From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CACE5C4332B for ; Thu, 19 Mar 2020 09:15:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ABCE52076C for ; Thu, 19 Mar 2020 09:15:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727589AbgCSJPe (ORCPT ); Thu, 19 Mar 2020 05:15:34 -0400 Received: from 8bytes.org ([81.169.241.247]:52214 "EHLO theia.8bytes.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727541AbgCSJOt (ORCPT ); Thu, 19 Mar 2020 05:14:49 -0400 Received: by theia.8bytes.org (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 246EDF00; Thu, 19 Mar 2020 10:14:29 +0100 (CET) From: Joerg Roedel To: x86@kernel.org Cc: hpa@zytor.com, Andy Lutomirski , Dave Hansen , Peter Zijlstra , Thomas Hellstrom , Jiri Slaby , Dan Williams , Tom Lendacky , Juergen Gross , Kees Cook , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, Joerg Roedel , Joerg Roedel Subject: [PATCH 69/70] x86/cpufeature: Add SEV_ES_GUEST CPU Feature Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2020 10:14:06 +0100 Message-Id: <20200319091407.1481-70-joro@8bytes.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20200319091407.1481-1-joro@8bytes.org> References: <20200319091407.1481-1-joro@8bytes.org> Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Joerg Roedel The feature bit will indicate whether the kernel runs as an SEV-ES guest. This can be used to apply alternatives at boot for SEV-ES guests and provides a way for user-space to detect whether it runs as an SEV-ES guest. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 2fee1a2cac2f..35df826ee3fc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_VMCALL ( 8*32+18) /* "" Hypervisor supports the VMCALL instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_VMW_VMMCALL ( 8*32+19) /* "" VMware prefers VMMCALL hypercall instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES ( 8*32+20) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES_GUEST ( 8*32+21) /* SEV-ES Guest */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */ #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE ( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 523a6a76c6c1..8cdb190822de 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -485,7 +485,6 @@ static void early_init_amd_mc(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 if (c->x86 >= 0xf) { unsigned long long tseg; @@ -614,6 +613,11 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV); setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES); } + + if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_SEV, &msr)) { + if (msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES_GUEST); + } } static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) -- 2.17.1