From: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
To: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
borntraeger@de.ibm.com, nrb@linux.ibm.com, nsg@linux.ibm.com,
seiden@linux.ibm.com, jgg@nvidia.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] KVM: s390: fix race in gmap_make_secure
Date: Thu, 27 Apr 2023 13:46:49 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230427134649.1e482d91@p-imbrenda> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZEpUEF7H86E9vVfS@osiris>
On Thu, 27 Apr 2023 12:53:04 +0200
Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 26, 2023 at 03:48:34PM +0200, Claudio Imbrenda wrote:
> > This patch fixes a potential race in gmap_make_secure and removes the
> > last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
> > Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
> > Fixes: 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests")
> > ---
> > arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++---------------------
> > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
>
> It would be helpful if this would be a bit more descriptive. "Fix
> race" is not very helpful :)
>
> What race does this fix?
> When can this happen?
> What are the consequences if the race window is being hit?
We are locking something we don't have a reference to, and as explained
by Jason and David in this thread <Y9J4P/RNvY1Ztn0Q@nvidia.com> it can
lead to all kind of bad things, including the page getting
unmapped (MADV_DONTNEED), freed, reallocated as a larger folio and the
unlock_page() would target the wrong bit.
Also there is another race with the FOLL_WRITE, which could race
between the follow_page and the get_locked_pte.
The main point of the patch is to remove the last follow_page without
FOLL_GET or FOLL_PIN, removing the races can be considered a nice bonus.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-27 11:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-26 13:48 [PATCH v2 0/1] fix race in gmap_make_secure Claudio Imbrenda
2023-04-26 13:48 ` [PATCH v2 1/1] KVM: s390: " Claudio Imbrenda
2023-04-27 10:53 ` Heiko Carstens
2023-04-27 11:46 ` Claudio Imbrenda [this message]
2023-04-27 12:01 ` Heiko Carstens
2023-04-27 12:17 ` Claudio Imbrenda
2023-04-27 12:45 ` Heiko Carstens
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20230427134649.1e482d91@p-imbrenda \
--to=imbrenda@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=borntraeger@de.ibm.com \
--cc=frankja@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=hca@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=jgg@nvidia.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-s390@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=nrb@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=nsg@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=seiden@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox