From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR
 randomization
Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 16:40:38 -0500
Message-ID: <20190131214038.GI28234@char.us.oracle.com>
References: <20190131192533.34130-1-thgarnie@chromium.org>
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Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, kristen@linux.intel.com,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
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        Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
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        Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>, Pa
To: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@chromium.org>
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On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 11:24:07AM -0800, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> There has been no major concern in the latest iterations. I am interested on
> what would be the best way to slowly integrate this patchset upstream.

One question that I was somehow expected in this cover letter - what
about all those lovely speculative bugs? As in say some one hasn't
updated their machine with the Spectre v3a microcode - wouldn't they
be able to get the kernel virtual address space?

In effect rendering all this hard-work not needed?