From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Paul McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
"Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
"Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>,
Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: [RESEND][patch V3 23/23] x86/kvm/svm: Move guest enter/exit into .noinstr.text
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2020 19:00:19 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200320180034.672927065@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20200320175956.033706968@linutronix.de
Split out the really last steps of guest enter and the early guest exit
code and mark it .noinstr.text. Add the required instr_begin()/end() pairs
around "safe" code and replace the wrmsr() with native_wrmsr() to prevent a
tracepoint injection.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -5714,58 +5714,9 @@ static void svm_cancel_injection(struct
svm_complete_interrupts(svm);
}
-static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static noinstr void svm_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
- struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
-
- svm->vmcb->save.rax = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
- svm->vmcb->save.rsp = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
- svm->vmcb->save.rip = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
-
- /*
- * A vmexit emulation is required before the vcpu can be executed
- * again.
- */
- if (unlikely(svm->nested.exit_required))
- return;
-
- /*
- * Disable singlestep if we're injecting an interrupt/exception.
- * We don't want our modified rflags to be pushed on the stack where
- * we might not be able to easily reset them if we disabled NMI
- * singlestep later.
- */
- if (svm->nmi_singlestep && svm->vmcb->control.event_inj) {
- /*
- * Event injection happens before external interrupts cause a
- * vmexit and interrupts are disabled here, so smp_send_reschedule
- * is enough to force an immediate vmexit.
- */
- disable_nmi_singlestep(svm);
- smp_send_reschedule(vcpu->cpu);
- }
-
- pre_svm_run(svm);
-
- sync_lapic_to_cr8(vcpu);
-
- svm->vmcb->save.cr2 = vcpu->arch.cr2;
-
- clgi();
- kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
-
- if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) &&
- vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns)
- kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
-
- /*
- * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
- * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
- * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
- * being speculatively taken.
- */
- x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
-
/*
* VMENTER enables interrupts (host state), but the kernel state is
* interrupts disabled when this is invoked. Also tell RCU about
@@ -5780,8 +5731,10 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
* take locks (lockdep needs RCU) and calls into world and some
* more.
*/
+ instr_begin();
__trace_hardirqs_on();
lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare(CALLER_ADDR0);
+ instr_end();
guest_enter_irqoff();
lockdep_hardirqs_on(CALLER_ADDR0);
@@ -5881,7 +5834,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
vmexit_fill_RSB();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
#else
loadsegment(fs, svm->host.fs);
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS
@@ -5904,7 +5857,64 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
*/
lockdep_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0);
guest_exit_irqoff();
+ instr_begin();
__trace_hardirqs_off();
+ instr_end();
+}
+
+static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ svm->vmcb->save.rax = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
+ svm->vmcb->save.rsp = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
+ svm->vmcb->save.rip = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
+
+ /*
+ * A vmexit emulation is required before the vcpu can be executed
+ * again.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(svm->nested.exit_required))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Disable singlestep if we're injecting an interrupt/exception.
+ * We don't want our modified rflags to be pushed on the stack where
+ * we might not be able to easily reset them if we disabled NMI
+ * singlestep later.
+ */
+ if (svm->nmi_singlestep && svm->vmcb->control.event_inj) {
+ /*
+ * Event injection happens before external interrupts cause a
+ * vmexit and interrupts are disabled here, so smp_send_reschedule
+ * is enough to force an immediate vmexit.
+ */
+ disable_nmi_singlestep(svm);
+ smp_send_reschedule(vcpu->cpu);
+ }
+
+ pre_svm_run(svm);
+
+ sync_lapic_to_cr8(vcpu);
+
+ svm->vmcb->save.cr2 = vcpu->arch.cr2;
+
+ clgi();
+ kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
+
+ if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) &&
+ vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns)
+ kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
+ * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
+ * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
+ * being speculatively taken.
+ */
+ x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
+
+ svm_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, svm);
/*
* We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-20 22:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-03-20 17:59 [RESEND][patch V3 00/23] x86/entry: Consolidation part II (syscalls) Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 17:59 ` [RESEND][patch V3 01/23] rcu: Dont acquire lock in NMI handler in rcu_nmi_enter_common() Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-24 15:37 ` [patch " Frederic Weisbecker
2020-03-20 17:59 ` [RESEND][patch V3 02/23] rcu: Add comments marking transitions between RCU watching and not Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-24 15:38 ` [patch " Frederic Weisbecker
2020-03-20 17:59 ` [RESEND][patch V3 03/23] vmlinux.lds.h: Create section for protection against instrumentation Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-24 12:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-04-03 8:08 ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 04/23] kprobes: Prevent probes in .noinstr.text section Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-23 14:00 ` [patch " Masami Hiramatsu
2020-03-23 16:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-24 5:49 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-03-24 9:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-25 13:39 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 05/23] tracing: Provide lockdep less trace_hardirqs_on/off() variants Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-03 8:34 ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 06/23] bug: Annotate WARN/BUG/stackfail as noinstr safe Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 21:01 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-04-02 21:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 21:43 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-04-02 21:49 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 07/23] lockdep: Prepare for noinstr sections Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 08/23] x86/entry: Mark enter_from_user_mode() noinstr Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 09/23] x86/entry/common: Protect against instrumentation Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 10/23] x86/entry: Move irq tracing on syscall entry to C-code Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 11/23] x86/entry: Move irq flags tracing to prepare_exit_to_usermode() Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 12/23] context_tracking: Ensure that the critical path cannot be instrumented Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 13/23] lib/smp_processor_id: Move it into noinstr section Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 14/23] x86/speculation/mds: Mark mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers() __always_inline Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 15/23] x86/entry/64: Check IF in __preempt_enable_notrace() thunk Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 16/23] x86/entry/64: Mark ___preempt_schedule_notrace() thunk noinstr Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 17/23] rcu/tree: Mark the idle relevant functions noinstr Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-24 16:09 ` Paul E. McKenney
2020-03-24 19:28 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-24 19:58 ` Paul E. McKenney
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 18/23] x86/kvm: Move context tracking where it belongs Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 19/23] x86/kvm/vmx: Add hardirq tracing to guest enter/exit Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-24 23:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-03-24 23:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 20/23] x86/kvm/svm: Handle hardirqs proper on " Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 21/23] context_tracking: Make guest_enter/exit_irqoff() .noinstr ready Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` [RESEND][patch V3 22/23] x86/kvm/vmx: Move guest enter/exit into .noinstr.text Thomas Gleixner
2020-03-20 18:00 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
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