From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, kvm list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] KVM: x86: Disallow KVM_SET_CPUID{2} if the vCPU is in guest mode
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 12:10:02 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191218201002.GE25201@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALMp9eR-ssCUT_6oZntZ=-5SEN7Y8q-HnraKW=WDHuAn9gYZfQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 11:38:43AM -0800, Jim Mattson wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 9:42 AM Sean Christopherson
> <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > Reject KVM_SET_CPUID{2} with -EBUSY if the vCPU is in guest mode (L2) to
> > avoid complications and potentially undesirable KVM behavior. Allowing
> > userspace to change a guest's capabilities while L2 is active would at
> > best result in unexpected behavior in the guest (L1 or L2), and at worst
> > induce bad KVM behavior by breaking fundamental assumptions regarding
> > transitions between L0, L1 and L2.
>
> This seems a bit contrived. As long as we're breaking the ABI, can we
> disallow changes to CPUID once the vCPU has been powered on?
I can at least concoct scenarios where changing CPUID after KVM_RUN
provides value, e.g. effectively creating a new VM/vCPU without destroying
the kernel's underlying data structures and without putting the file
descriptors, for performance (especially if KVM avoids its hardware on/off
paths) or sandboxing (process has access to a VM fd, but not /dev/kvm).
A truly contrived, but technically architecturally accurate, scenario would
be modeling SGX interaction with the machine check architecutre. Per the
SDM, #MCs or clearing bits in IA32_MCi_CTL disable SGX, which is reflected
in CPUID:
Any machine check exception (#MC) that occurs after Intel SGX is first
enables causes Intel SGX to be disabled, (CPUID.SGX_Leaf.0:EAX[SGX1] == 0)
It cannot be enabled until after the next reset.
Any act of clearing bits from '1 to '0 in any of the IA32_MCi_CTL register
may disable Intel SGX (set CPUID.SGX_Leaf.0:EAX[SGX1] to 0) until the next
reset.
I doubt a userspace VMM would actively model that behavior, but it's at
least theoretically possible. Yes, it would technically be possible for
SGX to be disabled while L2 is active, but I don't think it's unreasonable
to require userspace to first force the vCPU out of L2.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-18 20:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-18 17:42 [RFC PATCH] KVM: x86: Disallow KVM_SET_CPUID{2} if the vCPU is in guest mode Sean Christopherson
2019-12-18 19:38 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-18 20:10 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2019-12-18 20:57 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-18 21:24 ` Sean Christopherson
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