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From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
To: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"joro@8bytes.org" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"venu.busireddy@oracle.com" <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>,
	"Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	maz@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 10/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl
Date: Fri, 2 Apr 2021 11:09:24 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210402110924.GA17630@ashkalra_ubuntu_server> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABayD+eJzGRsE_Y+YRJ+w-PKbXyX0_kvTSZhZqhMLQtQj2w_7g@mail.gmail.com>

Hello Steve,

On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 06:40:06PM -0700, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 19, 2021 at 11:00 AM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 12:48:07PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> > > On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 10:15 AM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Mar 03, 2021 at 06:54:41PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> > > > > [+Marc]
> > > > >
> > > > > On Tue, Mar 02, 2021 at 02:55:43PM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> > > > > > On Fri, Feb 26, 2021 at 09:44:41AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > > > > On Fri, Feb 26, 2021, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> > > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 02:59:27PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> > > > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 12:20 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > Thanks for grabbing the data!
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > I am fine with both paths. Sean has stated an explicit desire for
> > > > > > > > > hypercall exiting, so I think that would be the current consensus.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Yep, though it'd be good to get Paolo's input, too.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > If we want to do hypercall exiting, this should be in a follow-up
> > > > > > > > > series where we implement something more generic, e.g. a hypercall
> > > > > > > > > exiting bitmap or hypercall exit list. If we are taking the hypercall
> > > > > > > > > exit route, we can drop the kvm side of the hypercall.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I don't think this is a good candidate for arbitrary hypercall interception.  Or
> > > > > > > rather, I think hypercall interception should be an orthogonal implementation.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The guest, including guest firmware, needs to be aware that the hypercall is
> > > > > > > supported, and the ABI needs to be well-defined.  Relying on userspace VMMs to
> > > > > > > implement a common ABI is an unnecessary risk.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > We could make KVM's default behavior be a nop, i.e. have KVM enforce the ABI but
> > > > > > > require further VMM intervention.  But, I just don't see the point, it would
> > > > > > > save only a few lines of code.  It would also limit what KVM could do in the
> > > > > > > future, e.g. if KVM wanted to do its own bookkeeping _and_ exit to userspace,
> > > > > > > then mandatory interception would essentially make it impossible for KVM to do
> > > > > > > bookkeeping while still honoring the interception request.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > However, I do think it would make sense to have the userspace exit be a generic
> > > > > > > exit type.  But hey, we already have the necessary ABI defined for that!  It's
> > > > > > > just not used anywhere.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >   /* KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL */
> > > > > > >   struct {
> > > > > > >           __u64 nr;
> > > > > > >           __u64 args[6];
> > > > > > >           __u64 ret;
> > > > > > >           __u32 longmode;
> > > > > > >           __u32 pad;
> > > > > > >   } hypercall;
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Userspace could also handle the MSR using MSR filters (would need to
> > > > > > > > > confirm that).  Then userspace could also be in control of the cpuid bit.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > An MSR is not a great fit; it's x86 specific and limited to 64 bits of data.
> > > > > > > The data limitation could be fudged by shoving data into non-standard GPRs, but
> > > > > > > that will result in truly heinous guest code, and extensibility issues.
> > > > > > >
> >
> > We may also need to pass-through the MSR to userspace, as it is a part of this
> > complete host (userspace/kernel), OVMF and guest kernel negotiation of
> > the SEV live migration feature.
> >
> > Host (userspace/kernel) advertises it's support for SEV live migration
> > feature via the CPUID bits, which is queried by OVMF and which in turn
> > adds a new UEFI runtime variable to indicate support for SEV live
> > migration, which is later queried during guest kernel boot and
> > accordingly the guest does a wrmrsl() to custom MSR to complete SEV
> > live migration negotiation and enable it.
> >
> > Now, the GET_SHARED_REGION_LIST ioctl returns error, until this MSR write
> > enables SEV live migration, hence, preventing userspace to start live
> > migration before the feature support has been negotiated and enabled on
> > all the three components - host, guest OVMF and kernel.
> >
> > But, now with this ioctl not existing anymore, we will need to
> > pass-through the MSR to userspace too, for it to only initiate live
> > migration once the feature negotiation has been completed.
> 
> I can't tell if you were waiting for feedback on this before posting
> the follow-up patch series.

Actually, i am going to post the follow-up patch series upstream early
next week. 

I have already added support for MSR handling and exit to userspace, the
current implementation looks like this :

The custom MSR is hooked both in svm_get_msr() and svm_set_msr():

@@ -2800,6 +2800,17 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
        case MSR_F10H_DECFG:
                msr_info->data = svm->msr_decfg;
                break;
+       case MSR_KVM_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION:
+               if (!sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+                       return 1;
+
+               if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION))
+                       return 1;
+
+               /*
+                * Let userspace handle the MSR using MSR filters.
+                */
+               return KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED;

So there is special check added for both sev_guest() and requisite CPUID
bit set in guest CPUID, if either fails this will signal #GP to guest.

Otherwise, it returns MSR_FILTER return code, which will allow userspace
to use msr intercepts to handle the reads and writes via userspace exits
using KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR.

Let me know if you have any feedback/comments on the above handling.

Thanks,
Ashish

> 
> Here are a few options:
> 1) Add the MSR explicitly to the list of custom kvm MSRs, but don't
> have it hooked up anywhere. The expectation would be for the VMM to
> use msr intercepts to handle the reads and writes. If that seems
> weird, have svm_set_msr (or whatever) explicitly ignore it.
> 2) Add a getter and setter for the MSR. Only allow guests to use it if
> they are sev_guests with the requisite CPUID bit set.
> 
> I think I prefer the former, and it should work fine from my
> understanding of the msr intercepts implementation. I'm also open to
> other ideas. You could also have the MSR write trigger a KVM_EXIT of
> the same type as the hypercall, but have it just say "the msr value
> changed to XYZ", but that design sounds awkward.
> 
> Thanks,
> Steve

  reply	other threads:[~2021-04-02 11:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-04  0:35 [PATCH v10 00/17] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:36 ` [PATCH v10 01/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:36 ` [PATCH v10 02/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 03/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 04/16] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 05/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:37 ` [PATCH v10 06/16] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:38 ` [PATCH v10 07/16] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:38 ` [PATCH v10 08/16] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 16:03   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-05  1:44   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-05  3:32     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 09/16] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 10/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04 16:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-04 16:34     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-17  1:03   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-17 14:00     ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-17 16:13       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18  6:48         ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-18 16:39           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 17:05             ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-18 17:50               ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-18 18:32     ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-02-24 17:51       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-24 18:22         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-25 20:20           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-25 22:59             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-25 23:24               ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-26 14:04               ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-26 17:44                 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-02 14:55                   ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-02 15:15                     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-03 18:54                     ` Will Deacon
2021-03-03 19:32                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-09 19:10                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-11 18:14                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-11 20:48                         ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-19 17:59                           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-02  1:40                             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-02 11:09                               ` Ashish Kalra [this message]
2021-03-08 10:40                   ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 19:51                     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-08 21:05                       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 21:11                       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-08 21:32                         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-03-08 21:51                         ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-09 19:42                           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-10  3:42                           ` Kalra, Ashish
2021-03-10  3:47                             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-03-08 21:48                       ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-17  1:06   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 11/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:39 ` [PATCH v10 12/16] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR Ashish Kalra
2021-02-05  0:56   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-05  3:07     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06  2:54       ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-06  4:49         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06  5:46         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-06 13:56           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-08  0:28             ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-08 22:50               ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-10 20:36                 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-02-10 22:01                   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-10 22:05                     ` Steve Rutherford
2021-02-16 23:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 13/16] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 14/16] KVM: x86: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature Ashish Kalra
2021-02-18 17:56   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 15/16] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration Ashish Kalra
2021-02-04  4:10   ` kernel test robot
2021-02-04  0:40 ` [PATCH v10 16/16] KVM: SVM: Bypass DBG_DECRYPT API calls for unencrypted guest memory Ashish Kalra
2021-02-09  6:23   ` kernel test robot

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