From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Subject: [RFC Part1 PATCH 02/13] x86/mm: add sev_snp_active() helper
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2021 11:44:13 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210324164424.28124-3-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210324164424.28124-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
The sev_snp_active() helper can be used by the guest to query whether the
SNP - Secure Nested Paging feature is active.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 9 +++++++++
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 31c4df123aa0..d99aa260d328 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
bool sme_active(void);
bool sev_active(void);
bool sev_es_active(void);
+bool sev_snp_active(void);
#define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
+static inline bool sev_snp_active(void) { return false; }
static inline int __init
early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 546d6ecf0a35..b03694e116fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -477,8 +477,10 @@
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV 0xc0010131
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT 0
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT 1
+#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT 2
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index c3d5f0236f35..5bd50008fc9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -390,6 +390,11 @@ bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED;
}
+bool sev_snp_active(void)
+{
+ return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED;
+}
+
/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
{
@@ -462,6 +467,10 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
if (sev_es_active())
pr_cont(" SEV-ES");
+ /* Secure Nested Paging */
+ if (sev_snp_active())
+ pr_cont(" SEV-SNP");
+
pr_cont("\n");
}
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-03-24 16:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-03-24 16:44 [RFC Part1 PATCH 00/13] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 16:44 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH 01/13] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2021-03-25 10:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-25 14:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-25 16:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-24 16:44 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-03-24 16:44 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH 03/13] x86: add a helper routine for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2021-03-26 14:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-26 15:42 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-26 18:22 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-26 19:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-26 20:04 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-26 19:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-26 20:01 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 16:44 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH 04/13] x86/sev-snp: define page state change VMGEXIT structure Brijesh Singh
2021-04-01 10:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-01 14:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-02 15:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-24 16:44 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH 05/13] X86/sev-es: move few helper functions in common file Brijesh Singh
2021-04-02 19:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-02 21:33 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 16:44 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH 06/13] x86/compressed: rescinds and validate the memory used for the GHCB Brijesh Singh
2021-04-06 10:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-06 15:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-06 19:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-04-07 11:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-07 19:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-08 13:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-04-07 11:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-07 13:35 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-07 14:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-04-07 17:15 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 16:44 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH 07/13] x86/compressed: register GHCB memory when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-04-07 11:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-07 17:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-07 17:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-04-08 8:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-24 16:44 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH 08/13] x86/sev-es: register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP " Brijesh Singh
2021-04-08 8:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-24 16:44 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH 09/13] x86/kernel: add support to validate memory in early enc attribute change Brijesh Singh
2021-04-08 11:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-08 12:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 16:44 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH 10/13] X86: kernel: make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 16:44 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH 11/13] x86/kernel: validate rom memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-04-09 16:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-09 17:40 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 16:44 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH 12/13] x86/sev-es: make GHCB get and put helper accessible outside Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 16:44 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH 13/13] x86/kernel: add support to validate memory when changing C-bit Brijesh Singh
2021-04-12 11:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-12 12:55 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-12 13:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-12 14:31 ` Brijesh Singh
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