From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4/7] KVM: x86/mmu: Do not apply HPA (memory encryption) mask to GPAs
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2021 16:05:49 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210623230552.4027702-5-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210623230552.4027702-1-seanjc@google.com>
Ignore "dynamic" host adjustments to the physical address mask when
generating the masks for guest PTEs, i.e. the guest PA masks. The host
physical address space and guest physical address space are two different
beasts, e.g. even though SEV's C-bit is the same bit location for both
host and guest, disabling SME in the host (which clears shadow_me_mask)
does not affect the guest PTE->GPA "translation".
For non-SEV guests, not dropping bits is the correct behavior. Assuming
KVM and userspace correctly enumerate/configure guest MAXPHYADDR, bits
that are lost as collateral damage from memory encryption are treated as
reserved bits, i.e. KVM will never get to the point where it attempts to
generate a gfn using the affected bits. And if userspace wants to create
a bogus vCPU, then userspace gets to deal with the fallout of hardware
doing odd things with bad GPAs.
For SEV guests, not dropping the C-bit is technically wrong, but it's a
moot point because KVM can't read SEV guest's page tables in any case
since they're always encrypted. Not to mention that the current KVM code
is also broken since sme_me_mask does not have to be non-zero for SEV to
be supported by KVM. The proper fix would be to teach all of KVM to
correctly handle guest private memory, but that's a task for the future.
Fixes: d0ec49d4de90 ("kvm/x86/svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 17 +++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 6 ------
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index 823a5919f9fa..9df7e4b315a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -20,11 +20,24 @@
* so the code in this file is compiled twice, once per pte size.
*/
+/* Shadow paging constants/helpers that don't need to be #undef'd. */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_PAGING_TMPL_COMMON_H
+#define __KVM_X86_PAGING_TMPL_COMMON_H
+
+#define GUEST_PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK (((1ULL << 52) - 1) & ~(u64)(PAGE_SIZE-1))
+#define PT64_LVL_ADDR_MASK(level) \
+ (GUEST_PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK & ~((1ULL << (PAGE_SHIFT + (((level) - 1) \
+ * PT64_LEVEL_BITS))) - 1))
+#define PT64_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(level) \
+ (GUEST_PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK & ((1ULL << (PAGE_SHIFT + (((level) - 1) \
+ * PT64_LEVEL_BITS))) - 1))
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_PAGING_TMPL_COMMON_H */
+
#if PTTYPE == 64
#define pt_element_t u64
#define guest_walker guest_walker64
#define FNAME(name) paging##64_##name
- #define PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK
+ #define PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK GUEST_PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK
#define PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl) PT64_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl)
#define PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(lvl) PT64_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(lvl)
#define PT_INDEX(addr, level) PT64_INDEX(addr, level)
@@ -57,7 +70,7 @@
#define pt_element_t u64
#define guest_walker guest_walkerEPT
#define FNAME(name) ept_##name
- #define PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK
+ #define PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK GUEST_PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK
#define PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl) PT64_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl)
#define PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(lvl) PT64_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(lvl)
#define PT_INDEX(addr, level) PT64_INDEX(addr, level)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
index bca0ba11cccf..6925dfc38981 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -38,12 +38,6 @@ static_assert(SPTE_TDP_AD_ENABLED_MASK == 0);
#else
#define PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK (((1ULL << 52) - 1) & ~(u64)(PAGE_SIZE-1))
#endif
-#define PT64_LVL_ADDR_MASK(level) \
- (PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK & ~((1ULL << (PAGE_SHIFT + (((level) - 1) \
- * PT64_LEVEL_BITS))) - 1))
-#define PT64_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(level) \
- (PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK & ((1ULL << (PAGE_SHIFT + (((level) - 1) \
- * PT64_LEVEL_BITS))) - 1))
#define PT64_PERM_MASK (PT_PRESENT_MASK | PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_user_mask \
| shadow_x_mask | shadow_nx_mask | shadow_me_mask)
--
2.32.0.288.g62a8d224e6-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-23 23:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-23 23:05 [PATCH 0/7] KVM: x86: guest MAXPHYADDR and C-bit fixes Sean Christopherson
2021-06-23 23:05 ` [PATCH 1/7] KVM: x86: Use guest MAXPHYADDR from CPUID.0x8000_0008 iff TDP is enabled Sean Christopherson
2021-06-23 23:05 ` [PATCH 2/7] KVM: x86: Use kernel's x86_phys_bits to handle reduced MAXPHYADDR Sean Christopherson
2021-06-23 23:05 ` [PATCH 3/7] KVM: x86: Truncate reported guest MAXPHYADDR to C-bit if SEV is supported Sean Christopherson
2021-06-23 23:05 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2021-06-23 23:05 ` [PATCH 5/7] KVM: VMX: Refactor 32-bit PSE PT creation to avoid using MMU macro Sean Christopherson
2021-06-23 23:05 ` [PATCH 6/7] KVM: x86/mmu: Bury 32-bit PSE paging helpers in paging_tmpl.h Sean Christopherson
2021-06-23 23:05 ` [PATCH 7/7] KVM: x86/mmu: Use separate namespaces for guest PTEs and shadow PTEs Sean Christopherson
2021-06-24 7:43 ` [PATCH 0/7] KVM: x86: guest MAXPHYADDR and C-bit fixes Paolo Bonzini
2021-06-24 16:30 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-24 16:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-24 17:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-06-24 17:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-24 22:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-24 22:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-06-24 22:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-24 23:47 ` Sean Christopherson
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