From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
x86@kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
"Wanpeng Li" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
"Jim Mattson" <jmattson@google.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 01/16] x86/intel: Initialize IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR at boot
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 17:15:44 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191022001544.GA32518@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191021235423.32733-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
+Cc Paolo and Radim, who occasionally work on KVM...
On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 04:54:23PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Opportunistically initialize IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR to enable VMX when
> the MSR is left unlocked by BIOS. Configuring IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL at
> boot time paves the way for similar enabling of other features, e.g.
> Software Guard Extensions (SGX).
>
> Temporarily leave equivalent KVM code in place in order to avoid
> introducing a regression on Centaur and Zhaoxin CPUs, e.g. removing
> KVM's code would leave the MSR unlocked on those CPUs and would break
> existing functionality if people are loading kvm_intel on Centaur and/or
> Zhaoxin. Defer enablement of the boot-time configuration on Centaur and
> Zhaoxin to future patches to aid bisection.
>
> Note, Local Machine Check Exceptions (LMCE) are also supported by the
> kernel and enabled via IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, but the kernel currently
> uses LMCE if and and only if the feature is explicitly enable by BIOS.
> Keep the current behavior to avoid introducing bugs, future patches can
> opt in to opportunistic enabling if it's deemed desirable to do so.
>
> Always lock IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL if it exists, even if the CPU doesn't
> support VMX, so that other existing and future kernel code that queries
> IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL can assume it's locked.
>
> Start from a clean slate when constructing the value to write to
> IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, i.e. ignore whatever value BIOS left in the MSR so
> as not to enable random features or fault on the WRMSR.
>
> Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Fat fingered a comma when manually editing the patch files :-/
> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu | 4 ++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 1 +
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 4 ++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 2 ++
> 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu b/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu
> index af9c967782f6..aafc14a0abf7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu
> @@ -387,6 +387,10 @@ config X86_DEBUGCTLMSR
> def_bool y
> depends on !(MK6 || MWINCHIPC6 || MWINCHIP3D || MCYRIXIII || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486SX || M486) && !UML
>
> +config X86_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR
> + def_bool y
> + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
> +
> menuconfig PROCESSOR_SELECT
> bool "Supported processor vendors" if EXPERT
> ---help---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
> index d7a1e5a9331c..df5ad0cfe3e9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ obj-y += umwait.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES) += capflags.o powerflags.o
>
> +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR) += feature_control.o
> ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
> obj-y += intel.o intel_pconfig.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_PM) += intel_epb.o
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
> index c0e2407abdd6..d2750f53a0cb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
> @@ -62,4 +62,8 @@ unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);
>
> extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR
> +void init_feature_control_msr(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
> +#endif
> +
> #endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..57b928e64cf5
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +#include <linux/tboot.h>
> +
> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
> +#include <asm/msr-index.h>
> +#include <asm/processor.h>
> +
> +void init_feature_control_msr(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> +{
> + u64 msr;
> +
> + if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, &msr))
> + return;
> +
> + if (msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED)
> + return;
> +
> + /*
> + * Ignore whatever value BIOS left in the MSR to avoid enabling random
> + * features or faulting on the WRMSR.
> + */
> + msr = FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED;
> +
> + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) {
> + msr |= FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
> + if (tboot_enabled())
> + msr |= FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
> + }
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, msr);
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> index c2fdc00df163..15d59224e2f8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> @@ -755,6 +755,8 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> /* Work around errata */
> srat_detect_node(c);
>
> + init_feature_control_msr(c);
> +
> if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
> detect_vmx_virtcap(c);
>
> --
> 2.22.0
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-22 0:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-21 23:46 [PATCH v2 00/16] x86/cpu: Clean up handling of VMX features Sean Christopherson
2019-10-21 23:54 ` [PATCH v2 01/16] x86/intel: Initialize IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR at boot Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 0:15 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2019-10-25 14:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-25 15:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-10-21 23:56 ` [PATCH v2 02/16] x86/mce: WARN once if IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR is left unlocked Sean Christopherson
2019-10-25 14:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-22 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 03/16] x86/centaur: Use common IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR initialization Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 04/16] x86/zhaoxin: " Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 05/16] KVM: VMX: Drop initialization of IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 10:51 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-22 15:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-14 18:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-15 10:10 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-25 16:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-25 16:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-22 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 06/16] x86/cpu: Clear VMX feature flag if VMX is not fully enabled Sean Christopherson
2019-10-25 16:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-11-14 18:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-15 10:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-11-15 10:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-11-15 15:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-15 15:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-22 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 07/16] KVM: VMX: Use VMX feature flag to query BIOS enabling Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 08/16] KVM: VMX: Check for full VMX support when verifying CPU compatibility Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 09/16] x86/vmx: Introduce VMX_FEATURES_* Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 10/16] x86/cpu: Detect VMX features on Intel, Centaur and Zhaoxin CPUs Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 11/16] x86/cpu: Print VMX flags in /proc/cpuinfo using VMX_FEATURES_* Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 12/16] x86/cpufeatures: Drop synthetic VMX feature flags Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 0:08 ` [PATCH v2 13/16] KVM: VMX: Use VMX_FEATURE_* flags to define VMCS control bits Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 0:09 ` [PATCH v2 14/16] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up synthetic virtualization flags Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 0:12 ` [PATCH v2 15/16] perf/x86: Provide stubs of KVM helpers for non-Intel CPUs Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 0:12 ` [PATCH v2 16/16] KVM: VMX: Allow KVM_INTEL when building for Centaur and/or Zhaoxin CPUs Sean Christopherson
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