
> >>>array is used only if SEV is active. This patch unconditionally
> >>>defines hv_clock_dec but only frees it if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y &&
> >>>!mem_encrypt_active().
> >>>
> >>
> >>Again we have to consider the bare metal scenario while doing this. The
> >>aux array you proposed will be added in decrypted section only when
> >>CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y. If CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=n then nothng
> >>gets put in .data.decrypted section. At the runtime, if memory
> >>encryption is active then .data.decrypted_hvclock will contains useful
> >>data.
> >>
> >>The __decrypted attribute in "" when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=n.
> >
> >Right, but won't the data get dumped into the regular .bss in that
> >case, i.e. needs to be freed?
> >
>
>
> Yes, the auxiliary array will dumped into the regular .bss when
> CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=n. Typically it will be few k, I am not
> sure if its worth complicating the code to save those extra memory.
> Most of the distro's have CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y anyways.
I just realized that we'll try to create a bogus array if 'NR_CPUS <=
HVC_BOOT_ARRAY_SIZE'. A bit ugly, but we could #ifdef away both that
and CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=n in a single shot, e.g.:
#if defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) && NR_CPUS > HVC_BOOT_ARRAY_SIZE
#define HVC_AUX_ARRAY_SIZE \
PAGE_ALIGN((NR_CPUS - HVC_BOOT_ARRAY_SIZE) * \
sizeof(struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info))
static struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info
hv_clock_aux[HVC_AUX_ARRAY_SIZE] __decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
#endif
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-06 19:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-06 11:42 [PATCH v5 0/5] x86: Fix SEV guest regression Brijesh Singh
2018-09-06 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] x86/mm: Restructure sme_encrypt_kernel() Brijesh Singh
2018-09-06 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] x86/mm: fix sme_populate_pgd() to update page flags Brijesh Singh
2018-09-06 11:43 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] x86/mm: add .data..decrypted section to hold shared variables Brijesh Singh
2018-09-06 11:43 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] x86/kvm: use __decrypted attribute in " Brijesh Singh
2018-09-06 11:43 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] x86/kvm: Avoid dynamic allocation of pvclock data when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2018-09-06 12:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-06 13:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-09-06 14:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-09-06 14:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-06 18:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-09-06 18:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-09-06 19:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-09-06 19:46 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-09-06 19:47 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2018-09-06 20:20 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-09-06 20:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-09-06 21:56 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-09-06 14:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-06 14:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-09-06 15:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-06 15:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-09-06 18:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-06 18:43 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-09-06 18:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-09-06 19:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-06 17:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-09-06 14:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-09-06 18:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-09-07 3:57 ` Brijesh Singh
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