From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, x86@kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com
Cc: weijiang.yang@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH 02/19] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks
Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 04:46:26 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220616084643.19564-3-weijiang.yang@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220616084643.19564-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
The Control-Flow Enforcement Technology contains two related features,
one of which is Shadow Stacks. Future patches will utilize this feature
for shadow stack support in KVM, so add a CPU feature flags for Shadow
Stacks (CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 7]).
To protect shadow stack state from malicious modification, the registers
are only accessible in supervisor mode. This implementation
context-switches the registers with XSAVES. Make X86_FEATURE_SHSTK depend
on XSAVES.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v2:
- Remove IBT reference in commit log (Kees)
- Describe xsaves dependency using text from (Dave)
v1:
- Remove IBT, can be added in a follow on IBT series.
Yu-cheng v25:
- Make X86_FEATURE_IBT depend on X86_FEATURE_SHSTK.
Yu-cheng v24:
- Update for splitting CONFIG_X86_CET to CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK and
CONFIG_X86_IBT.
- Move DISABLE_IBT definition to the IBT series.
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 1 +
3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 393f2bbb5e3a..2a3aaf5e1052 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -355,6 +355,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (16*32+ 4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
#define X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG (16*32+ 5) /* UMONITOR/UMWAIT/TPAUSE Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2 (16*32+ 6) /* Additional AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation Instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SHSTK (16*32+ 7) /* Shadow Stack */
#define X86_FEATURE_GFNI (16*32+ 8) /* Galois Field New Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_VAES (16*32+ 9) /* Vector AES */
#define X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ (16*32+10) /* Carry-Less Multiplication Double Quadword */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 36369e76cc63..c61c65bbc58d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -68,6 +68,12 @@
# define DISABLE_TDX_GUEST (1 << (X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST & 31))
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0
+#else
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
+#endif
+
/*
* Make sure to add features to the correct mask
*/
@@ -88,7 +94,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK14 0
#define DISABLED_MASK15 0
#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP| \
- DISABLE_ENQCMD)
+ DISABLE_ENQCMD|DISABLE_SHSTK)
#define DISABLED_MASK17 0
#define DISABLED_MASK18 0
#define DISABLED_MASK19 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
index c881bcafba7d..bf1b55a1ba21 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_XFD, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES },
{ X86_FEATURE_XFD, X86_FEATURE_XGETBV1 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE, X86_FEATURE_XFD },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES },
{}
};
--
2.27.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-16 8:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-06-16 8:46 [PATCH 00/19] Refresh queued CET virtualization series Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 01/19] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` Yang Weijiang [this message]
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 03/19] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 10:24 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 17:12 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-17 11:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-17 21:18 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-16 10:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 17:36 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 04/19] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 10:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 17:12 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 05/19] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 06/19] KVM: x86: Report XSS as an MSR to be saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 07/19] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on writes to MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 08/19] KVM: x86: Load guest fpu state when accessing MSRs managed by XSAVES Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 09/19] KVM: x86: Add #CP support in guest exception classification Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 10/19] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and flags Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 11/19] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for CR4.CET Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 12/19] KVM: VMX: Emulate reads and writes to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 13/19] KVM: VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace VMM to access GUEST_SSP Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 14/19] KVM: x86: Report CET MSRs as to-be-saved if CET is supported Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 15/19] KVM: x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 16/19] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise CET to userspace Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 10:59 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 15:27 ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-06-25 6:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 17/19] KVM: VMX: Pass through CET MSRs to the guest when supported Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 18/19] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested VMX Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 8:46 ` [PATCH 19/19] KVM: x86: Enable supervisor IBT support for guest Yang Weijiang
2022-06-16 11:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 11:19 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 15:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-06-16 9:10 ` [PATCH 00/19] Refresh queued CET virtualization series Christoph Hellwig
2022-06-16 11:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 10:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 10:21 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-06-16 14:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-06-16 15:06 ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-06-16 15:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-06-18 6:43 ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-07-14 19:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-15 15:04 ` Yang, Weijiang
2022-07-15 15:58 ` Sean Christopherson
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