Re: [PATCH v2 3/7] vfio/pci: Introduce VF token

Alex Williamson
2020-03-09T00:46:20Z

On Sat, 7 Mar 2020 01:04:41 +0000
"Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com> wrote:

> > From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> > Sent: Friday, March 6, 2020 11:39 PM
> >
> > On Fri, 6 Mar 2020 08:32:40 +0000
> > "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > > > From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> > > > Sent: Friday, March 6, 2020 2:18 AM
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, 25 Feb 2020 02:59:37 +0000
> > > > "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > > From: Alex Williamson
> > > > > > Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2020 2:54 AM
> > > > > >
> > > > > > If we enable SR-IOV on a vfio-pci owned PF, the resulting VFs are not
> > > > > > fully isolated from the PF. The PF can always cause a denial of service
> > > > > > to the VF, even if by simply resetting itself. The degree to which a PF
> > > > > > can access the data passed through a VF or interfere with its
> > operation
> > > > > > is dependent on a given SR-IOV implementation. Therefore we want
> > to
> > > > > > avoid a scenario where an existing vfio-pci based userspace driver
> > might
> > > > > > assume the PF driver is trusted, for example assigning a PF to one VM
> > > > > > and VF to another with some expectation of isolation. IOMMU
> > grouping
> > > > > > could be a solution to this, but imposes an unnecessarily strong
> > > > > > relationship between PF and VF drivers if they need to operate with
> > the
> > > > > > same IOMMU context. Instead we introduce a "VF token", which is
> > > > > > essentially just a shared secret between PF and VF drivers,
> > implemented
> > > > > > as a UUID.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The VF token can be set by a vfio-pci based PF driver and must be
> > known
> > > > > > by the vfio-pci based VF driver in order to gain access to the device.
> > > > > > This allows the degree to which this VF token is considered secret to
> > be
> > > > > > determined by the applications and environment. For example a VM
> > > > might
> > > > > > generate a random UUID known only internally to the hypervisor
> > while a
> > > > > > userspace networking appliance might use a shared, or even well
> > know,
> > > > > > UUID among the application drivers.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > To incorporate this VF token, the VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD
> > interface
> > > > is
> > > > > > extended to accept key=value pairs in addition to the device name.
> > This
> > > > > > allows us to most easily deny user access to the device without risk
> > > > > > that existing userspace drivers assume region offsets, IRQs, and other
> > > > > > device features, leading to more elaborate error paths. The format of
> > > > > > these options are expected to take the form:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > "$DEVICE_NAME $OPTION1=$VALUE1 $OPTION2=$VALUE2"
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Where the device name is always provided first for compatibility and
> > > > > > additional options are specified in a space separated list. The
> > > > > > relation between and requirements for the additional options will be
> > > > > > vfio bus driver dependent, however unknown or unused option
> > within
> > > > this
> > > > > > schema should return error. This allow for future use of unknown
> > > > > > options as well as a positive indication to the user that an option is
> > > > > > used.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > An example VF token option would take this form:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > "0000:03:00.0 vf_token=2ab74924-c335-45f4-9b16-8569e5b08258"
> > > > > >
> > > > > > When accessing a VF where the PF is making use of vfio-pci, the user
> > > > > > MUST provide the current vf_token. When accessing a PF, the user
> > MUST
> > > > > > provide the current vf_token IF there are active VF users or MAY
> > provide
> > > > > > a vf_token in order to set the current VF token when no VF users are
> > > > > > active. The former requirement assures VF users that an
> > unassociated
> > > > > > driver cannot usurp the PF device. These semantics also imply that a
> > > > > > VF token MUST be set by a PF driver before VF drivers can access their
> > > > > > device, the default token is random and mechanisms to read the
> > token
> > > > are
> > > > > > not provided in order to protect the VF token of previous users. Use
> > of
> > > > > > the vf_token option outside of these cases will return an error, as
> > > > > > discussed above.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > > drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 198
> > > > > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > > > drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h | 8 +
> > > > > > 2 files changed, 205 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
> > > > > > index 2ec6c31d0ab0..8dd6ef9543ca 100644
> > > > > > --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
> > > > > > +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c
> > > > > > @@ -466,6 +466,44 @@ static void vfio_pci_disable(struct
> > > > vfio_pci_device
> > > > > > *vdev)
> > > > > > vfio_pci_set_power_state(vdev, PCI_D3hot);
> > > > > > }
> > > > > >
> > > > > > +static struct pci_driver vfio_pci_driver;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > +static struct vfio_pci_device *get_pf_vdev(struct vfio_pci_device
> > *vdev,
> > > > > > + struct vfio_device **pf_dev)
> > > > > > +{
> > > > > > + struct pci_dev *physfn = pci_physfn(vdev->pdev);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (!vdev->pdev->is_virtfn)
> > > > > > + return NULL;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + *pf_dev = vfio_device_get_from_dev(&physfn->dev);
> > > > > > + if (!*pf_dev)
> > > > > > + return NULL;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (pci_dev_driver(physfn) != &vfio_pci_driver) {
> > > > > > + vfio_device_put(*pf_dev);
> > > > > > + return NULL;
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + return vfio_device_data(*pf_dev);
> > > > > > +}
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > +static void vfio_pci_vf_token_user_add(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev,
> > int
> > > > val)
> > > > > > +{
> > > > > > + struct vfio_device *pf_dev;
> > > > > > + struct vfio_pci_device *pf_vdev = get_pf_vdev(vdev,
> > &pf_dev);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (!pf_vdev)
> > > > > > + return;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + mutex_lock(&pf_vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > > + pf_vdev->vf_token->users += val;
> > > > > > + WARN_ON(pf_vdev->vf_token->users < 0);
> > > > > > + mutex_unlock(&pf_vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + vfio_device_put(pf_dev);
> > > > > > +}
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > static void vfio_pci_release(void *device_data)
> > > > > > {
> > > > > > struct vfio_pci_device *vdev = device_data;
> > > > > > @@ -473,6 +511,7 @@ static void vfio_pci_release(void *device_data)
> > > > > > mutex_lock(&vdev->reflck->lock);
> > > > > >
> > > > > > if (!(--vdev->refcnt)) {
> > > > > > + vfio_pci_vf_token_user_add(vdev, -1);
> > > > > > vfio_spapr_pci_eeh_release(vdev->pdev);
> > > > > > vfio_pci_disable(vdev);
> > > > > > }
> > > > > > @@ -498,6 +537,7 @@ static int vfio_pci_open(void *device_data)
> > > > > > goto error;
> > > > > >
> > > > > > vfio_spapr_pci_eeh_open(vdev->pdev);
> > > > > > + vfio_pci_vf_token_user_add(vdev, 1);
> > > > > > }
> > > > > > vdev->refcnt++;
> > > > > > error:
> > > > > > @@ -1278,11 +1318,148 @@ static void vfio_pci_request(void
> > > > *device_data,
> > > > > > unsigned int count)
> > > > > > mutex_unlock(&vdev->igate);
> > > > > > }
> > > > > >
> > > > > > +static int vfio_pci_validate_vf_token(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev,
> > > > > > + bool vf_token, uuid_t *uuid)
> > > > > > +{
> > > > > > + /*
> > > > > > + * There's always some degree of trust or collaboration
> > between SR-
> > > > > > IOV
> > > > > > + * PF and VFs, even if just that the PF hosts the SR-IOV
> > capability and
> > > > > > + * can disrupt VFs with a reset, but often the PF has more
> > explicit
> > > > > > + * access to deny service to the VF or access data passed
> > through the
> > > > > > + * VF. We therefore require an opt-in via a shared VF token
> > (UUID)
> > > > > > to
> > > > > > + * represent this trust. This both prevents that a VF driver
> > might
> > > > > > + * assume the PF driver is a trusted, in-kernel driver, and also
> > that
> > > > > > + * a PF driver might be replaced with a rogue driver, unknown
> > to in-
> > > > > > use
> > > > > > + * VF drivers.
> > > > > > + *
> > > > > > + * Therefore when presented with a VF, if the PF is a vfio
> > device and
> > > > > > + * it is bound to the vfio-pci driver, the user needs to provide
> > a VF
> > > > > > + * token to access the device, in the form of appending a
> > vf_token to
> > > > > > + * the device name, for example:
> > > > > > + *
> > > > > > + * "0000:04:10.0 vf_token=bd8d9d2b-5a5f-4f5a-a211-
> > f591514ba1f3"
> > > > > > + *
> > > > > > + * When presented with a PF which has VFs in use, the user
> > must also
> > > > > > + * provide the current VF token to prove collaboration with
> > existing
> > > > > > + * VF users. If VFs are not in use, the VF token provided for
> > the PF
> > > > > > + * device will act to set the VF token.
> > > > > > + *
> > > > > > + * If the VF token is provided but unused, a fault is generated.
> > > > >
> > > > > fault->error, otherwise it is easy to consider a CPU fault. 😊
> > > >
> > > > Ok, I can make that change, but I think you might have a unique
> > > > background to make a leap that a userspace ioctl can trigger a CPU
> > > > fault ;)
> > > >
> > > > > > + */
> > > > > > + if (!vdev->pdev->is_virtfn && !vdev->vf_token && !vf_token)
> > > > > > + return 0; /* No VF token provided or required */
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (vdev->pdev->is_virtfn) {
> > > > > > + struct vfio_device *pf_dev;
> > > > > > + struct vfio_pci_device *pf_vdev = get_pf_vdev(vdev,
> > > > > > &pf_dev);
> > > > > > + bool match;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (!pf_vdev) {
> > > > > > + if (!vf_token)
> > > > > > + return 0; /* PF is not vfio-pci, no VF
> > token */
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + pci_info_ratelimited(vdev->pdev,
> > > > > > + "VF token incorrectly provided, PF not
> > bound
> > > > > > to vfio-pci\n");
> > > > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (!vf_token) {
> > > > > > + vfio_device_put(pf_dev);
> > > > > > + pci_info_ratelimited(vdev->pdev,
> > > > > > + "VF token required to access
> > device\n");
> > > > > > + return -EACCES;
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + mutex_lock(&pf_vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > > + match = uuid_equal(uuid, &pf_vdev->vf_token-
> > >uuid);
> > > > > > + mutex_unlock(&pf_vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + vfio_device_put(pf_dev);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (!match) {
> > > > > > + pci_info_ratelimited(vdev->pdev,
> > > > > > + "Incorrect VF token provided for
> > device\n");
> > > > > > + return -EACCES;
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > + } else if (vdev->vf_token) {
> > > > > > + mutex_lock(&vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > > + if (vdev->vf_token->users) {
> > > > > > + if (!vf_token) {
> > > > > > + mutex_unlock(&vdev->vf_token-
> > >lock);
> > > > > > + pci_info_ratelimited(vdev->pdev,
> > > > > > + "VF token required to access
> > > > > > device\n");
> > > > > > + return -EACCES;
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (!uuid_equal(uuid, &vdev->vf_token->uuid))
> > {
> > > > > > + mutex_unlock(&vdev->vf_token-
> > >lock);
> > > > > > + pci_info_ratelimited(vdev->pdev,
> > > > > > + "Incorrect VF token provided
> > for
> > > > > > device\n");
> > > > > > + return -EACCES;
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > + } else if (vf_token) {
> > > > > > + uuid_copy(&vdev->vf_token->uuid, uuid);
> > > > > > + }
> > > > >
> > > > > It implies that we allow PF to be accessed w/o providing a VF token,
> > > > > as long as no VF is currently in-use, which further means no VF can
> > > > > be further assigned since no one knows the random uuid allocated
> > > > > by vfio. Just want to confirm whether it is the desired flavor. If an
> > > > > user really wants to use PF-only, possibly he should disable SR-IOV
> > > > > instead...
> > > >
> > > > Yes, this is the behavior I'm intending. Are you suggesting that we
> > > > should require a VF token in order to access a PF that has SR-IOV
> > > > already enabled? This introduces an inconsistency that SR-IOV can be
> > >
> > > yes. I felt that it's meaningless otherwise if an user has no attempt to
> > > manage SR-IOV but still leaving it enabled. In many cases, enabling of
> > > SR-IOV may reserve some resource in the hardware, thus simply hurting
> > > PF performance.
> >
> > But a user needs to be granted access to a device by a privileged
> > entity and the privileged entity may also enable SR-IOV, so it seems
> > you're assuming the privileged entity is operating independently and
> > not in the best interest of enabling the specific user case.
>
> what about throwing out a warning for such situation? so the userspace
> knows some collaboration is missing before its access to the device.

This seems arbitrary. pci-pf-stub proves to us that there are devices
that need no special setup for SR-IOV, we don't know that we don't have
such a device. Enabling SR-IOV after the user opens the device also
doesn't indicate there's necessarily collaboration between the two, so
if we generate a warning on one, how do we assume the other is ok? I
don't really understand why this is generating such concern. Thanks,

Alex

> > > > enabled via sysfs asynchronous to the GET_DEVICE_FD ioctl, so we'd
> > need
> > > > to secure the sysfs interface to only allow enabling SR-IOV when the PF
> > > > is already opened to cases where the VF token is already set? Thus
> > >
> > > yes, the PF is assigned to the userspace driver, thus it's reasonable to
> > > have the userspace driver decide whether to enable or disable SR-IOV
> > > when the PF is under its control. as I replied to patch [5/7], the sysfs
> > > interface alone looks problematic w/o knowing whether the userspace
> > > driver is willing to manage VFs (by setting a token)...
> >
> > As I replied in patch [5/7] the operations don't need to happen
> > independently, configuring SR-IOV in advance of the user driver
> > attaching or in collaboration with the user driver can also be enabled
> > with this series as is. Allowing the user driver to directly enable
> > SR-IOV and create VFs in the host is something I've avoided here, but
> > not precluded for later extensions. I think that allowing a user to
> > perform these operations represents a degree of privilege beyond
> > ownership of the PF itself, which is why I'm currently only enabling
> > the sysfs sriov_configure interface. The user driver needs to work in
> > collaboration with a privileged entity to enable SR-IOV, or be granted
> > access to operate on the sysfs interface directly.
>
> Thanks. this assumption was clearly overlooked in my previous thinking.
>
> >
> > > > SR-IOV could be pre-enabled, but the user must provide a vf_token
> > > > option on GET_DEVICE_FD, otherwise SR-IOV could only be enabled after
> > > > the user sets a VF token. But then do we need to invalidate the token
> > > > at some point, or else it seems like we have the same scenario when the
> > > > next user comes along. We believe there are PFs that require no
> > >
> > > I think so, e.g. when SR-IOV is being disabled, or when the fd is closed.
> >
> > Can you articulate a specific risk that this would resolve? If we have
> > devices like the one supported by pci-pf-stub, where it's apparently
> > sufficient to provide no device access other than to enable SR-IOV on
> > the PF, re-implementing that in vfio-pci would require that the
> > userspace driver is notified when the SR-IOV configuration is changed
> > such that a VF token can be re-inserted. For what gain?
> >
> > > > special VF support other than sriov_configure, so those driver could
> > > > theoretically close the PF after setting a VF token. That makes it
> > >
> > > theoretically yes, but I'm not sure the real gain of supporting such
> > > usage. 😊
> >
> > Likewise I don't see the gain of restricting it.
> >
> > > btw with your question I realize another potential open. Now an
> > > user could also use sysfs to reset the PF, which definitely affects the
> > > state of VFs. Do we want a token match with that path? or such
> > > intention is assumed to be trusted by VF drivers given that only
> > > privileged users can do it?
> >
> > I think we're going into the weeds here, a privileged user can use the
> > pci-sysfs reset interface to break all sorts of things. I'm certainly
> > not going to propose any sort of VF token interface to restrict it.
> > Privileged users can do bad things via sysfs. Privileged users can
> > configure PFs in ways that may not be compatible with any given
> > userspace VF driver. I'm assuming collaboration in the best interest
> > of enabling the user driver. Thanks,
> >
> > Alex
> >
> > > > difficult to determine the lifetime of a VF token and leads to the
> > > > interface proposed here of an initial random token, then the user set
> > > > token persisting indefinitely.
> > > >
> > > > I've tended consider all of these to be mechanisms that a user can
> > > > shoot themselves in the foot. Yes, the user and admin can do things
> > > > that will fail to work with this interface, for example my testing
> > > > involves QEMU, where we don't expose SR-IOV to the guest yet and the
> > > > igb driver for the PF will encounter problems running a device with
> > > > SR-IOV enabled that it doesn't know about. Do we want to try to play
> > > > nanny and require specific semantics? I've opt'd for the more simple
> > > > code here.
> > > >
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + mutex_unlock(&vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > > + } else if (vf_token) {
> > > > > > + pci_info_ratelimited(vdev->pdev,
> > > > > > + "VF token incorrectly provided, not a PF or
> > VF\n");
> > > > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + return 0;
> > > > > > +}
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > +#define VF_TOKEN_ARG "vf_token="
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > static int vfio_pci_match(void *device_data, char *buf)
> > > > > > {
> > > > > > struct vfio_pci_device *vdev = device_data;
> > > > > > + bool vf_token = false;
> > > > > > + uuid_t uuid;
> > > > > > + int ret;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (strncmp(pci_name(vdev->pdev), buf,
> > strlen(pci_name(vdev-
> > > > > > >pdev))))
> > > > > > + return 0; /* No match */
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (strlen(buf) > strlen(pci_name(vdev->pdev))) {
> > > > > > + buf += strlen(pci_name(vdev->pdev));
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (*buf != ' ')
> > > > > > + return 0; /* No match: non-whitespace after
> > name */
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + while (*buf) {
> > > > > > + if (*buf == ' ') {
> > > > > > + buf++;
> > > > > > + continue;
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (!vf_token && !strncmp(buf,
> > VF_TOKEN_ARG,
> > > > > > +
> > strlen(VF_TOKEN_ARG))) {
> > > > > > + buf += strlen(VF_TOKEN_ARG);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (strlen(buf) < UUID_STRING_LEN)
> > > > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + ret = uuid_parse(buf, &uuid);
> > > > > > + if (ret)
> > > > > > + return ret;
> > > > > >
> > > > > > - return !strcmp(pci_name(vdev->pdev), buf);
> > > > > > + vf_token = true;
> > > > > > + buf += UUID_STRING_LEN;
> > > > > > + } else {
> > > > > > + /* Unknown/duplicate option */
> > > > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + ret = vfio_pci_validate_vf_token(vdev, vf_token, &uuid);
> > > > > > + if (ret)
> > > > > > + return ret;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + return 1; /* Match */
> > > > > > }
> > > > > >
> > > > > > static const struct vfio_device_ops vfio_pci_ops = {
> > > > > > @@ -1354,6 +1531,19 @@ static int vfio_pci_probe(struct pci_dev
> > *pdev,
> > > > > > const struct pci_device_id *id)
> > > > > > return ret;
> > > > > > }
> > > > > >
> > > > > > + if (pdev->is_physfn) {
> > > > > > + vdev->vf_token = kzalloc(sizeof(*vdev->vf_token),
> > > > > > GFP_KERNEL);
> > > > > > + if (!vdev->vf_token) {
> > > > > > + vfio_pci_reflck_put(vdev->reflck);
> > > > > > + vfio_del_group_dev(&pdev->dev);
> > > > > > + vfio_iommu_group_put(group, &pdev->dev);
> > > > > > + kfree(vdev);
> > > > > > + return -ENOMEM;
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > + mutex_init(&vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > > + uuid_gen(&vdev->vf_token->uuid);
> > > > >
> > > > > should we also regenerate a random uuid somewhere when SR-IOV is
> > > > > disabled and then re-enabled on a PF? Although vfio disallows
> > userspace
> > > > > to read uuid, it is always safer to avoid caching a secret from previous
> > > > > user.
> > > >
> > > > What if our user is QEMU emulating SR-IOV to the guest. Do we want to
> > > > force a new VF token is set every time we bounce the VFs? Why? As
> > > > above, the session lifetime of the VF token might be difficult to
> > > > determine and I'm not sure paranoia is a sufficient reason to try to
> > > > create boundaries for it. Thanks,
> > > >
> > > > Alex
> > > >
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > if (vfio_pci_is_vga(pdev)) {
> > > > > > vga_client_register(pdev, vdev, NULL,
> > > > > > vfio_pci_set_vga_decode);
> > > > > > vga_set_legacy_decoding(pdev,
> > > > > > @@ -1387,6 +1577,12 @@ static void vfio_pci_remove(struct pci_dev
> > > > *pdev)
> > > > > > if (!vdev)
> > > > > > return;
> > > > > >
> > > > > > + if (vdev->vf_token) {
> > > > > > + WARN_ON(vdev->vf_token->users);
> > > > > > + mutex_destroy(&vdev->vf_token->lock);
> > > > > > + kfree(vdev->vf_token);
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > vfio_pci_reflck_put(vdev->reflck);
> > > > > >
> > > > > > vfio_iommu_group_put(pdev->dev.iommu_group, &pdev->dev);
> > > > > > diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h
> > > > > > b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h
> > > > > > index 8a2c7607d513..76c11c915949 100644
> > > > > > --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h
> > > > > > +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h
> > > > > > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> > > > > > #include <linux/pci.h>
> > > > > > #include <linux/irqbypass.h>
> > > > > > #include <linux/types.h>
> > > > > > +#include <linux/uuid.h>
> > > > > >
> > > > > > #ifndef VFIO_PCI_PRIVATE_H
> > > > > > #define VFIO_PCI_PRIVATE_H
> > > > > > @@ -84,6 +85,12 @@ struct vfio_pci_reflck {
> > > > > > struct mutex lock;
> > > > > > };
> > > > > >
> > > > > > +struct vfio_pci_vf_token {
> > > > > > + struct mutex lock;
> > > > > > + uuid_t uuid;
> > > > > > + int users;
> > > > > > +};
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > struct vfio_pci_device {
> > > > > > struct pci_dev *pdev;
> > > > > > void __iomem *barmap[PCI_STD_NUM_BARS];
> > > > > > @@ -122,6 +129,7 @@ struct vfio_pci_device {
> > > > > > struct list_head dummy_resources_list;
> > > > > > struct mutex ioeventfds_lock;
> > > > > > struct list_head ioeventfds_list;
> > > > > > + struct vfio_pci_vf_token *vf_token;
> > > > > > };
> > > > > >
> > > > > > #define is_intx(vdev) (vdev->irq_type == VFIO_PCI_INTX_IRQ_INDEX)
> > > > >
> > >
>