From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.7 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C351C2D0E8 for ; Thu, 26 Mar 2020 08:16:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D83002070A for ; Thu, 26 Mar 2020 08:16:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727856AbgCZIQP (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 Mar 2020 04:16:15 -0400 Received: from mga02.intel.com ([134.134.136.20]:27564 "EHLO mga02.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727849AbgCZIQO (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 Mar 2020 04:16:14 -0400 IronPort-SDR: ybsUDEKbcl4ES5Ii/p/H5gKaRvtntj4A4rFIVkaUJ1olrYjhi+MJakfOX4QR1IV7xObmV+99E8 iFey+QgJoVfw== X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga004.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.38]) by orsmga101.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Mar 2020 01:16:13 -0700 IronPort-SDR: 53ti/ap2rtlaL4wK+IFj898+HWKaFj2a/WlDAAzFUgMPSLagY3cEJdv53Eda5aiq1l6cxbzuV8 uhehj27GaHbw== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.72,307,1580803200"; d="scan'208";a="393898946" Received: from local-michael-cet-test.sh.intel.com ([10.239.159.128]) by orsmga004.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 26 Mar 2020 01:16:11 -0700 From: Yang Weijiang To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, jmattson@google.com Cc: yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com, Yang Weijiang Subject: [PATCH v11 7/9] KVM: X86: Add userspace access interface for CET MSRs Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2020 16:18:44 +0800 Message-Id: <20200326081847.5870-8-weijiang.yang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.2 In-Reply-To: <20200326081847.5870-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com> References: <20200326081847.5870-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com> Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org There're two different places storing Guest CET states, states managed with XSAVES/XRSTORS, as restored/saved in previous patch, can be read/write directly from/to the MSRs. For those stored in VMCS fields, they're access via vmcs_read/ vmcs_write. To correctly read/write the CET MSRs, it's necessary to check whether the kernel FPU context switch happened and reload guest FPU context if needed. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 ++++ 2 files changed, 144 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 87f101750746..a3d01014b9e7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1809,6 +1809,91 @@ static int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr) } } +static void vmx_get_xsave_msr(struct msr_data *msr_info) +{ + local_irq_disable(); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) + switch_fpu_return(); + rdmsrl(msr_info->index, msr_info->data); + local_irq_enable(); +} + +static void vmx_set_xsave_msr(struct msr_data *msr_info) +{ + local_irq_disable(); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) + switch_fpu_return(); + wrmsrl(msr_info->index, msr_info->data); + local_irq_enable(); +} + +#define CET_MSR_RSVD_BITS_1 GENMASK(1, 0) +#define CET_MSR_RSVD_BITS_2 GENMASK(9, 6) + +static bool cet_check_msr_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct msr_data *msr, + u64 mask) +{ + u64 data = msr->data; + u32 high_word = data >> 32; + + if (data & mask) + return false; + + if (!is_64_bit_mode(vcpu) && high_word) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static bool cet_check_ssp_msr_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct msr_data *msr) +{ + u32 index = msr->index; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) + return false; + + if (!msr->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) + return false; + + if (index == MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB) + return true; + + if (index == MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP) { + if (!(supported_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER)) + return false; + } else if (!(supported_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)) { + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static bool cet_check_ctl_msr_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct msr_data *msr) +{ + u32 index = msr->index; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) + return false; + + if (!msr->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT)) + return false; + + if (index == MSR_IA32_U_CET) { + if (!(supported_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER)) + return false; + } else if (!(supported_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)) { + return false; + } + + return true; +} /* * Reads an msr value (of 'msr_index') into 'pdata'. * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise. @@ -1941,6 +2026,26 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) else msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2]; break; + case MSR_IA32_S_CET: + if (!cet_check_ctl_msr_access(vcpu, msr_info)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET); + break; + case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB: + if (!cet_check_ssp_msr_access(vcpu, msr_info)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE); + break; + case MSR_IA32_U_CET: + if (!cet_check_ctl_msr_access(vcpu, msr_info)) + return 1; + vmx_get_xsave_msr(msr_info); + break; + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP: + if (!cet_check_ssp_msr_access(vcpu, msr_info)) + return 1; + vmx_get_xsave_msr(msr_info); + break; case MSR_TSC_AUX: if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)) @@ -2197,6 +2302,34 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) else vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2] = data; break; + case MSR_IA32_S_CET: + if (!cet_check_ctl_msr_access(vcpu, msr_info)) + return 1; + if (!cet_check_msr_write(vcpu, msr_info, CET_MSR_RSVD_BITS_2)) + return 1; + vmcs_writel(GUEST_S_CET, data); + break; + case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB: + if (!cet_check_ctl_msr_access(vcpu, msr_info)) + return 1; + if (!is_64_bit_mode(vcpu)) + return 1; + vmcs_writel(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, data); + break; + case MSR_IA32_U_CET: + if (!cet_check_ctl_msr_access(vcpu, msr_info)) + return 1; + if (!cet_check_msr_write(vcpu, msr_info, CET_MSR_RSVD_BITS_2)) + return 1; + vmx_set_xsave_msr(msr_info); + break; + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP: + if (!cet_check_ssp_msr_access(vcpu, msr_info)) + return 1; + if (!cet_check_msr_write(vcpu, msr_info, CET_MSR_RSVD_BITS_1)) + return 1; + vmx_set_xsave_msr(msr_info); + break; case MSR_TSC_AUX: if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 9654d779bdab..9e89ee6a09e1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1229,6 +1229,10 @@ static const u32 msrs_to_save_all[] = { MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 12, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 13, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 14, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 15, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 16, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 17, + + MSR_IA32_XSS, MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_IA32_S_CET, + MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, + MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, }; static u32 msrs_to_save[ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save_all)]; @@ -1504,6 +1508,13 @@ static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data, * invokes 64-bit SYSENTER. */ data = get_canonical(data, vcpu_virt_addr_bits(vcpu)); + break; + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP: + case MSR_IA32_U_CET: + case MSR_IA32_S_CET: + case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB: + if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu)) + return 1; } msr.data = data; -- 2.17.2