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From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
	Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>,
	Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>,
	Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 07/10] s390/uv: convert uv_destroy_owned_page() to uv_destroy_(folio|pte)()
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 16:21:17 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240412142120.220087-8-david@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240412142120.220087-1-david@redhat.com>

Let's have the following variants for destroying pages:

(1) uv_destroy(): Like uv_pin_shared() and uv_convert_from_secure(),
"low level" helper that operates on paddr and doesn't mess with folios.

(2) uv_destroy_folio(): Consumes a folio to which we hold a reference.

(3) uv_destroy_pte(): Consumes a PTE that holds a reference through the
mapping.

Unfortunately we need uv_destroy_pte(), because pfn_folio() and
friends are not available in pgtable.h.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
---
 arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h |  2 +-
 arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h      | 10 ++++++++--
 arch/s390/kernel/uv.c           | 24 +++++++++++++++++-------
 arch/s390/mm/gmap.c             |  6 ++++--
 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 60950e7a25f5..97e040617c29 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1199,7 +1199,7 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	 * The notifier should have destroyed all protected vCPUs at this
 	 * point, so the destroy should be successful.
 	 */
-	if (full && !uv_destroy_owned_page(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK))
+	if (full && !uv_destroy_pte(res))
 		return res;
 	/*
 	 * If something went wrong and the page could not be destroyed, or
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
index d2205ff97007..a1bef30066ef 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
@@ -483,7 +483,8 @@ static inline int is_prot_virt_host(void)
 int uv_pin_shared(unsigned long paddr);
 int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb);
 int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr);
-int uv_destroy_owned_page(unsigned long paddr);
+int uv_destroy_folio(struct folio *folio);
+int uv_destroy_pte(pte_t pte);
 int uv_convert_owned_from_secure(unsigned long paddr);
 int gmap_convert_to_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr);
 
@@ -497,7 +498,12 @@ static inline int uv_pin_shared(unsigned long paddr)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int uv_destroy_owned_page(unsigned long paddr)
+static inline int uv_destroy_folio(struct folio *folio)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int uv_destroy_pte(pte_t pte)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
index 3d3250b406a6..61c1ce51c883 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_pin_shared);
  *
  * @paddr: Absolute host address of page to be destroyed
  */
-static int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr)
+static int uv_destroy(unsigned long paddr)
 {
 	struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb = {
 		.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_DESTR_SEC_STOR,
@@ -131,11 +131,10 @@ static int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr)
 }
 
 /*
- * The caller must already hold a reference to the page
+ * The caller must already hold a reference to the folio
  */
-int uv_destroy_owned_page(unsigned long paddr)
+int uv_destroy_folio(struct folio *folio)
 {
-	struct folio *folio = phys_to_folio(paddr);
 	int rc;
 
 	/* See gmap_make_secure(): large folios cannot be secure */
@@ -143,13 +142,22 @@ int uv_destroy_owned_page(unsigned long paddr)
 		return 0;
 
 	folio_get(folio);
-	rc = uv_destroy_page(paddr);
+	rc = uv_destroy(folio_to_phys(folio));
 	if (!rc)
 		clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags);
 	folio_put(folio);
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/*
+ * The present PTE still indirectly holds a folio reference through the mapping.
+ */
+int uv_destroy_pte(pte_t pte)
+{
+	VM_WARN_ON(!pte_present(pte));
+	return uv_destroy_folio(pfn_folio(pte_pfn(pte)));
+}
+
 /*
  * Requests the Ultravisor to encrypt a guest page and make it
  * accessible to the host for paging (export).
@@ -437,6 +445,7 @@ int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr)
 {
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 	unsigned long uaddr;
+	struct folio *folio;
 	struct page *page;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -460,7 +469,8 @@ int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr)
 	page = follow_page(vma, uaddr, FOLL_WRITE | FOLL_GET);
 	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(page))
 		goto out;
-	rc = uv_destroy_owned_page(page_to_phys(page));
+	folio = page_folio(page);
+	rc = uv_destroy_folio(folio);
 	/*
 	 * Fault handlers can race; it is possible that two CPUs will fault
 	 * on the same secure page. One CPU can destroy the page, reboot,
@@ -472,7 +482,7 @@ int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr)
 	 */
 	if (rc)
 		rc = uv_convert_owned_from_secure(page_to_phys(page));
-	put_page(page);
+	folio_put(folio);
 out:
 	mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm);
 	return rc;
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
index 094b43b121cd..0351cb139df4 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
@@ -2756,13 +2756,15 @@ static const struct mm_walk_ops gather_pages_ops = {
  */
 void s390_uv_destroy_pfns(unsigned long count, unsigned long *pfns)
 {
+	struct folio *folio;
 	unsigned long i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		folio = pfn_folio(pfns[i]);
 		/* we always have an extra reference */
-		uv_destroy_owned_page(pfn_to_phys(pfns[i]));
+		uv_destroy_folio(folio);
 		/* get rid of the extra reference */
-		put_page(pfn_to_page(pfns[i]));
+		folio_put(folio);
 		cond_resched();
 	}
 }
-- 
2.44.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-12 14:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-12 14:21 [PATCH v2 00/10] s390: PG_arch_1+folio cleanups for uv+hugetlb David Hildenbrand
2024-04-12 14:21 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] s390/uv: don't call folio_wait_writeback() without a folio reference David Hildenbrand
2024-04-12 14:21 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] s390/uv: gmap_make_secure() cleanups for further changes David Hildenbrand
2024-05-07 15:27   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2024-04-12 14:21 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] s390/uv: split large folios in gmap_make_secure() David Hildenbrand
2024-05-07 15:43   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2024-04-12 14:21 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] s390/uv: convert PG_arch_1 users to only work on small folios David Hildenbrand
2024-05-07 15:49   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2024-04-12 14:21 ` [PATCH v2 05/10] s390/uv: update PG_arch_1 comment David Hildenbrand
2024-04-12 14:21 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] s390/uv: make uv_convert_from_secure() a static function David Hildenbrand
2024-05-07 15:53   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2024-04-12 14:21 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2024-05-07 16:25   ` [PATCH v2 07/10] s390/uv: convert uv_destroy_owned_page() to uv_destroy_(folio|pte)() Claudio Imbrenda
2024-04-12 14:21 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] s390/uv: convert uv_convert_owned_from_secure() to uv_convert_from_secure_(folio|pte)() David Hildenbrand
2024-05-07 16:26   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2024-04-12 14:21 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] s390/uv: implement HAVE_ARCH_MAKE_FOLIO_ACCESSIBLE David Hildenbrand
2024-05-07 16:29   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2024-04-12 14:21 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] s390/hugetlb: convert PG_arch_1 code to work on folio->flags David Hildenbrand
2024-05-07 16:33   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2024-05-08 18:08     ` David Hildenbrand
2024-05-10  8:45       ` Claudio Imbrenda
2024-04-30 18:49 ` [PATCH v2 00/10] s390: PG_arch_1+folio cleanups for uv+hugetlb David Hildenbrand
2024-05-06  8:38   ` Heiko Carstens
2024-05-07 16:34     ` Claudio Imbrenda

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