From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
To: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
"Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] vfio/type1: Cleanup remaining vaddr removal/update fragments
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2022 14:26:51 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221212142651.263dd6ae.alex.williamson@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8f29aad0-7378-ef7a-9ac5-f98b3054d5eb@oracle.com>
On Mon, 12 Dec 2022 15:59:11 -0500
Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com> wrote:
> On 12/12/2022 10:58 AM, Alex Williamson wrote:
> > On Mon, 12 Dec 2022 09:17:54 -0400
> > Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> wrote:
> >
> >> On Sat, Dec 10, 2022 at 09:14:06AM -0500, Steven Sistare wrote:
> >>
> >>> Thank you for your thoughtful response. Rather than debate the degree of
> >>> of vulnerability, I propose an alternate solution. The technical crux of
> >>> the matter is support for mediated devices.
> >>
> >> I'm not sure I'm convinced about that. It is easy to make problematic
> >> situations with mdevs, but that doesn't mean other cases don't exist
> >> too eg what happens if userspace suspends and then immediately does
> >> something to trigger a domain attachment? Doesn't it still deadlock
> >> the kernel?
> >
> > The opportunity for that to deadlock isn't obvious to me, a replay
> > would be stalled waiting for invalid vaddrs, but this is essentially
> > the user deadlocking themselves. There's also code there to handle the
> > process getting killed while waiting, making it interruptible. Thanks,
>
> I will submit new patches tomorrow to exclude mdevs. Almost done.
I've dropped the removal commits from my next branch in the interim.
Thanks,
Alex
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-12-12 21:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-12-07 21:45 [PATCH] vfio/type1: Cleanup remaining vaddr removal/update fragments Alex Williamson
2022-12-07 23:21 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-08 7:56 ` Tian, Kevin
2022-12-08 16:40 ` Alex Williamson
2022-12-09 18:40 ` Steven Sistare
2022-12-09 19:42 ` Alex Williamson
2022-12-09 19:52 ` Steven Sistare
2022-12-09 21:01 ` Alex Williamson
2022-12-10 14:14 ` Steven Sistare
2022-12-12 13:17 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-12 13:54 ` Steven Sistare
2022-12-12 15:58 ` Alex Williamson
2022-12-12 20:59 ` Steven Sistare
2022-12-12 21:26 ` Alex Williamson [this message]
2022-12-12 23:08 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-12 23:29 ` Alex Williamson
2022-12-12 23:35 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-12-13 0:04 ` Alex Williamson
2022-12-13 0:11 ` Jason Gunthorpe
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