[PATCH v12 28/29] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{PAUSE,RESUME}_ATTESTATION commands

Michael Roth
2024-03-31T16:46:22Z

These commands can be used to pause servicing of guest attestation
requests. This useful when updating the reported TCB or signing key with
commands such as SNP_SET_CONFIG/SNP_COMMIT/SNP_VLEK_LOAD, since they may
in turn require updates to userspace-supplied certificates, and if an
attestation request happens to be in-flight at the time those updates
are occurring there is potential for a guest to receive a certificate
blob that is out of sync with the effective signing key for the
attestation report.

These interfaces also provide some versatility with how similar
firmware/certificate update activities can be handled in the future.

Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 4 +++
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h | 12 +++++++
5 files changed, 154 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst b/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
index e1eaf6a830ce..dd5cf2098afd 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
@@ -128,8 +128,6 @@ the SEV-SNP specification for further details.

The SNP_GET_EXT_REPORT ioctl is similar to the SNP_GET_REPORT. The difference is
related to the additional certificate data that is returned with the report.
-The certificate data returned is being provided by the hypervisor through the
-SNP_SET_EXT_CONFIG.

The ioctl uses the SNP_GUEST_REQUEST (MSG_REPORT_REQ) command provided by the SEV-SNP
firmware to get the attestation report.
@@ -176,6 +174,54 @@ to SNP_CONFIG command defined in the SEV-SNP spec. The current values of
the firmware parameters affected by this command can be queried via
SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS.

+2.7 SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION / SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION
+--------------------------------------------------
+:Technology: sev-snp
+:Type: hypervisor ioctl cmd
+:Parameters (out): struct sev_user_data_snp_pause_transaction
+:Returns (out): 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+When requesting attestation reports, SNP guests have the option of issuing
+an extended guest request which allows host userspace to supply additional
+certificate data that can be used to validate the signature used to sign
+the attestation report. This signature is generated using a key that is
+derived from the reported TCB that can be set via the SNP_SET_CONFIG and
+SNP_COMMIT ioctls, so the accompanying certificate data needs to be kept in
+sync with the changes made to the reported TCB via these ioctls.
+
+Similarly, interfaces like SNP_LOAD_VLEK can modify the key used to sign
+the attestation reports, which may in turn require updating the certificate
+data provided to guests via extended guest requests.
+
+To allow for updating the reported TCB, endorsement key, and any certificate
+data in a manner that is atomic to guests, the SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION and
+SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION commands are provided.
+
+After SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION is issued, any attestation report requests via
+extended guest requests that are in-progress, or received after
+SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION is issued, will result in the guest receiving a
+GHCB-defined error message instructing it to retry the request. Once all
+the desired reported TCB, endorsement keys, or certificate data updates
+are completed on the host, the SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION command must be
+issued to allow guest attestation requests to proceed.
+
+In general, hosts should serialize updates of this sort and never have more
+than 1 outstanding transaction in flight that could result in the
+interleaving of multiple SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION/SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION pairs.
+To guard against this, SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION will fail if another process
+has already paused attestation requests.
+
+However, there may be occassions where a transaction needs to be aborted due
+to unexpected activity in userspace such as timeouts, crashes, etc., so
+SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION will always succeed. Nonetheless, this could
+potentially lead to SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION being called out of sequence, so
+to allow for callers of SNP_{PAUSE,RESUME}_ATTESTATION to detect such
+occurrences, each ioctl will return a transaction ID in the response so the
+caller can monitor whether the start/end ID both match. If they don't, the
+caller should assume that attestation has been paused/resumed unexpectedly,
+and take whatever measures it deems necessary such as logging, reporting,
+auditing the sequence of events.
+
3. SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
============================

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 234a998e2d2d..975e92005438 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -272,6 +272,8 @@ int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 asid, bool immut
int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level);
void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages);
void kdump_sev_callback(void);
+int snp_pause_attestation(u64 *transaction_id);
+void snp_resume_attestation(u64 *transaction_id);
#else
static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
static inline int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) { return -ENODEV; }
@@ -285,6 +287,8 @@ static inline int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 as
static inline int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { return -ENODEV; }
static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { }
+static inline int snp_pause_attestation(u64 *transaction_id) { return 0; }
+static inline void snp_resume_attestation(u64 *transaction_id) {}
#endif

#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index ab0e8448bb6e..09d62870306b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);

static unsigned long snp_nr_leaked_pages;

+/* For synchronizing TCB/certificate updates with extended guest requests */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(snp_pause_attestation_lock);
+static u64 snp_transaction_id;
+static bool snp_attestation_paused;
+
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-SNP: " fmt

@@ -568,3 +573,41 @@ void kdump_sev_callback(void)
if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
wbinvd();
}
+
+int snp_pause_attestation(u64 *transaction_id)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&snp_pause_attestation_lock);
+
+ if (snp_attestation_paused) {
+ mutex_unlock(&snp_pause_attestation_lock);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The actual transaction ID update will happen when
+ * snp_resume_attestation() is called, so return
+ * the *anticipated* transaction ID that will be
+ * returned by snp_resume_attestation(). This is
+ * to ensure that unbalanced/aborted transactions will
+ * be noticeable when the caller that started the
+ * transaction calls snp_resume_attestation().
+ */
+ *transaction_id = snp_transaction_id + 1;
+ snp_attestation_paused = true;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&snp_pause_attestation_lock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_pause_attestation);
+
+void snp_resume_attestation(u64 *transaction_id)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&snp_pause_attestation_lock);
+
+ snp_attestation_paused = false;
+ *transaction_id = ++snp_transaction_id;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&snp_pause_attestation_lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_resume_attestation);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index 97a7959406ee..7eb18a273731 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -2060,6 +2060,47 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_vlek_load(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
return ret;
}

+static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_pause_attestation(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
+{
+ struct sev_user_data_snp_pause_attestation transaction = {0};
+ struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!sev->snp_initialized || !argp->data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!writable)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ ret = snp_pause_attestation(&transaction.id);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)argp->data, &transaction, sizeof(transaction)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_resume_attestation(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
+{
+ struct sev_user_data_snp_pause_attestation transaction = {0};
+ struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
+
+ if (!sev->snp_initialized || !argp->data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!writable)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ snp_resume_attestation(&transaction.id);
+
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)argp->data, &transaction, sizeof(transaction)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
@@ -2123,6 +2164,12 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
case SNP_VLEK_LOAD:
ret = sev_ioctl_do_snp_vlek_load(&input, writable);
break;
+ case SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION:
+ ret = sev_ioctl_do_snp_pause_attestation(&input, writable);
+ break;
+ case SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION:
+ ret = sev_ioctl_do_snp_resume_attestation(&input, writable);
+ break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
index 2289b7c76c59..7b35b2814a99 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ enum {
SNP_COMMIT,
SNP_SET_CONFIG,
SNP_VLEK_LOAD,
+ SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION,
+ SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION,

SEV_MAX,
};
@@ -241,6 +243,16 @@ struct sev_user_data_snp_wrapped_vlek_hashstick {
__u8 data[432]; /* In */
} __packed;

+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_snp_pause_attestation - metadata for pausing attestation
+ *
+ * @id: the ID of the transaction started/ended by a call to SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION
+ * or SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION, respectively.
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_snp_pause_attestation {
+ __u64 id; /* Out */
+} __packed;
+
/**
* struct sev_issue_cmd - SEV ioctl parameters
*
--
2.25.1

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From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
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<pankaj.gupta@amd.com>, <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Subject: [PATCH v12 28/29] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{PAUSE,RESUME}_ATTESTATION commands
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2024 17:58:34 -0500
Message-ID: <20240329225835.400662-29-michael.roth@amd.com>
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These commands can be used to pause servicing of guest attestation
requests. This useful when updating the reported TCB or signing key with
commands such as SNP_SET_CONFIG/SNP_COMMIT/SNP_VLEK_LOAD, since they may
in turn require updates to userspace-supplied certificates, and if an
attestation request happens to be in-flight at the time those updates
are occurring there is potential for a guest to receive a certificate
blob that is out of sync with the effective signing key for the
attestation report.

These interfaces also provide some versatility with how similar
firmware/certificate update activities can be handled in the future.

Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 4 +++
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h | 12 +++++++
5 files changed, 154 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst b/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
index e1eaf6a830ce..dd5cf2098afd 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
@@ -128,8 +128,6 @@ the SEV-SNP specification for further details.

The SNP_GET_EXT_REPORT ioctl is similar to the SNP_GET_REPORT. The difference is
related to the additional certificate data that is returned with the report.
-The certificate data returned is being provided by the hypervisor through the
-SNP_SET_EXT_CONFIG.

The ioctl uses the SNP_GUEST_REQUEST (MSG_REPORT_REQ) command provided by the SEV-SNP
firmware to get the attestation report.
@@ -176,6 +174,54 @@ to SNP_CONFIG command defined in the SEV-SNP spec. The current values of
the firmware parameters affected by this command can be queried via
SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS.

+2.7 SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION / SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION
+--------------------------------------------------
+:Technology: sev-snp
+:Type: hypervisor ioctl cmd
+:Parameters (out): struct sev_user_data_snp_pause_transaction
+:Returns (out): 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+When requesting attestation reports, SNP guests have the option of issuing
+an extended guest request which allows host userspace to supply additional
+certificate data that can be used to validate the signature used to sign
+the attestation report. This signature is generated using a key that is
+derived from the reported TCB that can be set via the SNP_SET_CONFIG and
+SNP_COMMIT ioctls, so the accompanying certificate data needs to be kept in
+sync with the changes made to the reported TCB via these ioctls.
+
+Similarly, interfaces like SNP_LOAD_VLEK can modify the key used to sign
+the attestation reports, which may in turn require updating the certificate
+data provided to guests via extended guest requests.
+
+To allow for updating the reported TCB, endorsement key, and any certificate
+data in a manner that is atomic to guests, the SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION and
+SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION commands are provided.
+
+After SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION is issued, any attestation report requests via
+extended guest requests that are in-progress, or received after
+SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION is issued, will result in the guest receiving a
+GHCB-defined error message instructing it to retry the request. Once all
+the desired reported TCB, endorsement keys, or certificate data updates
+are completed on the host, the SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION command must be
+issued to allow guest attestation requests to proceed.
+
+In general, hosts should serialize updates of this sort and never have more
+than 1 outstanding transaction in flight that could result in the
+interleaving of multiple SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION/SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION pairs.
+To guard against this, SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION will fail if another process
+has already paused attestation requests.
+
+However, there may be occassions where a transaction needs to be aborted due
+to unexpected activity in userspace such as timeouts, crashes, etc., so
+SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION will always succeed. Nonetheless, this could
+potentially lead to SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION being called out of sequence, so
+to allow for callers of SNP_{PAUSE,RESUME}_ATTESTATION to detect such
+occurrences, each ioctl will return a transaction ID in the response so the
+caller can monitor whether the start/end ID both match. If they don't, the
+caller should assume that attestation has been paused/resumed unexpectedly,
+and take whatever measures it deems necessary such as logging, reporting,
+auditing the sequence of events.
+
3. SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
============================

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 234a998e2d2d..975e92005438 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -272,6 +272,8 @@ int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 asid, bool immut
int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level);
void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages);
void kdump_sev_callback(void);
+int snp_pause_attestation(u64 *transaction_id);
+void snp_resume_attestation(u64 *transaction_id);
#else
static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
static inline int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) { return -ENODEV; }
@@ -285,6 +287,8 @@ static inline int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 as
static inline int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { return -ENODEV; }
static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { }
+static inline int snp_pause_attestation(u64 *transaction_id) { return 0; }
+static inline void snp_resume_attestation(u64 *transaction_id) {}
#endif

#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index ab0e8448bb6e..09d62870306b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);

static unsigned long snp_nr_leaked_pages;

+/* For synchronizing TCB/certificate updates with extended guest requests */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(snp_pause_attestation_lock);
+static u64 snp_transaction_id;
+static bool snp_attestation_paused;
+
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-SNP: " fmt

@@ -568,3 +573,41 @@ void kdump_sev_callback(void)
if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
wbinvd();
}
+
+int snp_pause_attestation(u64 *transaction_id)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&snp_pause_attestation_lock);
+
+ if (snp_attestation_paused) {
+ mutex_unlock(&snp_pause_attestation_lock);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The actual transaction ID update will happen when
+ * snp_resume_attestation() is called, so return
+ * the *anticipated* transaction ID that will be
+ * returned by snp_resume_attestation(). This is
+ * to ensure that unbalanced/aborted transactions will
+ * be noticeable when the caller that started the
+ * transaction calls snp_resume_attestation().
+ */
+ *transaction_id = snp_transaction_id + 1;
+ snp_attestation_paused = true;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&snp_pause_attestation_lock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_pause_attestation);
+
+void snp_resume_attestation(u64 *transaction_id)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&snp_pause_attestation_lock);
+
+ snp_attestation_paused = false;
+ *transaction_id = ++snp_transaction_id;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&snp_pause_attestation_lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_resume_attestation);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index 97a7959406ee..7eb18a273731 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -2060,6 +2060,47 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_vlek_load(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
return ret;
}

+static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_pause_attestation(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
+{
+ struct sev_user_data_snp_pause_attestation transaction = {0};
+ struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!sev->snp_initialized || !argp->data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!writable)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ ret = snp_pause_attestation(&transaction.id);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)argp->data, &transaction, sizeof(transaction)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_resume_attestation(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
+{
+ struct sev_user_data_snp_pause_attestation transaction = {0};
+ struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
+
+ if (!sev->snp_initialized || !argp->data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!writable)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ snp_resume_attestation(&transaction.id);
+
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)argp->data, &transaction, sizeof(transaction)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
@@ -2123,6 +2164,12 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
case SNP_VLEK_LOAD:
ret = sev_ioctl_do_snp_vlek_load(&input, writable);
break;
+ case SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION:
+ ret = sev_ioctl_do_snp_pause_attestation(&input, writable);
+ break;
+ case SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION:
+ ret = sev_ioctl_do_snp_resume_attestation(&input, writable);
+ break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
index 2289b7c76c59..7b35b2814a99 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ enum {
SNP_COMMIT,
SNP_SET_CONFIG,
SNP_VLEK_LOAD,
+ SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION,
+ SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION,

SEV_MAX,
};
@@ -241,6 +243,16 @@ struct sev_user_data_snp_wrapped_vlek_hashstick {
__u8 data[432]; /* In */
} __packed;

+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_snp_pause_attestation - metadata for pausing attestation
+ *
+ * @id: the ID of the transaction started/ended by a call to SNP_PAUSE_ATTESTATION
+ * or SNP_RESUME_ATTESTATION, respectively.
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_snp_pause_attestation {
+ __u64 id; /* Out */
+} __packed;
+
/**
* struct sev_issue_cmd - SEV ioctl parameters
*
--
2.25.1