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From: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Viktor Mihajlovski <mihajlov@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>,
	Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>,
	Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] s390/uvdevice: Add 'Lock Secret Store' UVC
Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 11:31:52 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230512093153.206378-5-seiden@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230512093153.206378-1-seiden@linux.ibm.com>

Userspace can call the Lock Secret Store Ultravisor Call
using IOCTLs on the uvdevice.
During the handling of the new IOCTL nr the uvdevice will do some sanity
checks first. Then, perform the Ultravisor command, and copy the
return codes to userspace.
If the Lock Secrets UV facility is not present, UV will return
invalid command rc. This won't be fenced in the driver and does not
result in a negative return value. This is also true for any other
possible error code the UV can return.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
---
 arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h            |  2 ++
 arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/uvdevice.h |  3 +++
 drivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c          | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
index 1e4f0f6d4923..6180ac8909d5 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
 #define UVC_CMD_RETR_ATTEST		0x1020
 #define UVC_CMD_ADD_SECRET		0x1031
 #define UVC_CMD_LIST_SECRETS		0x1033
+#define UVC_CMD_LOCK_SECRETS		0x1034
 
 /* Bits in installed uv calls */
 enum uv_cmds_inst {
@@ -92,6 +93,7 @@ enum uv_cmds_inst {
 	BIT_UVC_CMD_RETR_ATTEST = 28,
 	BIT_UVC_CMD_ADD_SECRET = 29,
 	BIT_UVC_CMD_LIST_SECRETS = 30,
+	BIT_UVC_CMD_LOCK_SECRETS = 31,
 };
 
 enum uv_feat_ind {
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/uvdevice.h b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/uvdevice.h
index cf12d6b8d8d8..b6e8d47dd589 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/uvdevice.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/uvdevice.h
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ enum UVIO_IOCTL_NR {
 	UVIO_IOCTL_ATT_NR,
 	UVIO_IOCTL_ADD_SECRET_NR,
 	UVIO_IOCTL_LIST_SECRETS_NR,
+	UVIO_IOCTL_LOCK_SECRETS_NR,
 	/* must be the last entry */
 	UVIO_IOCTL_NUM_IOCTLS
 };
@@ -92,11 +93,13 @@ enum UVIO_IOCTL_NR {
 #define UVIO_IOCTL_ATT		UVIO_IOCTL(UVIO_IOCTL_ATT_NR)
 #define UVIO_IOCTL_ADD_SECRET	UVIO_IOCTL(UVIO_IOCTL_ADD_SECRET_NR)
 #define UVIO_IOCTL_LIST_SECRETS	UVIO_IOCTL(UVIO_IOCTL_LIST_SECRETS_NR)
+#define UVIO_IOCTL_LOCK_SECRETS UVIO_IOCTL(UVIO_IOCTL_LOCK_SECRETS_NR)
 
 #define UVIO_SUPP_CALL(nr)	(1ULL << (nr))
 #define UVIO_SUPP_UDEV_INFO	UVIO_SUPP_CALL(UVIO_IOCTL_UDEV_INFO_NR)
 #define UVIO_SUPP_ATT		UVIO_SUPP_CALL(UVIO_IOCTL_ATT_NR)
 #define UVIO_SUPP_ADD_SECRET	UVIO_SUPP_CALL(UVIO_IOCTL_ADD_SECRET_NR)
 #define UVIO_SUPP_LIST_SECRETS	UVIO_SUPP_CALL(UVIO_IOCTL_LIST_SECRETS_NR)
+#define UVIO_SUPP_LOCK_SECRETS	UVIO_SUPP_CALL(UVIO_IOCTL_LOCK_SECRETS_NR)
 
 #endif /* __S390_ASM_UVDEVICE_H */
diff --git a/drivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c b/drivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c
index 5fcd719047ab..621c9f2b9853 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static const u64 ioctl_nr_to_uvc_bit[] __initconst = {
 	[UVIO_IOCTL_ATT_NR] = BIT_UVC_CMD_RETR_ATTEST,
 	[UVIO_IOCTL_ADD_SECRET_NR] = BIT_UVC_CMD_ADD_SECRET,
 	[UVIO_IOCTL_LIST_SECRETS_NR] = BIT_UVC_CMD_LIST_SECRETS,
+	[UVIO_IOCTL_LOCK_SECRETS_NR] = BIT_UVC_CMD_LOCK_SECRETS,
 };
 
 static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(ioctl_nr_to_uvc_bit) == UVIO_IOCTL_NUM_IOCTLS);
@@ -338,6 +339,41 @@ static int uvio_list_secrets(struct uvio_ioctl_cb *uv_ioctl)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/** uvio_lock_secrets() - perform a Lock Secret Store UVC
+ *
+ * @uv_ioctl: ioctl control block
+ *
+ * uvio_lock_secrets() performs the Lock Secret Store Ultravisor Call.
+ * It performs the UV-call and copies the return codes to the
+ * ioctl control block.
+ *
+ * The argument address and size must be 0.
+ *
+ * If the List Secrets UV facility is not present,
+ * UV will return invalid command rc. This won't be fenced in the driver
+ * and does not result in a negative return value.
+ *
+ * Context: might sleep
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success or a negative error code on error.
+ */
+static int uvio_lock_secrets(struct uvio_ioctl_cb *ioctl)
+{
+	struct uv_cb_nodata uvcb = {
+		.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
+		.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_LOCK_SECRETS,
+	};
+
+	if (ioctl->argument_addr || ioctl->argument_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb);
+	ioctl->uv_rc = uvcb.header.rc;
+	ioctl->uv_rrc = uvcb.header.rrc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int uvio_copy_and_check_ioctl(struct uvio_ioctl_cb *ioctl, void __user *argp,
 				     unsigned long cmd)
 {
@@ -388,6 +424,9 @@ static long uvio_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	case UVIO_IOCTL_LIST_SECRETS_NR:
 		ret = uvio_list_secrets(&uv_ioctl);
 		break;
+	case UVIO_IOCTL_LOCK_SECRETS_NR:
+		ret = uvio_lock_secrets(&uv_ioctl);
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
 		break;
-- 
2.40.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-05-12  9:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-12  9:31 [PATCH 0/5] s390/uvdevice: Expose secret UVCs Steffen Eiden
2023-05-12  9:31 ` [PATCH 1/5] s390/uvdevice: Add info IOCTL Steffen Eiden
2023-05-12 12:51   ` Heiko Carstens
2023-05-13  6:10   ` kernel test robot
2023-05-12  9:31 ` [PATCH 2/5] s390/uvdevice: Add 'Add Secret' UVC Steffen Eiden
2023-05-12  9:31 ` [PATCH 3/5] s390/uvdevice: Add 'List Secrets' UVC Steffen Eiden
2023-05-17 16:03   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2023-05-17 16:11     ` Steffen Eiden
2023-05-12  9:31 ` Steffen Eiden [this message]
2023-05-12  9:31 ` [PATCH 5/5] s390/uv: Update query for secret-UVCs Steffen Eiden
2023-05-12 12:53   ` Heiko Carstens
2023-05-12 13:27     ` Janosch Frank
2023-05-12 15:34       ` Heiko Carstens
2023-05-17 15:54   ` Claudio Imbrenda

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