From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <bp@alien8.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
<pgonda@google.com>, <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 12/16] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception for Secure TSC enabled guests
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 20:43:54 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231220151358.2147066-13-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231220151358.2147066-1-nikunj@amd.com>
The hypervisor should not be intercepting RDTSC/RDTSCP when Secure TSC
is enabled. A #VC exception will be generated if the RDTSC/RDTSCP
instructions are being intercepted. If this should occur and Secure
TSC is enabled, terminate guest execution.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
index ccb0915e84e1..716aea6fc90c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
@@ -991,6 +991,16 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_rdtsc(struct ghcb *ghcb,
bool rdtscp = (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP);
enum es_result ret;
+ /*
+ * RDTSC and RDTSCP should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is
+ * enabled. Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled.
+ * This file is included from kernel/sev.c and boot/compressed/sev.c,
+ * use sev_status here as cpu_feature_enabled() is not available when
+ * compiling boot/compressed/sev.c.
+ */
+ if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC)
+ return ES_VMM_ERROR;
+
ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, exit_code, 0, 0);
if (ret != ES_OK)
return ret;
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-12-20 15:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-20 15:13 [PATCH v7 00/16] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 01/16] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25 10:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27 3:54 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 02/16] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 03/16] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25 11:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27 4:01 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-01-31 13:58 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-01 10:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-01 11:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-01 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-02 3:50 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-02 16:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-05 9:23 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-06 10:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 21:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27 4:05 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 04/16] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 05/16] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 06/16] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-26 22:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27 4:06 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 07/16] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 08/16] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 09/16] x86/cpufeatures: Add synthetic Secure TSC bit Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 10/16] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-01 15:46 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-01 15:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 11/16] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 13/16] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 14/16] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 15/16] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 16/16] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25 6:08 ` [PATCH v7 00/16] Add Secure TSC support " Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-01-26 1:00 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-01-27 4:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20231220151358.2147066-13-nikunj@amd.com \
--to=nikunj@amd.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=dionnaglaze@google.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=pgonda@google.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox