From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
To: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"joro@8bytes.org" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"venu.busireddy@oracle.com" <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>,
"Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
maz@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 10/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl
Date: Fri, 2 Apr 2021 11:09:24 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210402110924.GA17630@ashkalra_ubuntu_server> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABayD+eJzGRsE_Y+YRJ+w-PKbXyX0_kvTSZhZqhMLQtQj2w_7g@mail.gmail.com>
Hello Steve,
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 06:40:06PM -0700, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 19, 2021 at 11:00 AM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 12:48:07PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> > > On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 10:15 AM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Mar 03, 2021 at 06:54:41PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> > > > > [+Marc]
> > > > >
> > > > > On Tue, Mar 02, 2021 at 02:55:43PM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> > > > > > On Fri, Feb 26, 2021 at 09:44:41AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > > > > On Fri, Feb 26, 2021, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> > > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 02:59:27PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> > > > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 12:20 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > Thanks for grabbing the data!
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > I am fine with both paths. Sean has stated an explicit desire for
> > > > > > > > > hypercall exiting, so I think that would be the current consensus.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Yep, though it'd be good to get Paolo's input, too.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > If we want to do hypercall exiting, this should be in a follow-up
> > > > > > > > > series where we implement something more generic, e.g. a hypercall
> > > > > > > > > exiting bitmap or hypercall exit list. If we are taking the hypercall
> > > > > > > > > exit route, we can drop the kvm side of the hypercall.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I don't think this is a good candidate for arbitrary hypercall interception. Or
> > > > > > > rather, I think hypercall interception should be an orthogonal implementation.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The guest, including guest firmware, needs to be aware that the hypercall is
> > > > > > > supported, and the ABI needs to be well-defined. Relying on userspace VMMs to
> > > > > > > implement a common ABI is an unnecessary risk.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > We could make KVM's default behavior be a nop, i.e. have KVM enforce the ABI but
> > > > > > > require further VMM intervention. But, I just don't see the point, it would
> > > > > > > save only a few lines of code. It would also limit what KVM could do in the
> > > > > > > future, e.g. if KVM wanted to do its own bookkeeping _and_ exit to userspace,
> > > > > > > then mandatory interception would essentially make it impossible for KVM to do
> > > > > > > bookkeeping while still honoring the interception request.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > However, I do think it would make sense to have the userspace exit be a generic
> > > > > > > exit type. But hey, we already have the necessary ABI defined for that! It's
> > > > > > > just not used anywhere.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > /* KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL */
> > > > > > > struct {
> > > > > > > __u64 nr;
> > > > > > > __u64 args[6];
> > > > > > > __u64 ret;
> > > > > > > __u32 longmode;
> > > > > > > __u32 pad;
> > > > > > > } hypercall;
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Userspace could also handle the MSR using MSR filters (would need to
> > > > > > > > > confirm that). Then userspace could also be in control of the cpuid bit.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > An MSR is not a great fit; it's x86 specific and limited to 64 bits of data.
> > > > > > > The data limitation could be fudged by shoving data into non-standard GPRs, but
> > > > > > > that will result in truly heinous guest code, and extensibility issues.
> > > > > > >
> >
> > We may also need to pass-through the MSR to userspace, as it is a part of this
> > complete host (userspace/kernel), OVMF and guest kernel negotiation of
> > the SEV live migration feature.
> >
> > Host (userspace/kernel) advertises it's support for SEV live migration
> > feature via the CPUID bits, which is queried by OVMF and which in turn
> > adds a new UEFI runtime variable to indicate support for SEV live
> > migration, which is later queried during guest kernel boot and
> > accordingly the guest does a wrmrsl() to custom MSR to complete SEV
> > live migration negotiation and enable it.
> >
> > Now, the GET_SHARED_REGION_LIST ioctl returns error, until this MSR write
> > enables SEV live migration, hence, preventing userspace to start live
> > migration before the feature support has been negotiated and enabled on
> > all the three components - host, guest OVMF and kernel.
> >
> > But, now with this ioctl not existing anymore, we will need to
> > pass-through the MSR to userspace too, for it to only initiate live
> > migration once the feature negotiation has been completed.
>
> I can't tell if you were waiting for feedback on this before posting
> the follow-up patch series.
Actually, i am going to post the follow-up patch series upstream early
next week.
I have already added support for MSR handling and exit to userspace, the
current implementation looks like this :
The custom MSR is hooked both in svm_get_msr() and svm_set_msr():
@@ -2800,6 +2800,17 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
case MSR_F10H_DECFG:
msr_info->data = svm->msr_decfg;
break;
+ case MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION:
+ if (!sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION))
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Let userspace handle the MSR using MSR filters.
+ */
+ return KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED;
So there is special check added for both sev_guest() and requisite CPUID
bit set in guest CPUID, if either fails this will signal #GP to guest.
Otherwise, it returns MSR_FILTER return code, which will allow userspace
to use msr intercepts to handle the reads and writes via userspace exits
using KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR.
Let me know if you have any feedback/comments on the above handling.
Thanks,
Ashish
>
> Here are a few options:
> 1) Add the MSR explicitly to the list of custom kvm MSRs, but don't
> have it hooked up anywhere. The expectation would be for the VMM to
> use msr intercepts to handle the reads and writes. If that seems
> weird, have svm_set_msr (or whatever) explicitly ignore it.
> 2) Add a getter and setter for the MSR. Only allow guests to use it if
> they are sev_guests with the requisite CPUID bit set.
>
> I think I prefer the former, and it should work fine from my
> understanding of the msr intercepts implementation. I'm also open to
> other ideas. You could also have the MSR write trigger a KVM_EXIT of
> the same type as the hypercall, but have it just say "the msr value
> changed to XYZ", but that design sounds awkward.
>
> Thanks,
> Steve
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-02 11:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-04 0:35 [PATCH v10 00/17] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:36 ` [PATCH v10 01/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:36 ` [PATCH v10 02/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:37 ` [PATCH v10 03/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:37 ` [PATCH v10 04/16] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:37 ` [PATCH v10 05/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:37 ` [PATCH v10 06/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:38 ` [PATCH v10 07/16] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:38 ` [PATCH v10 08/16] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 16:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-05 1:44 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-05 3:32 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:39 ` [PATCH v10 09/16] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:39 ` [PATCH v10 10/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 16:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-04 16:34 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-17 1:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-17 14:00 ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-17 16:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 6:48 ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-18 16:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 17:05 ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-18 17:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 18:32 ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-24 17:51 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-24 18:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-25 20:20 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-25 22:59 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-25 23:24 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-26 14:04 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-26 17:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-02 14:55 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-02 15:15 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-03 18:54 ` Will Deacon
2021-03-03 19:32 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-09 19:10 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-11 18:14 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-11 20:48 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-19 17:59 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-02 1:40 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-02 11:09 ` Ashish Kalra [this message]
2021-03-08 10:40 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 19:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-08 21:05 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 21:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-08 21:32 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 21:51 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-09 19:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-10 3:42 ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-03-10 3:47 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-08 21:48 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-17 1:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04 0:39 ` [PATCH v10 11/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:39 ` [PATCH v10 12/16] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR Ashish Kalra
2021-02-05 0:56 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-05 3:07 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06 2:54 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-06 4:49 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06 5:46 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06 13:56 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-08 0:28 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-08 22:50 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-10 20:36 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-10 22:01 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-10 22:05 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-16 23:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04 0:40 ` [PATCH v10 13/16] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 0:40 ` [PATCH v10 14/16] KVM: x86: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature Ashish Kalra
2021-02-18 17:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04 0:40 ` [PATCH v10 15/16] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 4:10 ` kernel test robot
2021-02-04 0:40 ` [PATCH v10 16/16] KVM: SVM: Bypass DBG_DECRYPT API calls for unencrypted guest memory Ashish Kalra
2021-02-09 6:23 ` kernel test robot
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20210402110924.GA17630@ashkalra_ubuntu_server \
--to=ashish.kalra@amd.com \
--cc=Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
--cc=joro@8bytes.org \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=maz@kernel.org \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=qperret@google.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=srutherford@google.com \
--cc=venu.busireddy@oracle.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox