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From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, x86@kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com
Cc: weijiang.yang@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH 01/19] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack
Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 04:46:25 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220616084643.19564-2-weijiang.yang@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220616084643.19564-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com>

From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built for the
feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is
enabled, legacy non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without
protection.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

---
v2:
 - Remove already wrong kernel size increase info (tlgx)
 - Change prompt to remove "Intel" (tglx)
 - Update line about what CPUs are supported (Dave)

Yu-cheng v25:
 - Remove X86_CET and use X86_SHADOW_STACK directly.

Yu-cheng v24:
 - Update for the splitting X86_CET to X86_SHADOW_STACK and X86_IBT.

 arch/x86/Kconfig           | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler |  1 +
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 9783ebc4e021..79c6b0490350 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ config X86_64
 	depends on 64BIT
 	# Options that are inherently 64-bit kernel only:
 	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
+	select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if CC_HAS_INT128
 	select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
@@ -1969,6 +1970,22 @@ config X86_SGX
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+	def_bool n
+
+config X86_SHADOW_STACK
+	prompt "X86 Shadow Stack"
+	def_bool n
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+	help
+	  Shadow Stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
+	  return address corruption. Today the kernel's support is limited to
+	  virtualizing it in KVM guests.
+
+	  CPUs supporting shadow stacks were first released in 2020.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
index 26b8c08e2fc4..41428391e475 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
@@ -19,3 +19,4 @@ config AS_TPAUSE
 	def_bool $(as-instr,tpause %ecx)
 	help
 	  Supported by binutils >= 2.31.1 and LLVM integrated assembler >= V7
+
-- 
2.27.0


  reply	other threads:[~2022-06-16  8:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-06-16  8:46 [PATCH 00/19] Refresh queued CET virtualization series Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` Yang Weijiang [this message]
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 02/19] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 03/19] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 10:24   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 17:12     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-17 11:38       ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-17 21:18         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-16 10:25   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 17:36     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 04/19] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 10:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 17:12     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 05/19] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 06/19] KVM: x86: Report XSS as an MSR to be saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 07/19] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on writes to MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 08/19] KVM: x86: Load guest fpu state when accessing MSRs managed by XSAVES Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 09/19] KVM: x86: Add #CP support in guest exception classification Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 10/19] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and flags Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 11/19] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for CR4.CET Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 12/19] KVM: VMX: Emulate reads and writes to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 13/19] KVM: VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace VMM to access GUEST_SSP Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 14/19] KVM: x86: Report CET MSRs as to-be-saved if CET is supported Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 15/19] KVM: x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 16/19] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise CET to userspace Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 10:59   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 15:27     ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-06-25  6:55     ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 17/19] KVM: VMX: Pass through CET MSRs to the guest when supported Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 18/19] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested VMX Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16  8:46 ` [PATCH 19/19] KVM: x86: Enable supervisor IBT support for guest Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 11:05   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 11:19   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 15:56     ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-06-16  9:10 ` [PATCH 00/19] Refresh queued CET virtualization series Christoph Hellwig
2022-06-16 11:25   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 10:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 10:21   ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-06-16 14:18     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 15:06       ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-06-16 15:28       ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-06-18  6:43         ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-07-14 19:36           ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 15:04             ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-07-15 15:58               ` Sean Christopherson

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