From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5658EC433E0 for ; Mon, 1 Jun 2020 09:16:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 34534206E2 for ; Mon, 1 Jun 2020 09:16:43 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="BcPY4l0D" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727849AbgFAJQh (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Jun 2020 05:16:37 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-2.mimecast.com ([207.211.31.81]:31599 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727013AbgFAJQf (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Jun 2020 05:16:35 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1591002993; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=0Wd9igXbzydG2FapnoJya+QCDVjj2Ujw2KrJzi5Gj9E=; b=BcPY4l0DmJCRVSuEI5NzO5NYi7rub8uuNCbAmB2Y0BC9i6bqZH4u5Nw0DwVXuyu2lzCoRr hsSWBGzDFSl4C8jQDooX84/+so8NYht5bS2OJzrri33KVpkx5PcuN4eWdIRC3JR56c54qP 9HsO25eZj6YP7SDx0U2j7ovGo8hqKBs= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-307-DxNkUf26OiCA4Azbb0arTw-1; Mon, 01 Jun 2020 05:16:30 -0400 X-MC-Unique: DxNkUf26OiCA4Azbb0arTw-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx06.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.16]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 33292800053; Mon, 1 Jun 2020 09:16:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from work-vm (ovpn-113-144.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.113.144]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2D68E5C1B2; Mon, 1 Jun 2020 09:16:20 +0000 (UTC) Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2020 10:16:18 +0100 From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" To: Sean Christopherson Cc: David Gibson , qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, pair@us.ibm.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, cohuck@redhat.com, Marcel Apfelbaum , Paolo Bonzini , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Richard Henderson , Eduardo Habkost Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection Message-ID: <20200601091618.GC2743@work-vm> References: <20200521034304.340040-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> <20200529221926.GA3168@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200529221926.GA3168@linux.intel.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.13.4 (2020-02-15) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.16 Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org * Sean Christopherson (sean.j.christopherson@intel.com) wrote: > On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 01:42:46PM +1000, David Gibson wrote: > > A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the > > hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order > > to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. > > > > AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has > > its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism > > to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection > > level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected > > execution environment. > > > > The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each > > platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem > > ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. > > > > AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option > > "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other > > than SEV. > > > > This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration > > for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's > > "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a > > "guest-memory-protection" property pointing to a platform specific > > object which configures and manages the specific details. > > > > For now this series covers just AMD SEV and POWER PEF. I'm hoping it > > can be extended to cover the Intel and s390 mechanisms as well, > > though. > > > > Note: I'm using the term "guest memory protection" throughout to refer > > to mechanisms like this. I don't particular like the term, it's both > > long and not really precise. If someone can think of a succinct way > > of saying "a means of protecting guest memory from a possibly > > compromised hypervisor", I'd be grateful for the suggestion. > > Many of the features are also going far beyond just protecting memory, so > even the "memory" part feels wrong. Maybe something like protected-guest > or secure-guest? > > A little imprecision isn't necessarily a bad thing, e.g. memory-encryption > is quite precise, but also wrong once it encompasses anything beyond plain > old encryption. The common thread I think is 'untrusted host' - but I don't know of a better way to describe that. Dave -- Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK