From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Daniel P . Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"Markus Armbruster" <armbru@redhat.com>,
"Pankaj Gupta" <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>,
"Xiaoyao Li" <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
"Isaku Yamahata" <isaku.yamahata@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 47/49] hw/i386/sev: Add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2024 03:39:43 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240320083945.991426-48-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240320083945.991426-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
TODO: Brijesh as author, me as co-author (vice-versa depending)
drop flash handling? we only support BIOS now
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 12 +++++++-----
hw/i386/x86.c | 2 +-
include/hw/i386/x86.h | 2 +-
target/i386/sev-sysemu-stub.c | 2 +-
target/i386/sev.c | 15 +++++++++++----
target/i386/sev.h | 2 +-
6 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c b/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
index 3efabbbab2..9dbb3f7337 100644
--- a/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
+++ b/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ static void pc_system_flash_map(PCMachineState *pcms,
assert(PC_MACHINE_GET_CLASS(pcms)->pci_enabled);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pcms->flash); i++) {
+ hwaddr gpa;
+
system_flash = pcms->flash[i];
blk = pflash_cfi01_get_blk(system_flash);
if (!blk) {
@@ -178,11 +180,11 @@ static void pc_system_flash_map(PCMachineState *pcms,
}
total_size += size;
+ gpa = 0x100000000ULL - total_size; /* where the flash is mapped */
qdev_prop_set_uint32(DEVICE(system_flash), "num-blocks",
size / FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
sysbus_realize_and_unref(SYS_BUS_DEVICE(system_flash), &error_fatal);
- sysbus_mmio_map(SYS_BUS_DEVICE(system_flash), 0,
- 0x100000000ULL - total_size);
+ sysbus_mmio_map(SYS_BUS_DEVICE(system_flash), 0, gpa);
if (i == 0) {
flash_mem = pflash_cfi01_get_memory(system_flash);
@@ -192,7 +194,7 @@ static void pc_system_flash_map(PCMachineState *pcms,
if (sev_enabled()) {
flash_ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(flash_mem);
flash_size = memory_region_size(flash_mem);
- x86_firmware_configure(flash_ptr, flash_size);
+ x86_firmware_configure(gpa, flash_ptr, flash_size);
}
}
}
@@ -245,7 +247,7 @@ void pc_system_firmware_init(PCMachineState *pcms,
pc_system_flash_cleanup_unused(pcms);
}
-void x86_firmware_configure(void *ptr, int size)
+void x86_firmware_configure(hwaddr gpa, void *ptr, int size)
{
int ret;
@@ -262,6 +264,6 @@ void x86_firmware_configure(void *ptr, int size)
exit(1);
}
- sev_encrypt_flash(ptr, size, &error_fatal);
+ sev_encrypt_flash(gpa, ptr, size, &error_fatal);
}
}
diff --git a/hw/i386/x86.c b/hw/i386/x86.c
index 825dc4c735..e3ddc39133 100644
--- a/hw/i386/x86.c
+++ b/hw/i386/x86.c
@@ -1161,7 +1161,7 @@ void x86_bios_rom_init(MachineState *ms, const char *default_firmware,
*/
void *ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(bios);
load_image_size(filename, ptr, bios_size);
- x86_firmware_configure(ptr, bios_size);
+ x86_firmware_configure(0x100000000ULL - bios_size, ptr, bios_size);
} else {
if (!isapc_ram_fw) {
memory_region_set_readonly(bios, true);
diff --git a/include/hw/i386/x86.h b/include/hw/i386/x86.h
index 4dc30dcb4d..53dfd95cb2 100644
--- a/include/hw/i386/x86.h
+++ b/include/hw/i386/x86.h
@@ -143,6 +143,6 @@ void ioapic_init_gsi(GSIState *gsi_state, Object *parent);
DeviceState *ioapic_init_secondary(GSIState *gsi_state);
/* pc_sysfw.c */
-void x86_firmware_configure(void *ptr, int size);
+void x86_firmware_configure(hwaddr gpa, void *ptr, int size);
#endif
diff --git a/target/i386/sev-sysemu-stub.c b/target/i386/sev-sysemu-stub.c
index 96e1c15cc3..6af643e3a1 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev-sysemu-stub.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev-sysemu-stub.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ void qmp_sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *packet_header, const char *secret,
error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
}
-int sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)
+int sev_encrypt_flash(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)
{
g_assert_not_reached();
}
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index e2506f74da..d8e6aba67c 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -1449,7 +1449,7 @@ err:
}
int
-sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)
+sev_encrypt_flash(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)
{
SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
@@ -1459,7 +1459,14 @@ sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)
/* if SEV is in update state then encrypt the data else do nothing */
if (sev_check_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE)) {
- int ret = sev_launch_update_data(SEV_GUEST(sev_common), ptr, len);
+ int ret;
+
+ if (sev_snp_enabled()) {
+ ret = snp_launch_update_data(gpa, ptr, len,
+ KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ } else {
+ ret = sev_launch_update_data(SEV_GUEST(sev_common), ptr, len);
+ }
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "SEV: Failed to encrypt pflash rom");
return ret;
@@ -1829,8 +1836,8 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
}
if (build_kernel_loader_hashes(padded_ht, ctx, errp)) {
- if (sev_encrypt_flash((uint8_t *)padded_ht, sizeof(*padded_ht),
- errp) < 0) {
+ if (sev_encrypt_flash(area->base, (uint8_t *)padded_ht,
+ sizeof(*padded_ht), errp) < 0) {
ret = false;
}
} else {
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.h b/target/i386/sev.h
index 5cbfc3365b..d570777769 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.h
+++ b/target/i386/sev.h
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ uint32_t sev_get_cbit_position(void);
uint32_t sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void);
bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp);
-int sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp);
+int sev_encrypt_flash(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp);
int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
uint64_t gpa, Error **errp);
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-20 8:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 109+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-03-20 8:38 [PATCH RFC v3 00/49] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:38 ` [PATCH v3 01/49] Revert "linux-headers hack" from sevinit2 base tree Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:38 ` [PATCH v3 02/49] scripts/update-linux-headers: Add setup_data.h to import list Michael Roth
2024-03-20 9:19 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-20 8:38 ` [PATCH v3 03/49] scripts/update-linux-headers: Add bits.h to file imports Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 04/49] [HACK] linux-headers: Update headers for 6.8 + kvm-coco-queue + SNP Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 05/49] [TEMP] hw/i386: Remove redeclaration of struct setup_data Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 06/49] RAMBlock: Add support of KVM private guest memfd Michael Roth
2024-03-20 16:38 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 07/49] HostMem: Add mechanism to opt in kvm guest memfd via MachineState Michael Roth
2025-01-21 17:39 ` Peter Xu
2025-01-21 18:24 ` David Hildenbrand
2025-01-21 20:21 ` Peter Xu
2025-01-21 20:41 ` David Hildenbrand
2025-01-21 20:59 ` Peter Xu
2025-01-21 21:00 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 08/49] trace/kvm: Split address space and slot id in trace_kvm_set_user_memory() Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 09/49] kvm: Enable KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2 for memslot Michael Roth
2024-03-20 15:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 10/49] kvm: Introduce support for memory_attributes Michael Roth
2024-03-20 16:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 11/49] physmem: Introduce ram_block_discard_guest_memfd_range() Michael Roth
2024-03-20 9:37 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-03-20 12:43 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-20 12:58 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-03-20 17:38 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-20 20:04 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-03-21 20:24 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 12/49] kvm: handle KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 13/49] [FIXUP] "kvm: handle KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT": drop qemu_host_page_size Michael Roth
2024-03-20 12:46 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 14/49] trace/kvm: Add trace for page convertion between shared and private Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 15/49] kvm/memory: Make memory type private by default if it has guest memfd backend Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 16/49] memory: Introduce memory_region_init_ram_guest_memfd() Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 17/49] pci-host/q35: Move PAM initialization above SMRAM initialization Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 18/49] q35: Introduce smm_ranges property for q35-pci-host Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 19/49] kvm: Make kvm_convert_memory() obey ram_block_discard_is_enabled() Michael Roth
2024-03-20 16:26 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-20 19:47 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 20/49] trace/kvm: Add trace for KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 21/49] i386/sev: Introduce "sev-common" type to encapsulate common SEV state Michael Roth
2024-03-20 11:44 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-03-20 21:36 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-27 15:22 ` Markus Armbruster
2024-03-20 11:47 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-03-20 21:45 ` Michael Roth
2024-04-22 13:06 ` Markus Armbruster
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 22/49] i386/sev: Introduce 'sev-snp-guest' object Michael Roth
2024-03-20 11:58 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-03-20 22:09 ` Michael Roth
2024-04-22 13:52 ` Markus Armbruster
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 23/49] i386/sev: Add a sev_snp_enabled() helper Michael Roth
2024-03-20 12:35 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-03-20 22:11 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 24/49] target/i386: Add handling for KVM_X86_SNP_VM VM type Michael Roth
2024-03-20 9:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 25/49] i386/sev: Skip RAMBlock notifiers for SNP Michael Roth
2024-03-20 9:46 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-20 22:14 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 26/49] i386/sev: Skip machine-init-done " Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 27/49] i386/sev: Set ms->require_guest_memfd " Michael Roth
2024-03-20 9:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 28/49] i386/sev: Disable SMM " Michael Roth
2024-03-20 12:32 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 29/49] i386/sev: Don't disable block discarding " Michael Roth
2024-03-20 12:33 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 30/49] i386/cpu: Set SEV-SNP CPUID bit when SNP enabled Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 31/49] i386/sev: Update query-sev QAPI format to handle SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-03-20 12:10 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-03-20 22:23 ` Michael Roth
2024-04-22 15:01 ` Markus Armbruster
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 32/49] i386/sev: Don't return launch measurements for SEV-SNP guests Michael Roth
2024-03-20 12:15 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-03-20 12:27 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 33/49] kvm: Make kvm_convert_memory() non-static Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 34/49] i386/sev: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT handling for Page State Changes Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 35/49] i386/sev: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT handling for Page State Changes (MSR-based) Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 36/49] i386/sev: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT handling for Extended Guest Requests Michael Roth
2024-04-22 15:02 ` Markus Armbruster
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 37/49] i386/sev: Add the SNP launch start context Michael Roth
2024-03-20 9:58 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-20 22:32 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 38/49] i386/sev: Add handling to encrypt/finalize guest launch data Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 39/49] i386/sev: Set CPU state to protected once SNP guest payload is finalized Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 40/49] hw/i386/sev: Add function to get SEV metadata from OVMF header Michael Roth
2024-03-20 17:55 ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-03-20 22:35 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 41/49] i386/sev: Add support for populating OVMF metadata pages Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 42/49] i386/sev: Add support for SNP CPUID validation Michael Roth
2024-03-20 12:18 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 43/49] qapi, i386: Move kernel-hashes to SevCommonProperties Michael Roth
2024-03-20 12:20 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-04-22 15:03 ` Markus Armbruster
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 44/49] i386/sev: Extract build_kernel_loader_hashes Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 45/49] i386/sev: Reorder struct declarations Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 46/49] i386/sev: Allow measured direct kernel boot on SNP Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2024-03-20 12:22 ` [PATCH v3 47/49] hw/i386/sev: Add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-03-21 13:42 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 48/49] hw/i386/sev: Use guest_memfd for legacy ROMs Michael Roth
2024-03-20 18:12 ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-03-28 0:45 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-04-24 0:08 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-20 8:39 ` [PATCH v3 49/49] hw/i386: Add support for loading BIOS using guest_memfd Michael Roth
2024-03-20 9:59 ` [PATCH RFC v3 00/49] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-20 17:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-20 20:54 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-21 20:26 ` Michael Roth
2024-04-18 11:37 ` Ani Sinha
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