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From: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Reima Ishii <ishiir@g.ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] KVM: x86/mmu: Harden TDP MMU iteration against root w/o shadow page
Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2023 11:55:11 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230726035511.denul3w4cxl4runk@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZL/wsIVpcpKs/9Nq@google.com>

On Tue, Jul 25, 2023 at 08:56:32AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 25, 2023, Yu Zhang wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 21, 2023 at 06:23:48PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > Explicitly check that tdp_iter_start() is handed a valid shadow page
> > > to harden KVM against bugs where
> > 
> > Sorry, where? 
> 
> Gah, I must have seen something shiny when writing the changelog.
> 
> > It's not about guest using an invisible GFN, it's about a KVM bug, right?
> 
> Yes, the intent is to guard against a KVM bug, e.g. if KVM managed to get into
> the TDP MMU with an invalid root, or a root belonging to a shadow MMU.  I'll fix
> the changelog in v2.
> 
> > > Opportunistically stop the TDP MMU iteration instead of continuing on
> > > with garbage if the incoming root is bogus.  Attempting to walk a garbage
> > > root is more likely to caused major problems than doing nothing.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> > > ---
> > >  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c | 11 ++++++-----
> > >  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c
> > > index d2eb0d4f8710..bd30ebfb2f2c 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c
> > > @@ -39,13 +39,14 @@ void tdp_iter_restart(struct tdp_iter *iter)
> > >  void tdp_iter_start(struct tdp_iter *iter, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
> > >  		    int min_level, gfn_t next_last_level_gfn)
> > >  {
> > > -	int root_level = root->role.level;
> > > -
> > > -	WARN_ON(root_level < 1);
> > > -	WARN_ON(root_level > PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
> > > +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!root || (root->role.level < 1) ||
> > > +			 (root->role.level > PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL))) {
> > > +		iter->valid = false;
> > > +		return;
> > > +	}
> > >  
> > 
> > I saw many usages of WARN_ON_ONCE() and WARN_ON() in KVM. And just wonder,
> > is there any criteria for KVM when to use which?
> 
> Heh, already a step ahead of you :-)
> 
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230721230006.2337941-5-seanjc@google.com

Haha! That patch lies just above this series, and the explanation is very
convincing. :) Thanks! 

B.R.
Yu

  reply	other threads:[~2023-07-26  3:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-07-22  1:23 [PATCH 0/5] KVM: x86/mmu: Don't synthesize triple fault on bad root Sean Christopherson
2023-07-22  1:23 ` [PATCH 1/5] KVM: x86/mmu: Add helper to convert root hpa to shadow page Sean Christopherson
2023-07-22  1:23 ` [PATCH 2/5] KVM: x86/mmu: Harden new PGD against roots without shadow pages Sean Christopherson
2023-07-22  1:23 ` [PATCH 3/5] KVM: x86/mmu: Harden TDP MMU iteration against root w/o shadow page Sean Christopherson
2023-07-25 10:39   ` Yu Zhang
2023-07-25 15:56     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-26  3:55       ` Yu Zhang [this message]
2023-07-22  1:23 ` [PATCH 4/5] KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow guest from using !visible slots for page tables Sean Christopherson
2023-07-22  1:23 ` [PATCH 5/5] KVM: x86/mmu: Use dummy root, backed by zero page, for !visible guest roots Sean Christopherson
2023-07-25 11:36   ` Yu Zhang
2023-07-25 15:53     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-26  9:20       ` Yu Zhang

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