From: Takahiro Itazuri <itazur@amazon.com>
To: <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <itazur@amazon.com>,
<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<mingo@redhat.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <seanjc@google.com>,
<tglx@linutronix.de>, <x86@kernel.org>, <zulinx86@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] KVM: x86: Propagate AMD-specific IBRS bits to guests
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 22:24:16 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230228222416.61484-1-itazur@amazon.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y/5oBKi6vjZe83ac@zn.tnic>
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 21:45:56 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> So you mean we should stick *all* CPUID leafs in there just because
> anything can run in guests?
>
> What is the hypervisor then for?
I'm still a kernel newbie and I don't have a strong opinion for that.
I just thought it would be helpful if the KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID API
returns the same security information as the host, as long as it is
harmless. I'm inclined to withdraw this patch if it is not worth
enough.
> Really? Says who?
>
> $ grep -r . /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/
>
> gives you all you need to know.
>
> And if something's missing, then I'm listening.
"De facto standard" was too much. I apologize for my incorrect
expression and poor English. What I wanted to say is that the script
was introduced as a useful tool by Intel and SLES and it provides some
additional information (IBRS always-on in this case).
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/secure-coding/spectre-and-meltdown-checker-script.html
https://documentation.suse.com/sles/15-SP1/html/SLES-all/cha-spectre.html
Best regards,
Takahiro Itazuri
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-28 22:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-27 21:05 [PATCH 0/2] KVM: x86: Propagate AMD-specific IBRS bits to guests Takahiro Itazuri
2023-02-27 21:05 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD-specific IBRS bits Takahiro Itazuri
2023-02-27 21:05 ` [PATCH 2/2] KVM: x86: Propagate AMD-specific IBRS related bits Takahiro Itazuri
2023-02-27 21:40 ` [PATCH 0/2] KVM: x86: Propagate AMD-specific IBRS bits to guests Borislav Petkov
2023-02-28 18:13 ` Takahiro Itazuri
2023-02-28 19:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-28 19:41 ` Takahiro Itazuri
2023-02-28 20:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-28 22:24 ` Takahiro Itazuri [this message]
2023-02-28 22:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-06 21:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-06 21:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-03-06 21:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-06 21:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-03-06 21:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-07 18:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-07 18:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-07 19:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-07 19:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-03-06 21:31 ` Paolo Bonzini
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