From: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
To: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kvm-devel <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
ACPI Devel Maling List <linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Rafael Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>,
Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
isaku.yamahata@intel.com, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>,
Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>,
dongli.zhang@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 02/22] cc_platform: Add new attribute to prevent ACPI CPU hotplug
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 10:01:55 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220627100155.71a7b34c@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d3ba563f3f4e7aaf90fb99d20c651b5751972f7b.camel@intel.com>
On Thu, 23 Jun 2022 12:01:48 +1200
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 2022-06-22 at 13:42 +0200, Rafael J. Wysocki wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 22, 2022 at 1:16 PM Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Platforms with confidential computing technology may not support ACPI
> > > CPU hotplug when such technology is enabled by the BIOS. Examples
> > > include Intel platforms which support Intel Trust Domain Extensions
> > > (TDX).
> > >
> > > If the kernel ever receives ACPI CPU hotplug event, it is likely a BIOS
> > > bug. For ACPI CPU hot-add, the kernel should speak out this is a BIOS
> > > bug and reject the new CPU. For hot-removal, for simplicity just assume
> > > the kernel cannot continue to work normally, and BUG().
> > >
> > > Add a new attribute CC_ATTR_ACPI_CPU_HOTPLUG_DISABLED to indicate the
> > > platform doesn't support ACPI CPU hotplug, so that kernel can handle
> > > ACPI CPU hotplug events for such platform. The existing attribute
> > > CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED is for software CPU hotplug thus doesn't fit.
> > >
> > > In acpi_processor_{add|remove}(), add early check against this attribute
> > > and handle accordingly if it is set.
> > >
> > > Also take this chance to rename existing CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED to
> > > CC_ATTR_CPU_HOTPLUG_DISABLED as it is for software CPU hotplug.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
> > > ---
> > > arch/x86/coco/core.c | 2 +-
> > > drivers/acpi/acpi_processor.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > include/linux/cc_platform.h | 15 +++++++++++++--
> > > kernel/cpu.c | 2 +-
> > > 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> > > index 4320fadae716..1bde1af75296 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> > > @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ static bool intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
> > > {
> > > switch (attr) {
> > > case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO:
> > > - case CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED:
> > > + case CC_ATTR_CPU_HOTPLUG_DISABLED:
> > > case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
> > > case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT:
> > > return true;
> > > diff --git a/drivers/acpi/acpi_processor.c b/drivers/acpi/acpi_processor.c
> > > index 6737b1cbf6d6..b960db864cd4 100644
> > > --- a/drivers/acpi/acpi_processor.c
> > > +++ b/drivers/acpi/acpi_processor.c
> > > @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
> > > #include <linux/kernel.h>
> > > #include <linux/module.h>
> > > #include <linux/pci.h>
> > > +#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
> > >
> > > #include <acpi/processor.h>
> > >
> > > @@ -357,6 +358,17 @@ static int acpi_processor_add(struct acpi_device *device,
> > > struct device *dev;
> > > int result = 0;
> > >
> > > + /*
> > > + * If the confidential computing platform doesn't support ACPI
> > > + * memory hotplug, the BIOS should never deliver such event to
> > > + * the kernel. Report ACPI CPU hot-add as a BIOS bug and ignore
> > > + * the new CPU.
> > > + */
> > > + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_ACPI_CPU_HOTPLUG_DISABLED)) {
> >
> > This will affect initialization, not just hotplug AFAICS.
> >
> > You should reset the .hotplug.enabled flag in processor_handler to
> > false instead.
>
> Hi Rafael,
>
> Thanks for the review. By "affect initialization" did you mean this
> acpi_processor_add() is also called during kernel boot when any logical cpu is
> brought up? Or do you mean ACPI CPU hotplug can also happen during kernel boot
> (after acpi_processor_init())?
>
> I see acpi_processor_init() calls acpi_processor_check_duplicates() which calls
> acpi_evaluate_object() but I don't know details of ACPI so I don't know whether
> this would trigger acpi_processor_add().
>
> One thing is TDX doesn't support ACPI CPU hotplug is an architectural thing, so
> it is illegal even if it happens during kernel boot. Dave's idea is the kernel
> should speak out loudly if physical CPU hotplug indeed happened on (BIOS) TDX-
> enabled platforms. Otherwise perhaps we can just give up initializing the ACPI
> CPU hotplug in acpi_processor_init(), something like below?
The thing is that by the time ACPI machinery kicks in, physical hotplug
has already happened and in case of (kvm+qemu+ovmf hypervisor combo)
firmware has already handled it somehow and handed it over to ACPI.
If you say it's architectural thing then cpu hotplug is platform/firmware
bug and should be disabled there instead of working around it in the kernel.
Perhaps instead of 'preventing' hotplug, complain/panic and be done with it.
> --- a/drivers/acpi/acpi_processor.c
> +++ b/drivers/acpi/acpi_processor.c
> @@ -707,6 +707,10 @@ bool acpi_duplicate_processor_id(int proc_id)
> void __init acpi_processor_init(void)
> {
> acpi_processor_check_duplicates();
> +
> + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_ACPI_CPU_HOTPLUG_DISABLED))
> + return;
> +
> acpi_scan_add_handler_with_hotplug(&processor_handler, "processor");
> acpi_scan_add_handler(&processor_container_handler);
> }
>
>
> >
> > > + dev_err(&device->dev, "[BIOS bug]: Platform doesn't support ACPI CPU hotplug. New CPU ignored.\n");
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > + }
> > > +
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-27 8:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 114+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-06-22 11:15 [PATCH v5 00/22] TDX host kernel support Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:15 ` [PATCH v5 01/22] x86/virt/tdx: Detect TDX during kernel boot Kai Huang
2022-06-23 5:57 ` Chao Gao
2022-06-23 9:23 ` Kai Huang
2022-08-02 2:01 ` [PATCH v5 1/22] " Wu, Binbin
2022-08-03 9:25 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:15 ` [PATCH v5 02/22] cc_platform: Add new attribute to prevent ACPI CPU hotplug Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:42 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2022-06-23 0:01 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-27 8:01 ` Igor Mammedov [this message]
2022-06-28 10:04 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-28 11:52 ` Igor Mammedov
2022-06-28 17:33 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2022-06-28 23:41 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-24 18:57 ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 5:05 ` Kai Huang
2022-07-13 11:09 ` Kai Huang
2022-07-19 17:46 ` Dave Hansen
2022-07-19 23:54 ` Kai Huang
2022-08-03 3:40 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-03 9:20 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-29 5:33 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-06-29 9:09 ` Kai Huang
2022-08-03 3:55 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-03 9:21 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:15 ` [PATCH v5 03/22] cc_platform: Add new attribute to prevent ACPI memory hotplug Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:45 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2022-06-23 0:08 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-28 17:55 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2022-06-28 12:01 ` Igor Mammedov
2022-06-28 23:49 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-29 8:48 ` Igor Mammedov
2022-06-29 9:13 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:16 ` [PATCH v5 04/22] x86/virt/tdx: Prevent ACPI CPU hotplug and " Kai Huang
2022-06-24 1:41 ` Chao Gao
2022-06-24 11:21 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-29 8:35 ` Yuan Yao
2022-06-29 9:17 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-29 14:22 ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-29 23:02 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-30 15:44 ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-30 22:45 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:16 ` [PATCH v5 05/22] x86/virt/tdx: Prevent hot-add driver managed memory Kai Huang
2022-06-24 2:12 ` Chao Gao
2022-06-24 11:23 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-24 19:01 ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 5:27 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:16 ` [PATCH v5 06/22] x86/virt/tdx: Add skeleton to initialize TDX on demand Kai Huang
2022-06-24 2:39 ` Chao Gao
2022-06-24 11:27 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:16 ` [PATCH v5 07/22] x86/virt/tdx: Implement SEAMCALL function Kai Huang
2022-06-24 18:38 ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 5:23 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-27 20:58 ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 22:10 ` Kai Huang
2022-07-19 19:39 ` Dan Williams
2022-07-19 23:28 ` Kai Huang
2022-07-20 10:18 ` Kai Huang
2022-07-20 16:48 ` Dave Hansen
2022-07-21 1:52 ` Kai Huang
2022-07-27 0:34 ` Kai Huang
2022-07-27 0:50 ` Dave Hansen
2022-07-27 12:46 ` Kai Huang
2022-08-03 2:37 ` Kai Huang
2022-08-03 14:20 ` Dave Hansen
2022-08-03 22:35 ` Kai Huang
2022-08-04 10:06 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:16 ` [PATCH v5 08/22] x86/virt/tdx: Shut down TDX module in case of error Kai Huang
2022-06-24 18:50 ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 5:26 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-27 20:46 ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 22:34 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-27 22:56 ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 23:59 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-28 0:03 ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-28 0:11 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:16 ` [PATCH v5 09/22] x86/virt/tdx: Detect TDX module by doing module global initialization Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:16 ` [PATCH v5 10/22] x86/virt/tdx: Do logical-cpu scope TDX module initialization Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 11/22] x86/virt/tdx: Get information about TDX module and TDX-capable memory Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 12/22] x86/virt/tdx: Convert all memory regions in memblock to TDX memory Kai Huang
2022-06-24 19:40 ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 6:16 ` Kai Huang
2022-07-07 2:37 ` Kai Huang
2022-07-07 14:26 ` Dave Hansen
2022-07-07 14:36 ` Juergen Gross
2022-07-07 23:42 ` Kai Huang
2022-07-07 23:34 ` Kai Huang
2022-08-03 1:30 ` Kai Huang
2022-08-03 14:22 ` Dave Hansen
2022-08-03 22:14 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 13/22] x86/virt/tdx: Add placeholder to construct TDMRs based on memblock Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 14/22] x86/virt/tdx: Create TDMRs to cover all memblock memory regions Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 15/22] x86/virt/tdx: Allocate and set up PAMTs for TDMRs Kai Huang
2022-06-24 20:13 ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 10:31 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-27 20:41 ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 22:50 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-27 22:57 ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 23:05 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-28 0:48 ` Xiaoyao Li
2022-06-28 17:03 ` Dave Hansen
2022-08-17 22:46 ` Sagi Shahar
2022-08-17 23:43 ` Huang, Kai
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 16/22] x86/virt/tdx: Set up reserved areas for all TDMRs Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 17/22] x86/virt/tdx: Reserve TDX module global KeyID Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 18/22] x86/virt/tdx: Configure TDX module with TDMRs and " Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 19/22] x86/virt/tdx: Configure global KeyID on all packages Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 20/22] x86/virt/tdx: Initialize all TDMRs Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 21/22] x86/virt/tdx: Support kexec() Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 22/22] Documentation/x86: Add documentation for TDX host support Kai Huang
2022-08-18 4:07 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-08-18 9:33 ` Huang, Kai
2022-06-24 19:47 ` [PATCH v5 00/22] TDX host kernel support Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 4:09 ` Kai Huang
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