From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, peterz@infradead.org,
andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, seanjc@google.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, ravi.v.shankar@intel.com,
jiangshanlai@gmail.com, shan.kang@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v7 27/33] x86/fred: fixup fault on ERETU by jumping to fred_entrypoint_user
Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2023 03:27:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230404102716.1795-28-xin3.li@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230404102716.1795-1-xin3.li@intel.com>
If the stack frame contains an invalid user context (e.g. due to invalid SS,
a non-canonical RIP, etc.) the ERETU instruction will trap (#SS or #GP).
From a Linux point of view, this really should be considered a user space
failure, so use the standard fault fixup mechanism to intercept the fault,
fix up the exception frame, and redirect execution to fred_entrypoint_user.
The end result is that it appears just as if the hardware had taken the
exception immediately after completing the transition to user space.
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
---
Changes since v6:
* Add a comment to explain why it is safe to write to a previous FRED stack
frame. (Lai Jiangshan).
Changes since v5:
* Move the NMI bit from an invalid stack frame, which caused ERETU to fault,
to the fault handler's stack frame, thus to unblock NMI ASAP if NMI is blocked
(Lai Jiangshan).
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S | 8 ++-
arch/x86/include/asm/extable_fixup_types.h | 4 +-
arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S
index d975cacd060f..efe2bcd11273 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S
@@ -5,8 +5,10 @@
* The actual FRED entry points.
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
-#include <asm/errno.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
+#include <asm/errno.h>
+#include <asm/export.h>
#include <asm/fred.h>
#include "calling.h"
@@ -38,7 +40,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(fred_entrypoint_user)
call fred_entry_from_user
SYM_INNER_LABEL(fred_exit_user, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
FRED_EXIT
- ERETU
+1: ERETU
+
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE(1b, fred_entrypoint_user, EX_TYPE_ERETU)
SYM_CODE_END(fred_entrypoint_user)
.fill fred_entrypoint_kernel - ., 1, 0xcc
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/extable_fixup_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/extable_fixup_types.h
index 991e31cfde94..1585c798a02f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/extable_fixup_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/extable_fixup_types.h
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@
#define EX_TYPE_UCOPY_LEN4 (EX_TYPE_UCOPY_LEN | EX_DATA_IMM(4))
#define EX_TYPE_UCOPY_LEN8 (EX_TYPE_UCOPY_LEN | EX_DATA_IMM(8))
-#define EX_TYPE_ZEROPAD 20 /* longword load with zeropad on fault */
+#define EX_TYPE_ZEROPAD 20 /* longword load with zeropad on fault */
+
+#define EX_TYPE_ERETU 21
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
index 60814e110a54..9d82193adf3c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <xen/xen.h>
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+#include <asm/fred.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/kdebug.h>
@@ -195,6 +196,77 @@ static bool ex_handler_ucopy_len(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
return ex_handler_uaccess(fixup, regs, trapnr);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FRED
+static bool ex_handler_eretu(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
+{
+ struct pt_regs *uregs = (struct pt_regs *)(regs->sp - offsetof(struct pt_regs, ip));
+ unsigned short ss = uregs->ss;
+ unsigned short cs = uregs->cs;
+
+ /*
+ * Move the NMI bit from the invalid stack frame, which caused ERETU
+ * to fault, to the fault handler's stack frame, thus to unblock NMI
+ * with the fault handler's ERETS instruction ASAP if NMI is blocked.
+ */
+ regs->nmi = uregs->nmi;
+
+ fred_info(uregs)->edata = fred_event_data(regs);
+ uregs->ssx = regs->ssx;
+ uregs->ss = ss;
+ uregs->csx = regs->csx;
+ uregs->nmi = 0; /* The NMI bit was moved away above */
+ uregs->current_stack_level = 0;
+ uregs->cs = cs;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy error code to uregs and adjust stack pointer accordingly.
+ *
+ * The RSP used by FRED to push a stack frame is not the value in %rsp,
+ * it is calculated from %rsp with the following 2 steps:
+ * 1) RSP = %rsp - (IA32_FRED_CONFIG & 0x1c0) // Reserve N*64 bytes
+ * 2) RSP = RSP & ~0x3f // Align to a 64-byte cache line
+ * when the event delivery doesn't trigger a stack level change.
+ *
+ * Here is an example with N*64 (N=1) bytes reserved:
+ *
+ * 64-byte cache line ==> ______________
+ * |___Reserved___|
+ * |__Event_data__|
+ * |_____SS_______|
+ * |_____RSP______|
+ * |_____FLAGS____|
+ * |_____CS_______|
+ * |_____IP_______| <== ERETU stack frame
+ * 64-byte cache line ==> |__Error_code__|
+ * |______________|
+ * |______________|
+ * |______________|
+ * |______________|
+ * |______________|
+ * |______________|
+ * |______________| <== RSP after step 1)
+ * 64-byte cache line ==> |______________| <== RSP after step 2)
+ * |___Reserved___|
+ * |__Event_data__|
+ * |_____SS_______|
+ * |_____RSP______|
+ * |_____FLAGS____|
+ * |_____CS_______|
+ * |_____IP_______| <== ERETS stack frame
+ * 64-byte cache line ==> |__Error_code__|
+ *
+ * Thus a new FRED stack frame will always be pushed below a previous
+ * FRED stack frame ((N*64) bytes may be reserved between), and it is
+ * safe to write to a previous FRED stack frame as they never overlap.
+ */
+ uregs->orig_ax = error_code;
+ regs->sp -= 8;
+
+ return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs);
+}
+#endif
+
int ex_get_fixup_type(unsigned long ip)
{
const struct exception_table_entry *e = search_exception_tables(ip);
@@ -272,6 +344,10 @@ int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, unsigned long error_code,
return ex_handler_ucopy_len(e, regs, trapnr, reg, imm);
case EX_TYPE_ZEROPAD:
return ex_handler_zeropad(e, regs, fault_addr);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FRED
+ case EX_TYPE_ERETU:
+ return ex_handler_eretu(e, regs, error_code);
+#endif
}
BUG();
}
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-04 10:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-04 10:26 [PATCH v7 00/33] x86: enable FRED for x86-64 Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 01/33] x86/traps: let common_interrupt() handle IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 02/33] x86/fred: make unions for the cs and ss fields in struct pt_regs Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 03/33] x86/traps: add a system interrupt table for system interrupt dispatch Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 04/33] x86/traps: add install_system_interrupt_handler() Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 05/33] x86/traps: add external_interrupt() to dispatch external interrupts Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 06/33] x86/cpufeature: add the cpu feature bit for FRED Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 07/33] x86/opcode: add ERETU, ERETS instructions to x86-opcode-map Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 08/33] x86/objtool: teach objtool about ERETU and ERETS Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 09/33] x86/cpu: add X86_CR4_FRED macro Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 10/33] x86/fred: add Kconfig option for FRED (CONFIG_X86_FRED) Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 11/33] x86/fred: if CONFIG_X86_FRED is disabled, disable FRED support Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 12/33] x86/cpu: add MSR numbers for FRED configuration Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 13/33] x86/fred: header file for event types Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 14/33] x86/fred: header file with FRED definitions Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 15/33] x86/fred: reserve space for the FRED stack frame Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:26 ` [PATCH v7 16/33] x86/fred: add a page fault entry stub for FRED Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 17/33] x86/fred: add a debug " Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 18/33] x86/fred: add a NMI " Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 19/33] x86/fred: add a machine check " Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 20/33] x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 21/33] x86/fred: FRED initialization code Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 22/33] x86/fred: update MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 during task switch Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 23/33] x86/fred: let ret_from_fork() jmp to fred_exit_user when FRED is enabled Xin Li
2023-04-10 18:16 ` Dave Hansen
2023-04-10 18:31 ` Li, Xin3
2023-04-10 19:25 ` Li, Xin3
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 24/33] x86/fred: disallow the swapgs instruction " Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 25/33] x86/fred: no ESPFIX needed " Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 26/33] x86/fred: allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new thread Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` Xin Li [this message]
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 28/33] x86/ia32: do not modify the DPL bits for a null selector Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 29/33] x86/fred: allow FRED systems to use interrupt vectors 0x10-0x1f Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 30/33] x86/fred: allow dynamic stack frame size Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 31/33] x86/fred: BUG() when ERETU with %rsp not equal to that when the ring 3 event was just delivered Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 32/33] x86/fred: disable FRED by default in its early stage Xin Li
2023-04-04 10:27 ` [PATCH v7 33/33] KVM: x86/vmx: refactor VMX_DO_EVENT_IRQOFF to generate FRED stack frames Xin Li
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